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Exploring challenges of driving innovation in an established firm

A case study of explorative initiatives

Master's thesis in Management and Economics of Innovation

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Abstract

Ambidextrous organizations that successfully manage to balance exploration and exploitation prove to succeed in establishing a long term viability for their business. Tetra Pak, and more specifically their Services department, aims to pursue organizational ambidexterity in different ways, where one initiative called Fast Forward Services encompasses the challenges and opportunities of ambidexterity by introducing exploration. As the initiative, driven by trainees, aimed to challenge the status quo in terms of facilitating grassroot innovation through an Innovation Challenge, it is the epitome of exploring in an established firm. Thereby, the thesis focuses on how the initiative relates to Services ability to become increasingly ambidextrous, and what factors that affect the development and outcome of the initiative.

Through conducting 22 semi-structured interviews with employees within different organizational levels of Tetra Pak, patterns that thematic analysis showcased could portray the various aspects of driving ambidextrous initiatives in an established firm, thereby answering the research questions.

Results from the thesis shows that established companies struggle with organizational ambidexterity, as their strong exploitative capabilities that generated their success becomes a hindrance for exploration. Aspects for established companies to consider in pursuit of strengthened ambidexterity are discussed, where clear visions and commitment from management combined with increased learning culture are significant areas to consider for managerial practices. These recommendations can be applied to, not only the analyzed initiative and Innovation Challenge, but also for further ambidextrous efforts that established firms may pursue.

Keywords: Ambidexterity, Innovation culture, Boundary spanning, Integration, Tensions, Organizational learning

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Ludvig Holländer Nyström *Noa Tholén*

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List of Acronyms

D&T	Development & Technology
ELT	Executive Leadership Team
FFE	Fuzzy Front End
FFS	Fast Forward Services
FT	Future Talent
IC	Innovation Challenge
IO	Individual Objective
NPD	New Product Development
POC	Proof Of Concept
PS	Packaging Solutions
PSE	Processing Solutions & Equipment
R&D	Research & Development
RI	Radical Innovation
ROI	Return On Investment
SLM	Solution Lifecycle Management
SLT	Services Leadership Team

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1 Introduction

The introduction chapter will present the background of the thesis, as well as aim and scope, research questions and the delimitations that have been chosen.

1.1 Background

Innovative activities are becoming increasingly important for companies to differentiate themselves from their competitors (Anthony et al., 2008), with many challenges that arise regarding sustainability and other areas (Leach et al., 2012). Furthermore, as the product life cycle becomes increasingly shorter, earlier previous development processes and targets become inept to position the organization competitively within the competitive landscape (Atuahene-Gima, 2005).

Innovation literature enforce the importance on ambidexterity for companies to stay competitive and profitable in the long term, which relates to factors such as company culture, securing future business and several other aspects (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2011). Moreover, established firms tend to face additional challenges in reinventing themselves and pursuing innovations, as they are geared towards exploiting their current business, which is built on initial innovation (O'Connor, 2016). The classic examples of established organizations such as Kodak and Facit are well known examples of such pitfalls, failing to balance exploiting current business and exploring new (Louafi Akraouach, 2019; Fundin et al., 2017). Research shows that up to 80% of firms underestimate the importance of exploration and the benefits that it generates (Uotila et al., 2009).

A company which is interested in exploring how to become ambidextrous is Tetra Pak, as have a rich history of innovation, but sees an importance in maintaining the balance between exploiting their current business while still exploring new future business opportunities. Tetra Pak operates in different business areas and has separate organizational branches, with different levels of innovation taking place in each part. The Services organization has evolved from a supportive function to the other core businesses, Packaging Solutions (PS) & Processing Solutions & Equipment (PSE), to becoming a standalone business unit. As Services grows, they are looking for opportunities to create new products and services to provide for their customers. However, as the focus on growth in the Services department has dominated, innovative efforts have been less prominent than in the other two departments Packaging Solutions (PS) and Processing Solutions & Equipment (PSE). As an effort to counteract the decline in innovative initiatives within the Services organization, a group of employees within Tetra Pak took it on themselves to launch an initiative called Fast Forward Services.

With the aim to increase the innovative spirit and capabilities within the Services organization, with providing innovation courses and toolkits, as well as hosting an Innovation

Challenge (IC), the FFS initiative expands into more explorative activities. The IC specifically focused on enabling employees from all geographical locations that Services operate in to contribute to the innovative ideas that are pursued within Services, where their personal engagement, knowledge and competence would act as the major driving forces for new idea development. Processes and structures that were put in place in Services for validation purposes were seen as cumbersome and difficult to engage with, and therefore the IC would catapult ideas and knowledge into the organization by utilizing Minimal Viable Products for experimentation and validation. Services usually follows a stage-gate process for their product and services development pipeline, whereas the IC acted as an innovation funnel designed to pursue several ideas simultaneously in order to fast-forward the enrichment of the innovation portfolio. Implementing a different innovative function into Tetra Pak introduced opportunities for organizational learning, and thereby, there was an interest from Tetra Pak to investigate the FFS initiative, as well as the IC that was conducted within FFS, as it could generate valuable insights for the Services department to delve into.

The FFS initiative, being different in terms of the aim and execution to regular organizational innovation development, entails complexities throughout the innovation culture, management, processes, structure and the innovative scope. There is a need for achieving a balance between tailoring the initiative to fit into the organization for it to be approved, and to maintain the initial purpose of the initiative itself by altering the organization that surrounds it. Adjusting the initiative towards approval processes and stakeholders may expedite the initiative itself resulting in more innovations coming through, but at the potential loss of innovation outcome that would challenge rigid organizational processes.

1.2 Aim and scope

The aim of the study is to analyze the Fast Forward Services initiative as a case study to understand how Services works ambidextrously, and what the initiative has provided to Tetra Pak in terms of exploration. As there are plans to continue with the FFS initiative and conduct further Innovation Challenges, the aim of the study is to understand what aspects affected the initiative and its outcome, as well as how these factors relate to Services' capabilities to achieve organizational ambidexterity. These findings are to contribute towards the understanding of how established firms pursue organizational ambidexterity.

As the FFS initiative took place within and targeted Services, there will not be extensive comparisons between the differences among organizational departments in terms of innovative capabilities, and the innovative performance that comes from it. The Services department will be contrasted with relevant departments, but specific comparisons will not take place in the thesis. The Services department will be the main focus for the study, as the FFS initiative aimed to target Services ability to innovate specifically, and therefore other departments will not be extensively covered.

Determining the true cause of problems that arose during the initiation phase of FFS will not be explicitly accounted for, as it is a sensitive scenario and subject to opinionated answers. Therefore, there will not be any extensive investigations into the definite reasons for why certain events took place, but rather investigating how they relate to the balancing act of organizational ambidexterity.

1.3 Specification of issue under investigation

By combining the case study with the theoretical framework proposed, our research aims to investigate two main research questions.

- How has the Fast Forward Services initiative been driven within Tetra Pak?
- How can the key aspects from the Fast Forward Services initiative shed light on how a company such as Tetra Pak manages organizational ambidexterity?

As the balance between exploring new and exploiting current business is being targeted with the Fast Forward Services initiative, RQ1 aims to investigate how the FFS initiative has been driven in terms of different themes that have affected the initiative and its outcome. Furthermore, RQ2 then aims to generalize the findings from the case study in order to understand how organizational ambidexterity is balanced in established firms, with Tetra Pak as the basis.

1.4 Outline of the report

The thesis initially presents a theoretical framework that presents relevant theories that relate to organizational ambidexterity in established firms, and the challenges that it entails. Then the method is showcased, which culminates in the case description which will be the basis of the thesis. After the case has been concluded, results follow, with FFS specific depictions being the primary chapter, which then is followed by the analysis categories respectively. Following the results, the discussion connecting theoretical concepts with the results commences. The discussion is categorized by specific overarching themes relating to the themes presented in the results. Lastly, the conclusions and managerial implications are presented, providing recommendations and considerations based on the findings.

2 Innovation and the ambidextrous organization

Literature regarding ambidextrous organizations as well as radical innovation have been reviewed in a narrative structure. Two major themes have been identified in the literature which create a foundation for understanding how established firms manage ambidexterity and foster innovative initiatives.

2.1 Innovation in an established firm

For established firms to be successful, there is an essential aspect in repeatedly being able to innovate as a mechanism to disarm the threats that may disrupt their business, as well as to generate new business growth (Anthony et al., 2008). Innovation in established firms comes with two major challenges according to Markides (1998), where the first is that managers have to convince everyone in the established firm of the need and usefulness of a new idea for any success to be had. This is due to the competitive environment that new innovations face against the already established business, and since the innovation might not have established a strong business case in the inception, conveying the importance is essential for the idea to survive (Markides, 1998). Another challenge for established firms is the inability to export several key characteristics of the current business into the new innovation's environment, such as strategy, processes, culture and structures (Markides, 1998). Managing the innovation differently inherently leads to complexities in the firm, and thereby results in a balancing act between allocating resources towards maintaining the current business and pursuing the new innovation (Markides, 1998).

Since business models become increasingly resistant to change (Christensen et al., 2016), established firms have a tendency to be unsuccessful in innovating their business model, as they have to abandon the methods and certainties that their previous success has been based on in favor of new uncertainties (Koen et al., 2011). Established firms therefore have to be able to adapt their innovation strategies to circumstances, as satisfying customers by being market-driven can lead to iteratively improving current business rather than venturing into new business (Utterback, 1996), which describes the polarity of incremental and radical innovations (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005; Stringer, 2000). Radical innovation can be defined as innovations that strongly affect a company's ability to generate new business and reach new markets (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005; Henderson & Clark, 1990), but has a subjective meaning to different scholars (Stringer, 2000). Contrary, incremental innovation relates to innovations that aims to improve current business by altering their portfolio slightly in order to meet customers (Damanpour, 1991) as well as to increase their market dominance (Henderson & Clark, 1990). A major difference between incremental and radical innovations is that incremental innovations mostly reside in the same line of business as the precedent as a way to reinforce organizational capabilities (Henderson & Clark, 1990), but radical innovation can be allocated to either completely new lines of business, current business, or somewhere in between (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). Firms that are able to continuously radically innovate and commercialize upon the outcome gain a significant differentiation advantage over the competitors that do not (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005; Anthony et al., 2008).

However, the evaluation of radical innovations is complex, as managers in established firms generally have a lack of experience in radically innovating in lines outside of their current business, as well as the conflict of interest arising during the potential disruption of their respective business units due to a radical idea (Leifer et al., 2000). Furthermore, as established firms become comfortable with innovating in close proximity to their customers, radical innovations are difficult to derive from this method (Utterback, 1996), which is further obstructed by a success bias in only pursuing projects that align with current business strategy, that actively hinders investments in radical innovation capabilities (O'Connor & DeMartino, 2006). This point is further described by Savignac (2008), where constraints in financing ultimately reduce the likelihood of a company pursuing innovative activities, which then affects their commitments towards radical innovation. Lastly, Leifer et al. (2000) describe several complexities for managers in established firms that relate to radical innovations, which is capturing radical ideas from within the organization, resolving market uncertainties required for business case viability, converting radical projects into products as well as establishing a motivating aspect for individuals to engage.

Several aspects are important to consider for being able to innovate radically in an established firm, where a common understanding of the innovation is essential according to Vitasovic (2014). Considering the necessity of reaching a harmonious coexistence of the old and the new, organizations have to be able to manage the interfaces between where radical innovations take place and the core organization (O'Connor & DeMartino, 2006), acting as a prerequisite for implementing specific innovation programs aimed to radically innovate (R. Kanter, 1985). Furthermore, sustaining momentum and proactively stimulating the respective departments and functions that are to be affected by the innovation development and outcome is needed for commercializing radical innovation (Leifer et al., 2000). Tying back to the evaluation aspect, the scrutiny of radical ideas should optimally be done by managers with experience within the fields the innovation covers and no bias in terms of personal agenda (Leifer et al., 2000). By establishing a platform where identified opportunities can be recognized and evaluated, communicating a coherent vision of innovation, optimizing the organizational interfaces between departments and functions, as well as establishing encouraging reward systems, radical innovations become more manageable (Leifer et al., 2000).

2.2 The ambidextrous organization

Ambidextrous organizations both exploit existing products and explore new opportunities to foster innovation simultaneously (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; M. Tushman et al., 2010). Moreover, ambidexterity is proposed by many as an important capability for an organization to have (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2011; Van Looy et al., 2005), where Bartel and Garud (2009) and Farjoun (2010) deems it as a requirement from an evolutionary perspective. Exploitative activities might lead to short-term profits, but foster eventual stagnation, according to Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009), which opens up for vulnerability to market and technological changes. However, being able to act both exploitatively and exploratively, harvesting value for the short term and sowing new "seeds" for the long term, requires different logics and capabilities within an organization (Van Looy et al., 2005) and is therefore a difficult concept to implement and manage (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) as it creates tensions from different knowledge management processes (March, 1991). Achieving organizational ambidexterity results in a higher degree of ambidexterity than the sum of individual ambidextrous activities (Raisch et al., 2009), based on the concept that ambidextrous managers can integrate exploitative and explorative outcomes into other organizational branches than the place from which they were generated (M. L. Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996).

The performance of ambidextrous organizations relative to focused organizations is discussed by Van Looy et al. (2005), where focused equivalents perform better both in terms of returns and costs for managerial and organizational operations. However, companies who perform ambidextrous activities reinforce the long term sustainability of their business by exploring new opportunities continuously, creating radical innovations (Van Looy et al., 2005). In order for a company to preserve their competitive positioning and advantage, firms have to innovate continuously (Garud et al., 2013) and consider their selection criteria for which innovations to pursue (Goodman & Lawless, 1994).

2.3 Exploitation

Exploitation has, in the literature, been defined in different ways but the essence of its meaning lies in its polarity towards exploration. The activities that are included in exploitation, according to March (1991), relate to efficiency, optimizations, selection, production, commercialization, scalability and execution. A differing aspect between exploration and exploitation lies within their respective technology search activities, where exploitation entails local search whereas exploration is distant search (Benner & Tushman, 2002). Exploration is defined as experimentation with radical novel ideas or processes, whereas exploitation revolves around optimizing current practices (Bierly III & Daly, 2007).

Exploitation is more tied to its consequences due to the speed, proximity and clarity of feedback than exploration is, where a higher degree of uncertainty is characteristic (March, 1991). Results from exploitative activities are expected to be delivering consistent and reliable results, consequently shaping managerial practices towards process improvements and increased control (Chen, 2017). Furthermore, the opportunities for incremental innovations are often derived from the organization itself, where management teams delegate the information search to individuals within the organization (Reid & de Brentani, 2004).

The performance of an organization is influenced by both the potential return of an activity and the current competence of the organization in that activity (March, 1991), which in turn results in the phenomenon of increasing returns to experience, as theorized by Arthur (1984). Additionally, positive local feedback can contribute to companies favoring their current path over new ones (David, 1991), leading to suboptimal equilibria. Moreover, Herriott et al. (1985) suggest that organizations may become competent in an inferior activity to the point where superior activities with less experience are excluded. Over the long run, sustained exploration is essential for the continued intelligence of an organization, making tendencies towards increased exploitation and decreased exploration a potential hindrance to adaptive processes (March, 1991).

2.4 Exploration

Explorative activities include escalated risk-taking and an ignorance of core capabilities (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), as the purpose is to either stretch, transform or develop new capabilities (Chen, 2017). Explorative activities can take place in projects, where they serve as a medium for the interaction and engagement of various organizational actors, thereby facilitating the formation, emergence, and transformation of organizational beliefs, routines, and practices (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 2007; Ravasi & Lojacono, 2005). Different projects compete for access to corporate resources through interacting with top management (Burgelman, 1991; Kaplan, 2008), where the agents can act as either critics, sponsors or stakeholders for the project (Van De Ven & Grazman, 1997). The innovations which arise from explorative activities are oftentimes both initially discovered, structured and explored by individuals (Reid & de Brentani, 2004). Exploration consumes resources and returns uncertain, distant and delayed results, often affecting performance negatively (Chen, 2017).

Activities conducted with explorative efforts stretch, transform or create new capabilities for an organization (Chen, 2017). Radical innovations, being an explorative activity, involve a major shift in the activities undertaken by an organization (Damanpour, 1991) and strongly affect both the market, by offering novel benefits, as well as the firm's potential in generating new business (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). The new businesses derived from radical innovation activities can either be situated within white spaces or one/several lines of current business (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). For incremental innovations, idea generation usually follows strategic decisions (Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1982; Cooper, 1990; Griffin, 1997) while for radical innovations, Reid and de Brentani (2004) argue that the process is inverted as the idea initially is generated by boundary-spanning individuals, which then, when shared with the organization, is positioned strategically.

The early phase of product development includes the ideation phase (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; P. G. Smith & Reinertsen, 1991) which includes recognition and structuring of an opportunity/problem, explorative information search (Leifer et al., 2000; March, 1991; Urban & Hauser, 1980) and later, concept definition and information deep-dives, with potential funding approval (Cooper, 1990; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986; Crawford, 1980; Crawford et al., 2006; Urban & Hauser, 1980). For radical innovations in the early phase of idea development, there is a process for how decisions are made throughout the organization, where different entities take on specific roles which entail different degrees of influence over the process itself, and different time-frames of interacting with the process (Reid & de Brentani, 2004). Firstly, information from the environment is gathered and dissected into problems and opportunities for the organization, where individuals act as boundary spanners to filter the information that permeates into the organization in the gatekeeping role (Reid & de Brentani, 2004). The information taken from the environment is shared with corporate-level decision-makers, either directly or through smaller groups within the organization, making the gatekeeping interface (Reid & de Brentani, 2004).

The critical boundary-spanning role played by individuals is emphasized by Ancona et al. (2002), where "X-teams" specifically are defined by their high levels of external engagement, widely spread internal and external networks, adaptable levels of responsibility, and dynamic membership. These characteristics enable X-teams to effectively execute their tasks and significantly enhance the diffusion of innovation across the organization (Ancona et al., 2002). Lastly, the project interface is reached, where the organization positions the opportunity within its strategic landscape, and initiates a project within that specific area, while appointing project-level decision-makers in the process (Reid & de Brentani, 2004). The impact of organizational influence has been widely underestimated and often disregarded as inconsequential in the initial phases of the idea development stage, where scholars such as Drucker (1999), Mowery and Rosenberg (1999) and Veryzer Jr (1998) have shown that the decision-making of individuals to share information with the organization can hinder the process, and ultimately the firm's involvement in discontinuous innovation. Additionally, the lack of participation or comprehension by senior management, where key strategic, structural, and resource planning takes place, can lead to stagnation in the process (Burgelman & Sayles, 1988; Fusfeld, 1978; Khurana & Rosenthal, 1997). Nevertheless, the sharing of information among the organization is a crucial aspect in the development of collective intuition (Eisenhardt, 1999), hence, it is imperative to examine potential frameworks or procedures (Davenport, 1993) that support organizations in managing the initial idea development process for discontinuous innovations.

In order to sustain long-term success with radical innovations, O'Connor and Ayers (2005) highlight several aspects for organizations to consider. Firstly, for it to happen to begin with, a dedicated group of individuals must be established to facilitate the occurrence of radical innovation. Merely possessing an innovative culture is insufficient for organizations to successfully implement radical innovation, however, a lack of one does not prevent them from doing so either. Moreover, firms must establish a common language for how radical innovations are communicated within the organization. Senior leadership should furthermore be able to muster the courage to focus resources towards uncertain long-term commitments at the expense of short-term growth. Another aspect to consider is the role of market analysts, which need to fairly evaluate and represent the benefits of radical innovations, and champion them on a similar basis as incremental innovations. The concept of championing describes individuals who emerge voluntarily within an organization and plays a significant role in the innovation's development by actively promoting and advocating for it, particularly during its early stages (Achilladelis et al., 1971; Burgelman & Sayles, 1988). Radical innovation systems do not have to be sanctioned by the top management team, as a continuous affirmation of the importance of radical innovations for the firm by mid-level management teams can suffice (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). Radical innovation results in either partly stretched or completely transformed capabilities and processes within the firm, and moreover requires a high amount of acceptance (Damanpour, 1991).

While focus lies on culture change and education in the early stages of RI development, it later on shifts towards competency development and project advancement, as the now changed firm needs to exploit the newly formed RI capability (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). As a radical innovation system evolves, there is a tendency to deviate from the initial goal of pursuing ambitious ventures that possess a greater degree of risk but have the potential to yield long-term benefits. This shift in focus is due to the growing pressure to demonstrate tangible outcomes, which often leads to a reorientation towards more conventional, short-term initiatives that are better aligned with immediate results. Leaders of the radical innovation system must be able to simultaneously manage the group, stakeholder expectations and internal competition for resources while concurrently balancing future potential and present needs. Furthermore, incumbent firms need to acquire talents within new business creation, and make room for this by establishing roles within the firm linked to radical innovation responsibilities. The processes that manage radical innovations need to be based more on entrepreneurial concepts, such as experimentation and uncertainty elements being fundamental, rather than managerial processes, which rely on formal and established stage-gate processes. Adding to this, processes should include coaching and advising within the radical innovation systems, as they then prove to deliver better performance. Lastly, it is essential that the measurements used for incremental innovations differ from ones used in radical innovations, as they do not portray a fair representation of the success achieved (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005).

Four different organizational infrastructures for pursuing radical innovations is showcased by O'Connor and Ayers (2005); idea generators, R&D management systems, self-similar models and mirrored models, which all differ from each other in terms of which routes decision-making takes throughout the business unit, as well as the composition of actors within the structure. In many organizations, radical innovation (RI) systems initiate as idea generation groups, where O'Connor and Ayers (2005) depict the importance of how RI systems are managed. When neglecting the ambitious proposals from an idea generation group, their ability to incubate ideas become increasingly prominent, as a result of dissatisfaction with the lack of investments provided (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005).

Organizations need to manage and ensure cohesive processes between discovery, incubation and acceleration of new businesses in order for the organization to develop successful radical innovation capabilities, according to O'Connor and Ayers (2005). The main components of the discovery competency includes exploratory skills connected to technical as well as scientific discovery, which includes the internal and external search for opportunities and research that supports it (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). After an opportunity has been identified, for it to be able to evolve into a business proposition, sound incubation capabilities are essential, which means experimentative abilities in order to assess the technological, market and strategic fit (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). Once these experiments have resulted in a viable business case, integration commences. Focus shifts towards exploitative skills in order to accelerate growth and establish structures for the business to become self-sufficient within the organizational and market branch, often done by converting early customer leads into sales (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005).

2.5 Challenges with ambidexterity

Ultimately, choosing between exploration and exploitation is either done explicitly or implicitly, where calculated decision-making about competitive strategies or investments are more visible than the underlying organizational forces and customs which also affect the decision (March, 1991). Tensions between explorative and exploitative activities often arise within incumbent firms, according to Van Looy et al. (2005), where the resources and capabilities established for exploitative measures might hamper explorative activities. Building on this, Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) highlight three paradoxes which arise during the tensions between exploration and exploitation; strategic intent, customer orientation and personal drivers, which affect the tensions' intensity within an organization. Strategic intent is the leeway between continuously improving current business for long term customers and the reputation-building explorative activities, which targets new customers, where Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) highlight a conflict between profitability and creativity within firms. Furthermore, customer orientation is a paradox in that tight coupling shifts the focus towards customer needs, while a loose coupling fosters opportunity recognition (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Lastly, the tension regarding personal drivers arise due to the paradoxical nature of unstructured chaos and excessive rigidity pose as opposites (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009).

An issue which arises is how these innovations' performance is being measured, where Van Looy et al. (2005) highlight the importance of achieving a common vision in order to fully grasp the value which the innovation provides, a view which O'Reilly and Tushman (2011) reinforce. Protection of radical innovation is needed (Janos & Rich, 2013) as the tendency to prioritize exploitation over exploration (Benner & Tushman, 2002) often results in resorting to measurement criteria that are unfit for evaluating radical innovations (Christensen et al., 2008). Building on this, if there is a lack of consensus within the management team regarding the importance of ambidexterity, neutral individuals will be steered to resist the ambidextrous initiatives, reducing cooperation, increasing resource competition and slowing down execution (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2011).

2.6 Managing ambidexterity

Managing ambidexterity entails difficulties as introducing parallel structures can partition the organization, but having dual strategies might result in different divisions pursuing opposing goals (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). On the other hand, O'Reilly and Tushman (2011) argue that this parallel structure serves as a foundation for successful ambidexterity. Complementing integrated contexts with differentiation by utilizing parallel organizational structures enables individuals to switch between bureaucratic structure for routine tasks and organic structures for irregular tasks (Adler et al., 1999). The notion of devoting separate business units to exploration and exploitation is also supported by Chen (2017), which becomes structural ambidexterity at the corporate level. Implementing and incubating ideas that arise from explorative activities can be managed by a separate business unit, created intentionally to develop the idea further (Chen, 2017). However, Chen (2017) further emphasizes the burden which structural ambidexterity places on top executives, which, according to Mom et al. (2007) can be managed by acquiring top-down, horizontal and bottom-up knowledge flows, thereby increasing the levels of exploration and exploitation activities within their business.

The challenges within organizations regarding goal alignment between individuals and organizations, ambiguous roles, responsibilities and authority, absence of matrix guardians and lastly, silo-focused individuals is discussed by Sy et al. (2005). In order to remedy vague roles and responsibilities for employees Sy et al. (2005) highlight that clear guidelines, assignments of accountability, a single channel for responsibility decisions and an established plan for communication and information shared within the organization are essential. For employees to divert from a silo-focused behavior, organizations should provide training, clearly defined expectations, cross-functional work environments and a foundation for relationships to flourish (Sy et al., 2005). In order to address the growing complexities of the global marketplace, corporations must implement sophisticated organizational designs, as the traditional hierarchical structure is no longer adequate to meet the requirements for business success (Overholt, 1997). The matrix organizational structure remains a viable solution, as it serves as a model for effectively addressing complexities (H. R. Smith, 1978), where three different forms of matrix organizations exist according to Sy et al. (2005);

functional, balanced and project matrices, all existing on a continuous spectrum. Functional matrices entail a clear belonging to a specific functional department, contrary to project matrices where employees reside in the department in which the project concerns (Sy et al., 2005). Furthermore, project managers tend to have more control in project matrices than in functional, where their control is limited to the functional group itself (Sy et al., 2005).

Exploration and exploitation need to be managed in several aspects, according to Chen (2017), where strategy within exploitation should be deliberate, contrary to an emergent strategy focus for explorative activities. Through a process referred to as "guided evolution," top management teams have the ability to influence the formation of emergent strategies (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000). Furthermore, the structure of explorative activities need to be organic instead of the mechanistic structure in exploitative activities (Chen, 2017). Regarding incentives, exploitative actions should be motivated by payments, whereas tolerance for failure is more valuable in exploration (Chen, 2017). Lastly, the exploitative processes should focus on execution, while explorative processes are more search-oriented in their procedure (Chen, 2017).

Tying back to the underlying tensions arising from ambidexterity, the tension between passion and standardization can be managed by fostering both/and-thinking, and differentiating compartmentalized opportunities for both routine and nonroutine work (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Managing the strategic intent tension is done by including both breakthrough and profit-projects in the company's portfolio, in order to secure funds to allocate towards explorative efforts while also gaining good reputation to build a customer base (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Lastly, the customer orientation tension is managed by being opportunistic towards ideas that at first may seem limited, but also to make sure to step away from ideas after some time in order to not become too tightly coupled with the customers (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). These paradoxes (strategic intent, customer orientation and personal drivers) should not be eliminated according to Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009), but should be taken advantage of in terms of harvesting the energizing potential, as well as harnessing the complexity (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Van de Ven et al., 1999) through processes, structures and cultures (Garud et al., 2011).

An important aspect to consider in order to excel in explorative activities in an ambidextrous organization is the ability to allocate resources efficiently within the organization (Van Looy et al., 2005). Furthermore, in order to leverage ambidexterity as an organizational capability in the long term, management needs to continuously orchestrate resources towards ambidextrous activities, according to O'Reilly III and Tushman (2008). Adopting longer timeframes, together with pursuing synergies in terms of flexibility and cross-fertilization are areas that should be taken into consideration for a successful ambidextrous organization (Van Looy et al., 2005). O'Reilly and Tushman (2011) further contribute to the aspects to keep in mind when managing an ambidextrous organization. Clearly expressed visions and values with which employees can align combined with a cogent strategic intent justifying the need for exploration and exploitation in combination are seen as prerequisites for successful ambidexterity (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2011). Furthermore, senior leadership serves as the centerpiece in administering ambidexterity as they can balance tensions rising in the ambidextrous organization and encourage and support its development (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2011). By introducing structural ambidexterity, a concept described by Chen (2017) as separating exploration and exploitation into two separate business units, the balance is then to be managed by top management, which infers a major responsibility for senior leadership. Instead of separating exploration and exploitation into different business units, temporal separation can be implemented by sequential ambidexterity, which requires switching between the appropriate types of strategies, processes and structures required for either exploring or exploiting (Chen, 2017). However, these drastic changes in organizational functions and visions could result in disarray and a potential destruction of core organizational capabilities in the pursuit of achieving ambidexterity (Chen, 2017).

Behavioral integration serves as a coping mechanism for the contradictory knowledge processes within exploration and exploitation for managers (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), as contextual ambidexterity introduces supportive social processes, culture and relationships as a way to increase ambidextrous behavior (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Adding to this point, Ghoshal et al. (1997) describe context as stimuli and pressures that steer organizational and individual behavior towards ambidexterity, by the help of socialization and recognition. However, these social processes could also strain actors, due to the contradictory characteristics of radical and incremental innovations (Ghoshal et al., 1997). Martin & Martin (2009) suggest that conducting projects serves as a function to avoid potential restraints both in the cognitive and the structural environment. Chen (2017) deems contextual ambidexterity as a component of dynamic ambidexterity, where employees should be put in a context where they are encouraged to both explore and exploit. By implementing contextual ambidexterity, employees are not restricted by either time or business units, which enables explorations to emerge in unintended ways (Chen, 2017). There is a dynamic component to contextual ambidexterity, as individual decision-making determines the partition between time spent on demands for alignment versus adaptability, which ultimately affects the organization's ambidextrous performance (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).

The timing and likelihood of an organization being involved in radical innovations is to a higher degree in the hands of individuals, rather than the organization itself, by appropriating emerging trends into the organization's context (Reid & de Brentani, 2004), which cements the importance of individuals engaging in radical innovation. Ouchi (1980) describes three behavioral structures which an organization can adhere to; markets, bureaucracy and clans, where the efficiency and effectiveness of the structure vary depending on the degree of performance ambiguity and goal incongruence. Clans perform at their best ability when goal incongruence is low and performance ambiguity is high, being partly based on prominent teamwork obscuring true sources of prevalent performance (Ouchi, 1980). Clans differ fundamentally from bureaucracies in that they lack explicit auditing and evaluation, making them vulnerable to opportunistic behavior that can only be combated through close auditing - actions that are not possible in a clan (Ouchi, 1980). Instead, clans often establish common personal values aligned with the organization's values through an apprenticeship or trainee-program, as a measure to decrease the degree of goal incongruence within the organization (Ouchi, 1980).

Differentiation and integration are described by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) as segmenting the organizational system into separate subsystems, and the effort to align the different subsystems of an organization towards the successful completion of its mission respectively. Integration can be managed by social means, behavioral means, or by exploiting synergies, while differentiation is managed with structural or strategic means (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) argue that the structure, orientation of members, and time and goal focus of organizational subsystems, as well as the level of requisite integration and independence, have a significant impact on their performance, and are ultimately shaped by the stability and certainty of the relevant sub environment. A structure with a high degree of formalization is useful in order for codified and tacit knowledge to be anchored in the organization, which is especially valuable in turbulent environments, where personnel turnover can entail a higher degree of learning owing to the diversity introduced into the subsystem (March, 1991).

Organizational learning is increased when introducing diverse team members into a subsystem, which March (1991) describes as: *"The gains to individuals from adapting rapidly to the code are offset by second order losses stemming from the fact that the code can learn only from individuals who deviate from it."*. This point showcases the importance of embracing the diversity of individuals for the accumulated learnings to be increased within an organization. Individuals are likely to be more creative in their work when the organization motivates innovation (Amabile, 2018; Angle & Van de Ven, 1989), and by allowing for slack in resources, exploration becomes enabled during work activities (Damanpour, 1991; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Innovative contexts can be framed with fostering a culture of creativity (March, 1982; Schrage, 1999), an example being 3M's 15% rule where temporal structuring mechanisms allow for employees to allocate 15% of their work time towards explorative activities (Garud et al., 2011). Innovative ideas that have emerged from creative bottom-up processes (Burgelman, 1983; R. M. Kanter, 1988) are prone to be integrated into other ideas during a work rotation program (Galunic & Rodan, 1998), which is an example of a temporal structuring mechanism.

In order to reinforce and sustain organizational ambidexterity there are three factors which interact, according to Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009); a multilevel approach, complementary tactics and learning synergies. The multilevel approach increases management responsibility throughout the firm, reduces mixed messages, and enables employees to apply their discipline and passion in the optimal way for increased innovative developments (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Complementary tactics serve a purpose of reducing the defensiveness which can appear when tensions arise, but also as a way to foster embracing synergies by combining differentiation and integration (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Lastly, learning synergies enable an increased absorptive capacity within the organization, as knowledge bases are utilized to a higher degree and specializations within industries and products are leveraged (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Frequently taking advantage of new perspectives from individuals is a beneficial aspect of a modest degree of personnel turnover, where learning synergies aggregate the accumulated knowledge within an organization (March, 1991). Further adding to this point, Reid and de Brentani (2004) suggest that the individual's ability to absorb and act upon an untapped opportunity is the inception of accumulating organizational knowledge, being the champion for integrating novel ideas into the wider organization. Kohn Rådberg (2005) emphasizes the importance of ambidexterity being present on lower levels of the organization for it to diffuse into top-level ambidexterity, being essential for long-term ambidexterity.

The coexistence of both radical and incremental innovation within a single organization has resulted in ambidextrous companies, but O'Connor and Ayers (2005) argue that integrating radical innovation systems that already align with the current company culture raises the question of how radical innovations these systems can generate.

3 Method

In this section the methodology of the study will be discussed, where the study combines qualitative research and empirical case studies in order to investigate the research questions. By choosing qualitative methods, an inductive approach is taken to this research, where we gather interpretations and opinions on the field of study. Lastly, the case is introduced.

3.1 Research design

Qualitative studies have been the basis of this study, and the reasoning is based on several aspects. First and foremost, the thesis is based on a unique case that served as a foundation for investigating organizational ambidexterity taking place in a specific initiative within an established firm, showcasing both the perception on the subject over time and the uniqueness of it (Bell et al., 2022). Being able to generalize the findings from a specific case study calls for qualitative analysis as they give both the depth and context required to portray scenarios (Bell et al., 2022).

Considering that the case study involves depicting a series of events and an understanding of the initiative's impact on the organization, accumulating stories will enable a nuanced and encompassing picture (Bell et al., 2022; Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2017). By inviting subjective views into the study, context is given from the specific interviewee's expertise and position, further adding to the diversity of perspectives included (Bell et al., 2022). The analysis has been based on a multilevel approach, where the organization, groups and individuals within it have been the subject of study (Bell et al., 2022). A qualitative approach has enabled the study to delve into the specific interviewees' perceptions of the occurrences in terms of providing context and relevant background information for their respective views (Bell et al., 2022). The data collection has been made in accordance with Yin's (2009) case study approach, where multiple sources have been utilized, which then have been organized in a database, constructing a clear line of reasoning. Lastly, thematic analysis has been employed as a way to categorize and unearth commonalities in the respective data that was generated, which then was coded into the specific themes that were identified (Bell et al., 2022).



Figure 3.1: Schematic overview over the research process for the thesis, adopted from Bell et al. (2022).

Considerations while conducting qualitative research include the risk of interviewees not answering truthfully, either by trying to portray a favorable depiction of themselves, or by trying to adhere to the interviewers agenda or interests (Bell et al., 2022). This has been remedied by remaining objective in the questions asked and trying to validate speculative statements through other interviews. Another pitfall is the desire to quantify the qualitative data to mimic the nature of quantitative research in order to give evidence of something, rather than giving a description of their perception (Alvesson, 2003). By accounting for each and every perspective separately, quality is prioritized over quantity in terms of statements provided. Furthermore, qualitative studies may have a tendency to become too subjective (Bell et al., 2022), which in this study has been remedied by involving both teams within the organization and an expert in the academic field to scrutinize the study and provide insights. The difficulty to replicate qualitative studies has been counteracted by following established structures throughout the entire study, in order to easily showcase the process and findings through transparency (Bell et al., 2022). Lastly, in order to actually be able to generalize the findings from the qualitative study, there has been a correspondence to relevant theory in the scenarios presented, as a way to showcase the specific events (Bell et al., 2022).

3.2 Interviews

Bell et al. (2022) argue that interviews can be utilized to gain nuanced as well as detailed answers. Moreover, they are preferred when trying to lay out the events within longitudinal research. Considering the aim of this research, interviews, specifically semi-structured interviews, were used to establish the timeline, challenges, pivotal moments and plans ahead for FFS as well as to dissect the role FFS plays in Tetra Pak as an organization. Purposive sampling was used (Bell et al., 2022), as the study seeks specific insights from specific employees within the organization, in order to reconstruct events correctly and provide fair representations of the process itself.

The interviewees initially involved the FFS team itself, in order to gain a foundational representation of the FFS initiative, as they possess information regarding timelines and critical events taking place. After these interviews had been conducted, more senior managers involved in the FFS initiative were interviewed, who all had varying degrees of engagement in the initiative itself. Interviews with senior managers were conducted in order to get a more high level perspective on the initiative and how it was carried out, and what it really means for Tetra Pak as an organization. Following these interviews, participants in the IC were also interviewed, to get the participants' opinions and descriptions of their respective journeys in the initiative.

Bell et al. (2022), furthermore, recommend recording interviews in order to be fully engaged in the interview, and to not lose any detail in an answer to a question. This also ensures that the data is not initially tainted by the researchers' current view of what is relevant and furthermore that no data is lost. The intention to record the interviews has been disclosed from the very outset, combined with the fact that interviewees won't be named in the study, in order for the interviewee to feel comfortable with sharing thoughts and events. Interviews were conducted remotely via Microsoft Teams, Webex Meetings or Zoom, which was done due to the geographical dispersion of interviewees in the study, as many were situated in different continents, but also for convenience, where no previous arrangements are required, except establishing an internet connection. Building on this point, it is important to be especially patient with the interviewee as fluctuating internet connections can interfere with the flow of the interview. Moreover, conveying interest and engagement in the interview is an aspect that was considered in order to make the interviewees feel comfortable.

In total, 22 interviews were conducted during the study, which were distributed over different categories, and the number of interviews were based on the concept of diminishing returns in terms of information. First and foremost, since the FFS team was the initial group of interviewees to be addressed, interviews were carried out with almost all of the past or present members of the FFS team, in order to portray events and viewpoints in a fair manner. Not all members were able to participate in an interview, but efforts were made in terms of contacting members well in advance of the interviewee taking place. By discussing together with the FFS team and our supervisors at both Tetra Pak and Chalmers University of Technology, the next target group for interviews would be the stakeholders who had been involved with the FFS initiative throughout its development. The selection of interviewees in this respective group consisted of several levels of managerial roles and different degrees of involvement with the initiative itself, which also would portray different perspectives and depictions of events.

The majority of interviews were facilitated through a supervisor at Tetra Pak, as there already was an established connection present, which then would legitimize requests for interviews. Lastly, interviews commenced with the participants in the IC, and this selection of participants was based on discussions with our supervisor at Tetra Pak, who recommended specific people based on their respective advancements in the IC. By including diverse viewpoints in all interviewee groups, the study is able to describe several viewpoints and depictions of events, and could therefore describe the plethora of opinions on the investigated subject. This will enable the case study to be generalizable, where the case study can serve as a foundation for understanding the theoretical framework that is proposed, and thereby contribute to the learnings from organizational ambidexterity within established firms.

The interview questions have been constructed in accordance with the recommendations from Bell et al. (2022) and Kvale (1994) in mind, where open questions constitute the majority of interview questions, in order to receive extensive and contrasting responses. Different interview question templates were used for the different interviewees and the interviewee

Table 3.1: All interviewees divided by role, level, department as well as number of interviewees within each role.

Interview subjects			
Role	**Level**	**Department**	**# of interviews**
Management	Senior - Executive	Services	8
FFS Team	Entry - Medium	Across Tetra Pak	9
IC Participant	Entry - Medium	Services & Market Operations	5

categories, depending on their involvement in the case and their respective position in the organization, in order for the results to be accurate descriptions and statements rather than speculative guesses. The interview templates used for each interviewee category can be found in the Appendix. In order to be able to draw conclusions and connections between the different interviewees' answers, there was an effort to maintain similar questions between the different categories of interviewees and the respective interviewees themselves. For the interviewees to have an opportunity to fairly portray their answers, the questions have been provided in advance, for the interviewees to gauge the aim and purpose of the interview. Furthermore, anonymity has been ensured for the interviewees and the results that they present, where their names or identifiable attributes have not been included.

The interviews themselves were carried out jointly between the researchers, in order for there to be sufficient attention to the interviewee and the answers that they provide. The interviews were carried out with the camera on for all participants, as this would enable an easier reading of facial expressions and attitudes to certain questions, which could then be analyzed whether to ask a follow-up question or not. During the interviews, there was a division of tasks being performed, where one of us was in charge of asking questions and follow-up questions, and the other one took notes of what was being said. The reasoning behind the division of work tasks was to both give the interviewee full attention during the interview itself, to actively listen and thereby be able to ask suitable follow-up questions in the moment, but also to be able to analyze the transcribed interview results sooner, which then would minimize any type of distorted interpretations. Interviews were always recorded, with permission from the interviewee being ascertained during the booking of the interview and at the beginning of the interview once again, and the recording was done via a separate device. Considering the recording quality, interviews were conducted in quiet places with minimal interference from outside elements, to minimize the amount of noise pollution, which could affect the outcome of the recording. After the interview had been completed, transcribing the recording commenced, where we would transcribe the interviews equally divided, in order to balance the amount of labor and the margin of error. We decided to manually transcribe rather than using software to transcribe, as this would enable us to rightfully represent the interview and be able to catch every point and sentence that was portrayed in the recording.

3.3 Data analysis

To make sense of the collected data, Ryand and Bernand (2003) recommend using a thematic analysis. This approach allows for the identification of patterns within each transcript as well as across several transcripts, which was utilized in this study. Thematic analysis was conducted jointly, where each transcribed interview was analyzed by summarizing statements made and extrapolating them into takeaways. These takeaways were then categorized into the respective theme that the takeaway related to, themes that were identified once the interviews had been carried out, and related to the theoretical framework. The themes that would end up being used in the thematic analysis were Management, Process, Structure, Culture, Explore vs Exploit and Innovation Challenge Story. Management related takeaways related to aspects that included managerial implications or events taking place, Process was used for process-related statements, Structure was for structural aspects within the organization, Culture related to the innovation culture at Tetra Pak, Explore vs Exploit related to the concept of ambidexterity and the tension between the two concepts within Tetra Pak, and the IC Story related to depicting events that took place in the IC itself.



Figure 3.2: Visualization of the themes employed for the analysis.

Once the categorization into themes was complete, another analysis was made, to distinguish if statements were explanatory or speculative, which would aid the differentiation between factual events and speculative opinions. Once the thematic analysis was complete, there was a final categorization into a table that would divide the takeaways into respective interviewee groups and the research question that is being answered.

3.4 The case of FFS

Included in the case description is a general description of Tetra Pak, Services as a department and function and the Future Talent Program. Information has been derived from Tetra Pak's channels, as well as from interviews conducted in the study. Moreover, a broad depiction of the Fast Forward Services initiative with context of why it was started, goals of it, critical events and obstacles as well as plans for the next iteration will be accounted for.

3.4.1 Tetra Pak

Tetra Pak is a global company that specializes in food packaging and processing and was founded in 1951 in Lund, Sweden, with its headquarters residing in Lausanne, Switzerland (Tetra Pak, 2022e). Tetra Pak operates in more than 160 countries and has a workforce of around 25,000 employees (Tetra Pak, 2022e). Tetra Pak is best known for its Tetra Pak cartons, which are widely used for packaging milk, juices, and other food and beverage products. These cartons are made from a combination of paperboard, aluminum, and plastic, and they are designed to be lightweight, compact, and easy to transport. Tetra Pak also provides a range of other packaging solutions, such as caps, straws, secondary packaging material and corresponding equipment (Tetra Pak, 2022b).

In addition to its focus on packaging, Tetra Pak also has a strong commitment to sustainability, where the company is working to reduce its environmental impact by using renewable materials, minimizing waste, and reducing energy consumption (Tetra Pak, 2022b; Tetra Laval S.A., 2020, 2021).

Tetra Pak is divided into separate departments; Packaging Solutions, Processing Solutions & Equipment, Services, Market Operations, Development & Technology, which is then supported by separate functions in Sustainability & Communications, Human Resources & Transformation, Finance & Supplier Management as well as Legal Affairs. Packaging Solutions concerns the packaging material used to protect the food or beverage from the environments with a wide variety of aseptic and chilled packages (Tetra Pak, 2022c). Processing Solutions & Equipment is the department that focuses on food and drink processing related services (Tetra Pak, 2022d). Development & Technology is a central innovation function that pursues R&D related innovation development for ideas. For Tetra Pak, innovation is and has always been crucial, and consequently has become mentioned as an innovating company. Tetra Pak went through a substantial reorganization in 2022 called "next chapter".

As many firms that develop and produce industrial products, services has become an increasingly important area. The Services department within Tetra Pak, staffed with 6300 employees, provides a range of services to customers who use Tetra Pak equipment. These services include technical support, maintenance, training, and consulting. The goal of the



Figure 3.3: Schematic overview over the organizational structure in relation to customers

Services team is to help customers maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of their Tetra Pak equipment, while also reducing downtime and minimizing costs (Tetra Laval S.A., 2021). Furthermore, Services works closely with customers globally to understand their needs and provide tailored solutions. For example, the team may provide training to operators on how to use Tetra Pak equipment effectively, or they may perform routine maintenance to ensure that equipment is running smoothly. The Services team may also provide consulting services to help customers optimize their production processes or improve their sustainability performance (Tetra Laval S.A., 2020).

It was not until around two decades ago that Tetra Pak began to monetize their Services department. Since then, the department has seen a steady growth, with a year-on-year revenue growth of around 8 percent the last 5 years, with the revenue growing from €1.5B in 2018 to €2B in 2022 (Tetra Laval S.A., 2022, 2019). Overall, the Services department plays an important role in helping Tetra Pak customers get the most value from their equipment and achieve their business objectives. There are some innovative functions within Services that focus on exploring new business, but these are relatively recently started and focus more on exploring opportunities within their current portfolio. The Services department follows a B2B approach, where their customers mostly concert of businesses themselves, as the services provided relate to the machines that Tetra Pak sells (Tetra Laval S.A., 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022).

Services follows a 3-year strategic plan, which is then further divided into more actionable 1-year operational plans, which aim to grow the Services business further. In Services, employees are measured on their performances, which are evaluated based on their Individual Objectives (IO), which are set coherently with their closest manager. These IOs can include different milestones or targets based on what the respective manager believes to be valuable, as well as the individual's personal ambitions and driving forces.

Future Talent Program

The Future Talent Program is a key initiative within Tetra Pak aimed at developing young professionals within the company. The program includes a range of initiatives designed to provide young professionals with valuable experience and skills. One of the main components of the program is the trainee program that lasts for 12-18 months, which provides recent graduates with hands-on experience working in different areas of the company. In addition to the trainee program, the FT program also includes internships, leadership development programs, and other initiatives aimed at developing young professionals. The goal of the program is to build a pipeline of talented individuals who can help the company achieve its goals and drive innovation. Overall, the FT program is an important part of Tetra Pak's strategy for developing its workforce and building a strong company for the future. By investing in the development of young professionals, Tetra Pak is ensuring that it has the talent it needs to stay competitive and continue to innovate in the food packaging industry (Tetra Pak, 2022a).

3.4.2 Fast Forward Services and the Innovation Challenge

Fast Forward Services (FFS) is an initiative which was started in March 2020 as an effort to revamp the Services innovation within Tetra Pak. The foundation of the FFS initiative came about during a reorganization of the organizational structure within Tetra Pak, where a number of employees in the FT graduate program considered the innovative capabilities and resources being diminished for the Services function. The FTs believed that organizational structures that previously had been put in place for innovation to flourish were now being removed as a consequence of the reorganization. Moreover, the FTs believed that the majority of innovations actually taking place within the Services department were considered incremental, and radical innovations typically came from other parts of the organization, such as PS and PSE, as they had more organizational structures in place for innovating. The FTs originally named the program Fast Forward Tetra Pak, with the aim to involve all of Tetra Pak into their innovation initiative. However, during the initiation phase, there was a rebranding to Fast Forward Services, as the necessity to enhance innovative capabilities was most prominent within the Services branch, according to the team.

As previously stated, the Services department was previously seen more as a supportive function for other organizational branches, such as PS and PSE, but has gradually become more of an independent business, which the FTs believed to be another suitable reason for increasing the innovation within Services. Before the initiative was created, there were no long-term innovations planned for 18 months ahead within the Services innovation pipeline, which the FTs found during their initial internal research. Simultaneously, influence from environmental and social concerns drove the FTs to initiate FFS. Their initial aim was to build knowledge and innovation culture, enhance innovation ownership and resources, pursue global bottom-up innovation and hands-on innovative activities for employees. There were several measures proposed, including an internal education program on innovation as well as an innovation toolbox which employees could utilize in exploration. Another part of FFS was a hackathon that Tetra Pak did together with a university in Munich, where they would generate present and future business opportunities for both short and long term for Tetra Pak, as a way to unearth novel ideas. However, the most significant part of FFS, which also is the base of this thesis, is the Innovation Challenge.

The *Innovation Challenge* is an internal grassroot innovation funnel where employees were free to submit innovative ideas, an idea which they then would champion and become CEO of if the idea was approved. The IC followed the Evolve methodology, which is an externally developed method for incubating innovations within large organizations where the three stages, Red Stage, Blue Stage and Gold Stage, represent a development and selection process similar to an innovation funnel. By utilizing the Evolve methodology in a department where many employees have customer-facing roles, and therefore extensive knowledge in customer needs and pains, employees would be able to utilize their deep knowledge to develop value-adding ideas. The methodology is similar to experimentative entrepreneurial design processes, where the CEO of the idea is the driving force of proving the viability, and gains access to toolboxes and coaching during their development phase. The purpose of the different stages is for the IC participant to gradually prove their idea in different contexts, such as business cases and customer pilots. With the ideas being validated in this new process, the participants, and Services as a whole, would be able to accelerate the opportunity for the idea to become implemented widely, and to set the direction for innovation and Service's development. The FFS team's part in this process is to provide the toolboxes and coaching as well as managing stakeholders, timelines and scope of the FFS program itself. After meeting with potential stakeholders and pitching the IC to different management team members, the FFS team finally gained acceptance and commitment, but with some preconditions from the senior stakeholders to tailor the initiative more towards Tetra Pak's organizational capabilities and aims. An example was that the FTs had to convince stakeholders to measure innovation using different metrics than traditional ones such as ROI or expected revenue, in order for the initiative to portray fair results.

Roles

The roles within the FFS team varied throughout, with different areas of responsibilities depending on their expertise, interest and the scenario which the initiative was in at that moment, with a dynamic responsibility distribution throughout the timeline in activities such as coaching. Considering that the FTs came from different departments within Tetra Pak, they all could provide some area of expertise that would facilitate the development of the initiative, with examples such as Communication, Supplier Management etc.

Management of the initiative was assigned to the Senior Leadership Team, who then appointed a reference group that would support the FFS team, open doors and relieve roadblocks, as well as give advice on how to proceed with critical actions taking place throughout the initiative. Moreover, an additional manager was tasked with following the team closely in a more operational setting.

Each IC participant was also given an idea sponsor, with responsibilities entailing removing roadblocks and bottlenecks in the processes within the organization, as well as facilitating an increased exposure to the internal network of potential recipients of ideas.

Critical Events

Idea submission was a collection process for ideas throughout the organization, where any employee within Services could submit their idea proposals. Requirements for the initial submission included a rough overview of the proposed idea, the intended application and value of the idea, as well as the potential engagement for the idea champion to pursue the idea. The activities which took place for the FFS team in this phase were to market the IC throughout Tetra Pak in order to generate interest and awareness, with the aim of increasing the amount of idea submissions. In total, 151 champions entered the IC, which then would be taken into the next stage, idea selection.

The selection process for advancing into Red Stage was done by the FFS team in conjunction with a reference group, consisting of one person from each organizational branch (Services, PS and PSE) appointed by the SLT that would act as an intermediary for the organization's interests. Selection criteria were initially based on motivational factors of the idea owner, rather than the idea itself, as the Fast Forward Services team believed more in the person than the idea itself as being important, similar to entrepreneurial theory. Later in the process, another layer of strategic fit was introduced into the selection criteria, which was the main deciding factor for whether an idea would be chosen or not. The SLT wanted the program to generate ideas into the innovation pipeline for 3-5 years forward, and therefore argued for a strategic fit to be the basis of selection. The ideas would be judged on the potential value provided to either customers to Tetra Pak or Tetra Pak itself, with both new sales opportunities and increased operational efficiency being considered. The FFS team had to align their vision with stakeholders' interests for the selection process to be carried out.

In total, 50 ideas were chosen to qualify for the Red Stage which included several activities aimed to conceptualize and define the ideas. The IC participants investigated and validated the problem that they had encountered, defined a solution for it, built preto- and/or prototypes, described their vision, analyzed their business model, captured the customer value proposition, and lastly, constructed a pitch. This pitch was then to be presented during a Demo day, where established and potentially new stakeholders would be present and evaluate the ideas' viability and fit to their innovation agenda. The FFS team acted as coaches to the ideas, where they would give advice on idea development and pitch formulation in order for the idea to be correctly represented. The reference group had meetings with the Fast Forward Services team on a daily/weekly basis during the Red Stage. Ideas chosen to be adequately interesting to the jury present at the Demo day were to be advanced into the next stage, Blue Stage.

Altogether, 7 ideas were advanced into the Blue Stage, where the steps included hypothesis formulation, proof-of-concept development, testing with end-users, evaluating and collecting learnings, in order to establish the business case of the idea. Firstly, a budget had to be allocated to each idea, which methodologically would be a fixed sum of 50k€, but was altered by Tetra Pak to be case specific for each idea, based on the perceived capital requirements to conduct a MVP test. Considering the alteration to the budgeting process, the budget allocation took longer than planned, as it required specific attention and evaluation of each idea. After a budget had been allocated, the idea would be assigned to a specific stakeholder within Tetra Pak, which would act as a project sponsor for the idea. This sponsor would facilitate the search for a suitable customer to perform the MVP tests with. The FFS team acted as coaches for the participants in order to help them find the most suitable stakeholder for their idea. Lastly, ideas that went through all stages were presented at another Demo day, where their idea would be evaluated once again for approval to the next stage, Gold Stage.

In August of 2021, a major reorganization was announced within Tetra Pak, which was called "next chapter". The reorganization included significant structural changes internally, with a promotion of new members of the SLT, ELT and throughout the organization. This reorganization coincided with the Blue Stage, which ultimately delayed operations as there were uncertainties regarding the stakeholders which would need to validate steps in the development process. Another complexity introduced by the reorganization was that sponsors and managers to the participants could also be assigned new roles and responsibilities within the organization, which required new approvals and alignments for the employees to continue their engagement with the initiative.

In total, 3 projects entered the Gold Stage, where preparation for the implementation phase begins, where an allocation into a specific department takes place based on the relevance of the idea to be received in the respective department. This department would appoint a project manager for the specific project which could thereafter either be handed over directly to a designated project team, abandoning the IC participant, or be transitioned into the department with the participant still in the project. This phase includes stakeholder management for the FFS team, as the idea is to be integrated into the organization and will therefore need to align with the optimal department and team. After an idea has successfully finished all the steps in

Gold Stage, a ceremony is held to give recognition and awards to the idea champion.

After all these stages have been completed, the now developed solution is to be fully integrated and scaled within Tetra Pak, and depending on the maturity of the idea and its validated stages, it could either skip Tetra Pak's internal validation process completely, skip some stages, or go through the validation process similar to an internally developed idea outside of FFS. This integration process is called the Solution Lifecycle Management tool and is a stage-gate based process for validating and processing ideas that later on can be prioritized in the organization.

Table 3.2: Critical events and related sub-activities in the initiative, elapsed time in each phase, as well as how many participants who were engaged in each phase.

Critical Events			
Phase	**Sub-activities**	**# of participants**	**Time elapsed**
Idea submission	Marketing	151	1 month
Idea selection	Stakeholder alignment	50	1 month
Red Stage	Idea conceptualization Demo day	49	3 months
Blue Stage	Budget discussion Stakeholder selection Customer pilot selection Demo day	7	9 months
Gold Stage	Decide receiving department Hand-over or transition Stakeholder management Ceremony	3	13 months

FFS 2.0

The first IC is coming to an end of its cycle as of spring 2023 and there are ambitions to run a second iteration called FFS 2.0, with an increased focus on sustainability proposed as a framing for the initiative. In order to take advantage of tacit knowledge learnt during the first iteration, a full-time project manager will be appointed if the initiative is kept for another iteration, where this PM would manage stakeholder relations as well as the operational team of FTs.

Integrating an initiative such as FFS poses many challenges for Tetra Pak, as there is a need to maintain the innovative vision and purpose of the initiative itself while transitioning the initiative into the organizational structures and processes in place. This concerns concepts such as stakeholder management and ambidexterity, combined with how to utilize the innovative capabilities within a global organization. As of now, only one project has finalized the Gold Stage, and moreover, the IC itself is yet to be concluded after 2 years, which is more than double of what the Evolve methodology suggests. Furthermore, the IC is yet to generate any revenue from the ideas that have been developed. Whether there will be a second iteration is yet to be decided. The utilization of this case will be to shed light on how Tetra Pak can maintain the uncertainties and differences of incubating radical innovations while integrating the function into the organization, without negatively affecting the program with structural and organizational processes.

4 Results and analysis

In this section, findings from the interviews will be presented to give context for discussion and analysis with reference to scientific literature. Firstly, the FFS Driven subsection delves into everything that relate to the FFS initiative, and the following chapters describe depictions regarding more overarching topics that relates to the FFS initiative, as well as Services more specifically. After the results have been provided, a table connecting theory and results is provided, which also generates the respective discussion topics.



Figure 4.1: Schematic overview of the disposition of results.

In order to gain a deep understanding of how the FFS initiative has been run and how innovation is driven at Tetra Pak Services, several interviews with employees working in different areas and levels of Services have been conducted. Below you see a table presenting all interviewees, where names and specific positions have been chosen to not be included for integrity reasons.

4.1 FFS driven

What was the basis for initiating FFS, what was done successfully and what could be improved for upcoming iterations are questions that will be accounted for in this section.

4.1.1 Background

Member 6 explains that following the restructuring of the organization in 2020, there were little to no people in the Services organization that officially worked on innovation. After Member 6 discussed this aspect with 7 other Future Talents, they decided to start researching innovation historically at Tetra Pak. What the team found was that there was no structured approach to open innovation, internal innovation or innovation culture in Services, which was when they identified their opportunity, according to Member 2. Following the research, the team started talking with the SLT, one of whom agreed to carve out time for the team to work on the project and also committed to supporting the team throughout the project.

Table 4.1: All the interview subjects represented by their role in the initiative as well as their respective coded name that will be used to give accounts.

Interview Subjects	
Role	Coded Name
FFS Team	Member 1
FFS Team	Member 2
FFS Team	Member 3
FFS Team	Member 4
FFS Team	Member 5
FFS Team	Member 6
FFS Team	Member 7
FFS Team	Member 8
FFS Team	Member 9
Senior Level	Senior 1
Senior Level	Senior 2
Senior Level	Senior 3
Senior Level	Senior 4
Senior Level	Senior 5
Senior Level	Senior 6
Senior Level	Senior 7
Senior Level	Senior 8
IC Participant	Participant 1
IC Participant	Participant 2
IC Participant	Participant 3
IC Participant	Participant 4
IC Participant	Participant 5

According to Senior 3 and 4, FFS was created to remedy the lack of long-term innovations in the Services innovation pipeline by involving people from different markets and backgrounds. Senior 4 adds that FFS provides a way to test concepts quickly and brings young people with unbiased views into the innovation pipeline. Senior 6 believes FFS was created to encourage people to engage in innovation and to explore new avenues for growth in Services. Senior 7 states that FFS was designed to create a more visible and open process for generating ideas, and to reinvent Services by developing new solutions, with many ideas coming from the younger generation. Finally, Participant 3 believes FFS was created to provide an open door for internal staff to share ideas and create new services and products.

4.1.2 Goals

In order to align the initiative or project undertaken by an organization, goals can be used as a visionary tool for achieving a common understanding among the stakeholders, with Members, Seniors and Participants in this case.

MEMBERS' VIEW

According to Member 5, their initial goal was to change the way Tetra Pak works with innovation regarding management and corporate innovation where introducing a new process would enable people to test their ideas. Moreover, another goal was to change the mentality and culture of innovation in Tetra Pak. The FFS team put a lot of effort into taking the SLT on board with this process, as a way to change their mindsets and show them how things can be done differently in Tetra Pak, without losing touch with the goals and visions of the company. Another goal was to make innovation accessible to all, as many people in the company have innovative ideas and experiences, but don't have the platform or opportunity to work on it where Member 1 believes the goal was to facilitate bottom-up innovation.

SENIORS' VIEW

Senior 6 believes that the goal of FFS is to engage people and that it is important to close the loop to ensure that the engagement brings results. It is also an opportunity to leverage commonalities and increase visibility for employees and managers. Senior 8 sees FFS as a way to strengthen Tetra Pak's innovation culture. Senior 3 and 5 both view the goal of FFS as filling the innovation pipeline in Services with ideas that have been validated together with customers, which then can bring additional growth. FFS is moreover a way to engage and motivate people to develop ideas that may not be possible in their day-to-day jobs and to nurture and evaluate those ideas to feed more into the funnel of Services Development in Senior 2's eyes. Senior 6 states that FFS is a way to motivate employees by making them a part of a "winning team", which is seen as more important than monetary compensation. Overall, FFS is seen as a way to revamp the innovation spirit within Services, to explore new avenues, and to involve people in different markets and with different backgrounds.

PARTICIPANTS' VIEW

In Participant 1's eyes, the goal of FFS was to improve the innovative products in Tetra Pak, where they realized that they had to keep up with competition and customer satisfaction, where a program that could endorse and help innovation could be structured in an organized way, which FFS is according to Participant 1. Participant 1 moreover states that there is no department dedicated to developing new products in the Services aftermarket area similar to the ones that exist in Packaging for example. According to Participant 2, the goal of FFS is to enable the global team to get better communication of customer needs as well as other ideas from areas that they wouldn't have received otherwise. Furthermore, Participant 2 believes that Tetra Pak tends to focus on finding a solution and then finding a fitting problem for that solution, not the other way around. This is something that needs to be changed, and FFS can contribute towards the solution according to Participant 2. The goal of FFS is to boost innovation by encouraging employees to apply for ideas, as well as an opportunity for Tetra Pak to hear the voices of people that don't regularly work in innovation and integrate ideas from them into their innovation road map according to Participant 5.

4.1.3 Learnings

The Innovation Challenge is coming to an end currently, and insights on how it could be improved will be reviewed below. The insights relate to the participants' experiences, the perception and importance of the initiative, as well as the radical or incremental nature.

Innovation Challenge participants

In order to understand the innovation process that the challenge represents, the participants' experiences will first be accounted for in order to give some context into further scenarios presented. One participant's process went smoothly until he reached the Blue Stage, as there was complexity regarding the implementation process and people in Tetra Pak being unaware of FFS, and therefore questioned it. An issue of how FFS was done is that it was carried out within Services, which meant that when things ended up in different departments, such as D&T, they had no idea what was going on. Finding pilot customers was also a difficult aspect, as Tetra Pak's agreements with customers are about them selling developed products, and not developing incremental MVPs to customers.

Another participant expected for their idea to be translated into a project or product, where it should have been moved seamlessly if he would be able to present the benefits and value of the idea, but this was not how it turned out. This participant did most of the initial product development and project management, but when including it into organizational processes it became slow, as the processes regarding business case, budget, approvals and stakeholder management are much more cumbersome, whereas if you don't get enough support, you can get stalled. The idea was slowed down by the process, and as a result they ran out of budget, which meant that they had to solve the business case to get the additional funding required to solve their problems.

Even if one participant's project did not advance further than Red Stage in the challenge, the project still went on, as the responsible manager was able to allocate a budget for it outside of the IC. Lastly, it is made clear from the interview that the participant would have pursued this project regardless of the Innovation Challenge's existence.

One interviewed participant experienced many roadblocks in the project's development as there was a need for expertise within supplier management, fiscal controlling and logistics, with their pilot phase being negatively affected and massively delayed. As the participant is yet to finalize the results of the pilot phase due to waiting on the customer, findings from this phase are yet to be presented, leaving the participant in Blue Stage currently. There is a need to validate the idea further after completing the Gold Stage, as they have only tested it in one region, with one market and one customer.

Partly because of a lack of time, and partly because of a perceived disconnect between the FFS process and what actually needed to be done, one participant ended the journey in the Red Stage. This disconnect was also brought up with the FFS team. Moreover, following test-and-validation conversations with 10 customers, this participant found out that customers were not particularly interested in Participant 4s proposal currently, which consequently enforced the participant's decision to quit the challenge.

Another participant's team never formalized their idea, as they didn't find a suitable customer or partner to develop their idea with, which was down to both them not being able to push it to their customer, and that the reorganization made the D&T department to not push it either. Roles and responsibilities changed both in Tetra Pak and their customer's end, which meant that the collaboration eventually fell through. People in the organization weren't able to help in the innovation process as they were busy with their usual tasks according to this participant.

4.1.4 Perception of the Initiative

The initial reaction to the Fast Forward Services initiative was not that great in Member 5's opinion, but as engagement increased and POC emerged, the acceptance from stakeholders grew as well. Innovation is a numbers game, and the more ideas you have, the higher possibility of a successful and profitable idea, according to Senior 8, which is why it was considered a source of good ideas. Senior 8 viewed FFS as a way to get more ideas into the pool of available ideas. Moreover, the required investment for FFS was a modest amount compared to the potential gains for Tetra Pak, so according to Senior 8 it was a no-brainer to commit to it. Member 1 continues by explaining that top management is pushing for the team to close the loop of the first iteration, which ties into a deeper context of innovation; if they can't finish the first iteration, why should other people also try if every project ultimately dissolves? Senior 3 claims that the organization-wide lack of awareness of FFS is down to not seeing any real results from it as of yet, highlighting the importance of showcasing a POC. FFS needs to deliver something from the initiative according to Senior 3, because if 2 of 100 projects are scaled up then they have something, but if nothing is scaled, you have burned a lot of time, money and resources, as well as the trust.

In Member 6's eyes, FFS is not especially recognized, even within Services. Participant 4 explains that while there was a big surge of in-house publicity and talk about FFS during its launch, it quite quickly died out as there was no formal follow-up, a celebration of quick wins or reinforcement about what happened. But on the other hand, as Senior 2 puts it, this is only the first iteration and the reactions and feedback have generally been very good from those who were aware. The participants in the IC particularly appreciated the initiative, stating that it was a way to add value to their work life and daily work. Member 6 speculates that this is because they felt trusted to do something outside their work description and that they could find motivation through participating as well.

An opportunity with FFS 2.0, according to Senior 3, is to explore areas where they are weak currently, which could be done by defining the challenge and its scope more precisely. By defining it further, Services can find things that complement their portfolio, which Senior 1 moreover believes would enable the specific field to get more innovative ideas in itself. Furthermore, not only will innovation themes be a benefit of defining the challenge itself, this also gives an opportunity to establish what is expected from the different phases, according to Senior 3. Senior 5 argues that employing a sustainability theme in the IC could have a real impact on the sustainability agenda for Services and the company as a whole, as well as enabling the distribution of tangible sustainable solutions for their customers in a short period of time, as there is momentum for this agenda currently. Building on this, Senior 6 believes that the IC framework has been established, but now needs to be filled up with the right strategy. Senior 6 believes that selling the vision of the IC as an innovative capability might become the engine that ultimately makes the initiative take off, which then requires delivering on the promises made. Regardless of the IC outcome, Senior 2 believes that the FFS way-of-working with innovation should be integrated into the organization to a higher extent, whether it be only for Services or organization-wide.

Importance of the initiative

According to Senior 7, Tetra Pak considers three dimensions as critical to the organization; new ideas, engagement and improving the work life for staff, and as FFS contributes to all of these, it is important to Tetra Pak. Participant 1 believes that the FFS initiative differentiates Tetra Pak from its competitors, where Senior 5 states that the buy-in from management speaks to the importance of the FFS initiative to Tetra Pak. Whether FFS is important for Tetra Pak as a whole, Senior 1 is unsure of, but considers it important for Services at least as it gives them momentum, new ideas and engagement which is very important for the SLT. Building on this, Participant 2 thinks that the initiative is very important to Tetra Pak and should therefore be expanded into Packaging Solutions and Processing Solutions & Equipment as well.

Contrary to the above statements, Senior 8 is unsure of the importance of the FFS initiative to Tetra Pak, as it could either generate massive leaps or small incremental improvements that add up to something, which then affects the degree of importance. However, Senior 8 still believes that if Services don’t pursue these kinds of initiatives, they will never know the results that might come out of it, which is why it is considered to be more of an investment rather than arbitrary. Member 7 believes that the FFS initiative is important but still needs to prove itself in terms of showing participation rewards and buy-in from management, as it is moving in the right direction currently and the concept could turn out to be relevant for other organizational departments. If these two aspects aren't proven by the initiative it will not be successful, where employees won't add extra tasks on top of their daily work to have the risk of failure on their shoulders, according to Member 7. Furthermore, Member 7 believes that they shouldn't expand the FFS initiative into other organizational departments until Tetra Pak have demonstrated that the solutions derived from the IC actually are implemented from Gold Stage. Lastly, Participant 5 believes that the FFS initiative is not that important for Tetra Pak, as it is seen as a testing ground, and the company's existence doesn't depend on it, and moreover states that if nothing comes from the IC after 2 years, it will be considered a waste of money.

Radical or incremental

Participant 3 believes that the IC as an innovation process is radical to Tetra Pak, as they use tools to prove the concept in a fast way relative to how the usual process is carried out, where idea collection is 6-12 months relative to only a couple of months for the IC. Moreover, the opportunity for any employee to present an idea to the organization is radical in itself in Tetra Pak, according to Participant 1, where Member 8 further emphasizes that, unlike other initiatives in Services, FFS was started by employees in the Services department, and not by the leadership team or by client needs explicitly. Coming from another angle, Participant 4 states that, while being unaware of many other organization-wide initiatives like FFS, having an environment that encourages experimentation, and allows for testing and mistakes is rewarding as well as beneficial for the organization as it enables creativity.

Tying into the outcome of FFS, Senior 1 expected radical innovations and believes that some of the ideas that came through actually were. As they work with incremental innovations day in and day out, Senior 1 would like for the IC to generate radical innovations, where Services could pursue things like a startup and challenge the status quo. Extending this reasoning further, Participant 1 believes that radical ideas could be more attractive for the IC to generate, as incremental ideas should already be a part of the continuous improvement process. Pursuing radical ideas in a novel way could also inspire people from the organization to engage in the initiative, according to Senior 1. Senior 4 hopes that they can have more radical innovations in the next IC iteration and that they are open to failing, as this would be an opportunity to learn.

"When you put constraints on an initiative, it is not going to become radical. To succeed we need to radically change the way we think" - Member 9

While Member 2 agrees with the above statements and considers FFS as a radical innovation from a cultural perspective - giving tools and platforms for doing projects internally - the innovations that have come out from the IC are not radical due to the required strategic alignment that the SLT imposed. Senior 4 echoes this point, but contrasts by stating that there are both radical and incremental things that came from the IC, but agrees on the point that most of the radical innovations were filtered out in the initial phases where the selection favored more incremental ideas. A possible explanation is given by Member 5, who claims that as the FFS initiative was relatively immature, there was no consideration for entertaining too radical ideas that didn't achieve a strategic fit with Tetra Pak according to Member 5. Another reason for more radical ideas not emerging, according to Senior 2, is that participants' ideas were related to solving their work-problems, which were incremental improvements rather than truly radical ideas. In Participant 1's eyes, the IC can be both radical and incremental and it is not inherent to the challenge itself - it depends on if you choose radical ideas or not in the process. Senior 5 acknowledges that the IC could be for both incremental and radical innovations, but argues that the outcome rather depends on the freedom and budget that is given to the initiative. Member 7 believes that when the solutions generated in the first IC have proved their value in the organization, Tetra Pak will be able to get different kinds of ideas in the coming iterations, where radical innovations could be possible.

According to Senior 6, a balance is required in directing idea generators as some may develop innovative ideas spontaneously, while others may require guidance. Therefore, Senior 6 argues that two versions of the IC could be implemented; one allowing complete creative freedom and the other encouraging individuals to innovate within a specific area. However, putting any sort of framework or limitation on initiatives such as the IC is a mistake according to Senior 8, as you then limit the possible outcomes. Senior 8 explains that when specific solutions are needed, it calls for specific definitions and a strict budget, but when a more ambiguous solution is demanded, putting any limitations on an innovator who has a radical idea would be a mistake and should instead be given space to explore that idea.

Member 6 states that the FFS initiative is not radical at all as there have been many similar initiatives throughout the years in Tetra Pak and Member 7 moreover states that the first iteration of the IC was more incremental. Agreeing on this point, Senior 7 argues that the innovations that came out of the IC were absolutely incremental and not radical, which was accordingly to Senior 7's expectations as the majority of ideas were add-ons to something already existing in the organization. This was an issue according to Senior 3, as many of these incremental ideas were already addressed or were in development within the organization. On the other hand, Members 2 and 7 believe that proving small ideas is important, to show that they work in the organization to gain acceptance and validation, which is why the first iteration of the IC was conducted in an incremental way.

Most of the ideas chosen in the IC were not disruptive at all, and could have been run as business-as-usual activities according to Member 9. Member 4 further describes that the radical ideas proposed in the IC that didn't align with the Tetra Pak strategy were eliminated in the screening process of ideas, which removed an important part of actually enriching the pipeline. Furthermore, Senior 3 expected more radical ideas and opportunities for new revenue streams and operating models which unfortunately didn't turn out, which might have been down to the IC not being the right forum for these ideas to come out. Senior 3 highlights that another issue with the IC is that some ideas were based on testing a technology rather than a technology's customer viability and market, which is a focus that employees tend to have in Tetra Pak. Senior 2 expected the FFS initiative to be an environment where Services could do things differently and test ideas quickly, but this revolutionary thinking is yet to be seen. Member 9 believes that FFS is an incremental innovation as the initiative was constrained to fit into certain criteria where there was no leeway to broaden the scope, and summarizes the reasoning with the following statement: "When you put constraints on an initiative, it is not going to become radical if we don't radically change the way we think".

Senior 6 believes that there is a possibility of having a radical change, but this will probably not occur in each IC iteration, due to radical innovations being unusual in nature. Building on this, Senior 7 argues that the appetite for radical innovations in the organization is very low, as they typically challenge the status quo, and require time, money and people to bring them into life. Participant 5 highlights another aspect to consider, which is that many of Services' customers are large companies themselves, so their risk assessments have to be cleared as well for innovation to take place. Moreover, Participant 5 believes that by demanding a business case in the IC, radical ideas become impossible to develop, as a radical idea shouldn't be able to provide a solid business case that a customer understands yet. On the other hand, Member 9 believes that radical ideas could have been chosen in the IC if there was a visionary leader in place that could see the value and potential of future market needs in radical ideas, rather than dismissing them for lack of short-term viability. Participant 5 states that if Services would support the initiative with strategic intent, and exempt the ideas from meeting profit requirements, the initiative would perform better in terms of achieving radical innovations by opening up for more customer collaboration.

Member 3 states that the initial goal of generating radical ideas with the FFS initiative was unsuccessful as there was not enough support given by the organization where Participant 4 suspects that FFS will only produce incremental innovation as radical innovation requires top-down endorsement with more uncertainty involved in the process. There is a need for stakeholder management, alignment and sponsorship, but Participant 4 doesn't think that anyone would sponsor something more radical as this would imply organizational change and thereby friction which an initiative like FFS can't surpass. The ideas coming into the challenge can be radical, but they have to be done in incremental steps in the procedures and processes for it to be fully implemented into the organization according to Participant 5, with requirements for infrastructure, maintenance etc. Companies are looking at radical opportunities but are only able to provide incremental investments, and therefore radical innovation is not feasible according to Participant 5.

4.2 Explore vs exploit

Member 9 explains that until the late 90s, Tetra Pak did not charge customers for providing services that were complementary to their other products and solutions sold by PS and PSE, but now Services has grown to become an extremely lucrative business. Seniors 2 and 5 state that the recent transition from Services being a supportive function to the standalone business unit that it is currently has led to an increase in the capability of innovation. Senior 2 states that since 2010, Services have strategically defined where to play and how to win, which required a lot of innovation, as they entered into previously uncharted product and service categories, and ultimately resulted in significant growth. However, following this growth, Services has become increasingly inert, where there is a more prominent focus on operations according to Senior 2. According to Member 9, Services is not in a sense of urgency to innovate or disrupt their industry, and therefore focus on exploitative activities on the back of previous explorative success. Services is the market leader but this doesn't protect them from changes in laws, where Member 7 states that their solutions can be rendered irrelevant if they don't innovate. While there was more room for exploration when Services was a less prominent business area, they now have more monetary resources to spend on innovation, which is a benefit in terms of being able to innovate according to Senior 5.

"Companies have to be able to change themselves to stay competitive and relevant"
- Senior 8

Nevertheless, Senior 2 believes that a great challenge for Services is to become faster and more agile while maintaining and leveraging their size and growth. Services is growing at a strong pace of more than 8% each year, and is focused on maintaining this growth, which means that long and medium term growth is somewhat neglected, according to Senior 1. Furthermore, Senior 1 believes that since the 3-year plans have not included much space for long term innovation, Services still focuses on organic growth and operational efficiency, which is why Services is still being considered a "legacy business" according to Member 4. Considering this positioning as a legacy business within Tetra Pak, the resources that are allocated towards exploration have been focused on PS and PSE, as they are considered better suited for innovations since they have products according to Member 4, while Services has services, parts and maintenance.

Moreover, Member 9 believes that there is a lack of ability to innovate in terms of business models in Services, especially in terms of sustainability, as they do not have the ability to evaluate the intangible nature of these kinds of innovations which are therefore considered to be high risk. Senior 5 agrees that the opaque results connected to more radical innovation is a challenge for Services to evaluate, and therefore focus on more incremental reactive innovations that they regularly entertain. Tetra Pak is still the global leader within food and beverage packaging, but there are many things that could be done by proactively pursuing innovations outside of the core business areas in Member 5's opinion. The SLT follows a low risk and low investment approach to radical innovations according to Member 3, as it is important for Services to provide proof of concept and returns from their investments. On the other hand, Senior 6 argues that Services doesn't need to pursue radical innovations constantly, but they need to make sure that when the opportunity is there, Tetra Pak is the radical innovator, and not their competitor. Building on this statement, Senior 6 believes that the radical innovations that will catapult Tetra Pak forward should come from either PS or PSE, and not Services, tying into the legacy business positioning. Services considers incremental innovations to be enough of a differentiation advantage to avoid commoditization according to Senior 2.

Senior 5 states that the ability to innovate differs between organizational departments within Tetra Pak, where some are more considered to be suited for innovations and some are more for operations as the company is run currently. Member 4 describes that PS and PSE are pushed to a higher extent by the external environment, competitors and governmental policies, which then forces them to innovate, but Services are not being competed against in that way, and therefore are not that inclined to innovate. These differences in pressure to innovate between departments is the reason for why there are more teams dedicated to exploration in PS and PSE than in Services. Moreover, Member 2 states that there is a complexity regarding the possibility to deviate from regular work activities in Services to focus on long term development of personal growth, as they often have to face customer problems and urges, combined with short term nature of the strategy in markets.

People in the organization are, in Senior 3's eyes, skeptical about innovative initiatives due to earlier failures that have occurred. Seniors 3 and 6 describe that previously, the innovation wave was very clearly communicated and publicized, before they even scaled it up, and they never delivered complete results from it. Services was very innovative a few years ago according to Senior 1, and Member 3 explains that Services had dedicated resources and activities related to explorative activities, such as hackathons and open innovation centered teams. Generation of ideas was not an issue, but the integration of ideas back into the organization was an ongoing challenge, according to Member 3, and moreover with the next chapter reorganization, confusion shrouded the innovation and they lost momentum in Senior 1's eyes.

Although there still is a strong culture of innovation in Services, according to Senior 5, with it even being the reason for Senior 5 joining the organization, it seems to have "slowed down" in recent years. This is a result of a prioritization of operations, and rightfully so according to Senior 5. However, Senior 5 also expresses a concern for this trend, as a complete neglect of innovation could end up deteriorating the company’s positioning. Senior 8 has a slightly different view, claiming that the deep rooted culture of innovation sometimes makes Services lose track of the things in the business that enable exploration, in the pursuit of the "new shiny thing". An innovation can over time generate revenue, but there is a need to remember the major revenue drivers from the current business while simultaneously innovating, according to Senior 8.

Member 9 highlights the trade-off between short term profits and long term developments as being a challenging aspect for innovation in Services, where managers need to show that their department is profitable currently and potential future profitability is consequently not considered equally valuable. Tetra Pak has had a history of flip flopping in innovation according to Senior 8, where their innovation pendulum has gone from one extreme to the other, where their challenge is to balance the bread and butter products and incubate the new ones which then will become important. There is a tendency to abandon products which are nowhere near their end-phase of their life cycle, as employees become preoccupied with the new things, according to Senior 8. Senior 2 also notes the dilemma of obsoleting your own products as a consequence of innovation and moreover that this cycle is speeding up. On the other hand, Senior 1 believes that it is a consequence of Services short term focus on competition that long term innovation is neglected. Senior 3 states that in order for Services to reach their ambitious growth targets, they are required to both fine-tune their current portfolio, but also consider something new that can bridge the gap between organic growth and the required growth. A certain amount of growth is derived from the existing business and saturating the market share, but there is a need for further growth if they are to reach their targets, according to Senior 3. Senior 8, though, highlights that there is an inconsistency as Services, with their current portfolio of innovations, could sustain their growth for the next 3-4 years without a shadow of a doubt.

In contrast, from Member 3’s point of view, there is an unwillingness to innovate and change the existing processes, as there is an opinion that they are delivering on their targets in terms of steady growth and sales. Therefore, taking on more risk is seen as unnecessary for Services, as they are afraid of damaging their reputation, according to Member 3. Furthermore, Senior 8 sees a potential future saturation and stagnation in sales growth, which is why they need innovation as a way to supersede these potential stagnations. Senior 6 highlights the importance of making room for exploration, as it might take 10 tries to get 2 successful explorations, but you need to have the capability to explore 10 options to reach the 2 successful ones.

Senior 5 states that Services needs to find a balance between focusing on operational pressing issues and visionary explorative activities aimed at creating future businesses. Furthermore, there is a need to clarify to the company how important it is to be a breakthrough leader and act proactively rather than reactively, according to Senior 5. Exploration is taking place in Tetra Pak, but as it is mostly done in silos, there is an opportunity to collaborate more on exploratory activities throughout the organizations, where they could leverage their collective experience, competence and knowledge according to Senior 4. Member 9 believes that this calls for a visionary leader that can determine and see the value of abstract innovations.

4.3 Management

Management's involvement in exploration has proven to be essential for the longevity of explorative initiatives. However, interviewees have different views on the required as well as optimal degree of support and involvement - perspectives which are accounted for below.

4.3.1 FFS

Member 9 states that the most important stakeholders were the SLT, as they not only sponsored the initiative, but the entire SLT also became brand ambassadors, where they cascaded the information throughout their respective department, which added credibility and validity to the information. Participant 1 believes that it was valuable to get support from the SLT in the IC, where endorsement for ideas took place. However, managing all 9 SLT stakeholders was a challenge in itself, as each individual had different views on correct procedures for the initiative.

The hackathon that FFS held with a university in Munich generated many viable business ideas, where Member 2 personally valued these open innovation environments that generated radical innovation. However, the SLT did not take advantage of or integrate any of these ideas into the organization, which showcased top management's strategy of taking active decisions to maintain the core business. Member 6 expresses a feeling of disconnect between the SLT and the FFS team, where the concept of "not invented here" was present amongst the managers and a sense of management shunning away from employees proposing new ways of working or ideas. An example of this lack of belief is showcased by the 3 year plan for Services not including any mentioning of the FFS initiative, which Member 3 thinks is a shame, as it could be a main activity that would drive ideas. When it comes to changing the mindset and behavior of people in the organization, Member 3 feels like the FFS team lacks the support from both the SLT and the Services department as a whole. Member 3 describes that when speaking to stakeholders or others in the Services department they get positive feedback and affirmations, but their proposals are seldom converted into actions such as integrating it into roadmaps, strategies or conveying messages.

“Some business leaders are put in place to deliver short-term gains, and should therefore not evaluate long-term ideas.” - Member 9

Member 1 explains that while there’s overall been a lot of freedom to operate for the FFS team, management did at times micro-manage the team, for example during the selection of Red Stage applicants, which required a lot of alignment back and forth between stakeholders. During the evaluation process of Red Stage applicants, too much management involvement with the aim of trying to shape the concept, led to negative effects from support rather than positive. Some in the SLT, according to Member 9, delegated the engagement with the IC to others in the organization, but some of them wanted to engage in order to evaluate ideas themselves instead of it being done by FTs. Questions that the reference group raised, according to Member 3 and Senior 4, was how aligned the idea was to their Strategy 2030, the connection with the participant’s leadership behavior, the productivity the idea would bring, costs related to the initiative and ROI. Member 3 believed that the point of following the Evolve methodology, with little to no selection criteria for ideas, was to see the customer value more clearly and save money by experimenting early. In retrospect, Member 3 believes that involving 10 people in the reference group generated too much feedback and ideas which ultimately led to the management team handpicking the ideas that had a strategic fit with Services. Many of the ideas generated in the IC were good according to Member 3, but just not developed enough to gain acceptance as they then were seen as too risky, unfit for the Tetra Pak brand or would belong to an unprioritized area for Services and were thereby rejected. Elaborating further, Senior 4 believes that the selection of ideas was correct, but hopes that they could move towards something more radical and breakthrough, which would require a change in selection criteria and definition of the IC.

Member 9 believes that SLT’s hands-on involvement in the selection of ideas harmed the development of the initiative, as each SLT member in some shape or form prioritized their own gains from ideas. This may or may not have been on purpose, but Member 9 highlights that the SLT rather chose ideas based on their designated business area opportunity. Member 9 believes that stakeholders should be independent from the gains that come from choosing an idea, in order to avoid bias in the selection process. However, Senior 2 explains that by choosing ideas that the sponsors liked and were closely related to their business enabled them to help teams overcome problems or roadblocks. Optimally, according to Member 9, the SLT should have been integrated into the initiative after the selection of ideas had taken place, at the point where the idea becomes important for the business outlook and trajectory. Otherwise, the involvement is too heavy as there are a plethora of ideas, which do not need to be evaluated by senior management, due to their bias.

Concerning integration of ideas, Senior 2 states that management team members need to be more clear about the Gold Stage and what happens subsequently, in order to manage expectations of how ideas are taken care of after they reach the Gold Stage better. Senior 4 explains that at the Red Stage selection, there were hundreds of radical ideas that had to be transformed from vanity to reality, and the SLT members were frankly not prepared to support that commitment at the time. This would require a review of the setup according to Senior 4, where the IC could provide an initial brief in the specific area that the initiative is trying to innovate within, in order to generate ideas that are more aligned with the selection criteria.

"A very small decision could turn into a month's discussion" - Member 3

Senior 4 states that the management team and organization as a whole has to know what radical innovations mean in order for them to be taken into the organization. This concept definition relates to the foundation for which the selection criteria are based on, and ultimately what the organization expects from the ideas proposed in the IC according to Senior 4. Regarding the support provided, Senior 6 agrees with Member 1 and 9's experience of support becoming too controlling sometimes as many of the SLTs are very opinionated. Receiving opinions from Seniors adds validity and credibility to the ideas as well as the process, but comes at the expense of introducing constraints, according to Members 2 and 9. This is a common dilemma according to Senior 6, as you want to find the balance between the better decision made by diversity and inclusion, and the quicker decision making of appointing a person to decide. In light of the cumbersome decision making processes that the SLT introduced, Member 3 describes that a very small decision could turn into a month's discussion.

On the other hand, Member 1 believes that more support would have been beneficial to establish more formalized structures for FFS, as it is currently dependent on the FFS team's willingness to keep it alive. Member 2 states that the support given could have been improved, as the SLT mostly supported when they were asked to, but didn't utilize their network or authority to the highest degree for the initiative's best. This statement is echoed by Senior 4, who doesn't believe that everybody was clear about the steps necessary to support the initiative fully. Moreover, Senior 4 states that the managers not directly involved with the IC had no idea about what was going on within the initiative, and could have contributed more if they would have known, where Senior 3 further highlights that the SLT could have been more engaged and supportive to the initiative, by spending more time with the FFS team and actively inquiring about the need for resources and support. However, Senior 3 is not sure that the outcome would have been better if they were given more support, but perhaps more and better ideas would have gone to Gold Stage.

For the next iteration, Member 1 is hoping for management to take ownership of FFS to make sure that new iterations take place but leave operations to the FFS team, enabling the team to work with a more open mind towards different ideas in the IC, instead of the current stage-gate process with a lot of time spent on small details. Furthermore, Member 7 believes that varying amounts of support is necessary in every phase of the FFS initiative, as the participants needs to have enough support and sponsors need to have capacity to take on the projects and check with other parts of the company to make sure that no parallel similar projects are ongoing.

4.3.2 Services

The Services organization lacks visionary leaders that look beyond short term profits, according to Member 9, where there is an expressed demand for innovation from the SLT, but they don't believe that there is a reason to create a specific team for innovation. Member 9 states that the SLT would rather employees allocate time towards initiatives such as FFS as an extracurricular activity than to increase the headcount, while also not providing any salary benefits for the added responsibility. According to Member 9, the SLT does not realize the amount of hours that is actually spent on these kinds of initiatives, and therefore deem it possible to pursue as extracurricular work. Furthermore, Member 6 believes that there is an issue on the middle management level, as there is a need for managers to be able to carve out time and resources for employees to define for themselves how their day-to-day work tasks would look like, as a way to increase exploration. Tying into this, Member 6 highlights that there is a disconnect between how employees are being evaluated by their managers and the way to create innovative environments and opportunities for employees, as the IOs are focused on exploitative activities and targets relating to these, and do not relate to explorative KPIs. Member 4 agrees with this and believes that integrating explorative IOs would ultimately increase the undertaking of explorative activities in Services.

For Services to increase exploration, there needs to be directions and initiatives coming from top-down according to Member 4, as managers are enablers for initiatives like FFS, and if it is not in their strategy, there won't be any initiatives taken. Seniors 1 and 7 believe that both the SLT and ELT should aggressively promote innovation to a higher extent, as their efforts affect the culture of innovation both in Services and Tetra Pak. Building on this, Participant 4 states that having a clear vision and guidance from top-down on what they believe is important and what they strive for is essential, as securing net sales is not enough.

In Senior 6's eyes, initiatives like FFS is an opportunity for managers to help define what winning means for a team, and could use it as a way to motivate their employees by letting them take an active role in it. However, for the effect to take place, Senior 6 believes that you also need to have a strong vision in the beginning, involve people, and make sure that you actually reach the end-point of the initiative. Another important role of management according to Senior 6 is to minimize the difference between the sum of the individual intelligence in an organization and the collective intelligence of the organization, as an effort to increase innovation. Lastly, Senior 1 argues that if you don't create the space for innovation from the top down, then the ideas will not find a home in the organization, so therefore leadership is important for idea development. However, Member 5 fears that even if management ends up pursuing these explorative ideas fully, it might be too difficult to establish ownership of an idea and implement it if strategic goals point in another direction.

4.4 Processes

Organizational processes have been significant in their impact on the FFS initiative, the IC and the overall ambidextrous efforts within Services, and are therefore discussed below.

4.4.1 FFS

Initially, the SLT included a team of directors, the reference group, in the screening process, which Senior 5 doesn't believe was either fair nor effective for the process and the ideas, as it became unnecessarily cumbersome. Building on this, Senior 6 states that the process used to evaluate ideas could be improved, as on one side, you have to dig deeper into ideas to really understand their value, but on the other side, there are so many ideas proposed so you might not be able to handle them all. Senior 6 believes that a rough numerical judgment could sort out some of the ideas to make the workload more manageable.

The process involved opinions from the SLT, which had to be taken into account and be looped into the decision making process, which wasn't efficient according to Senior 6. Elaborating further, Senior 5 believes that directors should have been introduced later into the IC, acting more as a validating function rather than an evaluating function. When discussing operational decisions, it is not practical to involve the SLT into the process, as they are quite far away from operational contexts, according to Senior 6. However, there is a need to have a director-level halfway steering team, to make sure that you align with the organization, according to Senior 6. SLT should be the deciding factor regarding budgets according to Senior 6, where scenarios are proposed and then decided upon by the SLT. Senior 6 believes that these processes require the involved decision makers to be able to disagree and commit to the task at hand if presented with fair and strong arguments. During the IC, being unable to agree to disagree led to the process being halted because of a small decision, which could have easily been dismissed. Senior 6 believes that the FFS team and stakeholders should have established clear roles in the beginning, so that everyone knew their responsibilities and then also knew the influence and authority they would have over the process.

Member 5 does not believe that the organizational support affected the aim of the initiative in a significant way - a statement which Senior 3 and 5 agrees with. Senior 7 contrasts the situation, stating that some participants did not contact the project sponsor or highlight challenges at the right time which slowed things down, while those coaches and sponsors who engaged with their teams and followed the process were able to successfully develop their idea. The IC itself was affected due to altering the methodological approach for how Evolve was used according to Member 5, and further argues that following the methodology more closely would have resulted in a failure considering the many processes and expectations present in Services. Regarding Evolve, Member 3 states that the methodology was chosen to enable experimentative design in the innovation process, however this methodology was compromised when the initiative was tailored towards Services' processes. The result was losing the concept of fast prototyping when trying to follow processes, satisfy stakeholders and play it safe in Member 3's opinion. Member 6 considers Services as process-heavy due to the problem-solving engineering character, which ultimately leads to high inertia, making it difficult to change these processes.

Member 2 highlights that methodologically, all participants should be given an equal predetermined budget to pursue their idea, but some ideas in the IC needed more funds and some less, which is why the SLT altered the budget allocation structure. Senior 3 states that some IC participants came with unreasonably big budget ideas that were to be tested, which is why the SLT reinforced that the aim was to make a rapid prototype in line with the experimentative innovation process to test its validity. Forming the budget allocation structure took a long time, and therefore compromised the process, which ended up affecting many of the IC participants as they lost momentum with their idea according to Member 2, 4 and 8. Participant 3 states that their initiative was affected both directly and indirectly by the delay in the organizational processes, which meant that they had to find another customer to collaborate with, compromising their customer pilot.

Elaborating on the subject, Member 9 states that in the Services organization, there is no flexibility for stakeholders to have the authority to allocate resources outside of their budget for sponsoring an idea, which constrains the entire process. Even if the initiative was supported financially by the SLT, there was no visionary leader that proactively initiated processes that could become bottlenecks according to Member 4, such as querying the finance team before budgets were due to be allocated. Participant 1 believes Services could have been more proactive in terms of thinking about how the process should end for the IC, where a specific budget in advance regardless of the outcome could have resulted in more freedom and ultimately a better customer pilot.

Member 4 highlights the "next chapter" reorganization, which occurred during the Blue Stage, affected the initiative massively, as the Blue Stage includes open ended processes, leading to many delays due to the uncertainty imposed by the reorganization. Senior 6 states that a lot of marketing of the FFS initiative was taking place initially, but decreased when they reached the implementation phase as turbulence after the reorganization cloaked the initiative within the organization. Extending the issue further, Member 2 states that the low amount of slack in the organization is affecting the time being spent on creative work, such as the FFS initiative. In the Blue Stage, participants had to turn to other organizational teams for help with prototyping to follow the Tetra Pak process, but as these teams already had backlogs of work, combined with no POC being established for the participant's idea yet, their requests were deprioritized, according to Member 4. Participant 4 discusses that if there is no time to deploy or availability for projects that come out of the IC, urgent and pressing matters will overshadow the explorative activity, especially if the core business is at risk.

Another difficult aspect, according to Member 4, regards the implementation and integration phase of ideas into the organization after the Gold Stage, where there is no Evolve methodology to follow in this stage, which could be a hindrance as internal processes have proved cumbersome. Member 4 states that process friction is more prominent in the Gold Stage, as the initiative is exposed to the organization's internal processes to a higher extent in this stage, whereas before they were more independent. Another issue with implementing ideas in the Gold Stage is that more approval and testing is required from the organization, which already has been done in the previous phases of the IC, which makes Member 3 question the usefulness of all the validation in the IC process. Member 4 also believes that some ideas, already validated in the IC, should be entitled to skip at least one of the five toll gates in the SLM tool. Agreeing on this point, Senior 2 proposes that the Services development process should be coordinated with the outcome of Gold Stage, which would enable bypassing some stages in the process, with this continuity being established before reaching the Gold Stage. However, for this to be possible, the methodology and approval process employed in the IC needs to be understood by everyone involved, as otherwise, recipients of the idea will resort to following their own processes instead of accepting the deviation in an agile way, according to Member 4. A contrasting opinion is proposed by Senior 3, who believed that people in the organization thought of the IC as another way to gather resources and funding for their daily issues, which they turned to once their traditional development process request had been denied. Therefore, Senior 3 believes that the ideas that are generated from the IC should be subject to the normal development processes for the IC and not be seen as a shortcut.

Senior 7 further expresses that an issue arises once the idea is supposed to go into full development, where a "not invented here" syndrome for the idea becomes present within the receiving department, which has to be addressed in order to ascertain drive for the idea. Services has to change its processes according to Senior 4, as they currently don't have a clear space in current processes for the FFS setup, which Senior 3 agrees with, but doesn't necessarily point to the processes having to be changed. Instead, Senior 3 believes that creating a complementary process in the SLM process, with a separate budget, would enable an environment in which to test many ideas and invite failure as a source of learning. The IC could be integrated into the SLM process for when ideas have gone through the Gold Stage according to Senior 3, as if there is a business case, then there is a valid foundation for the idea. Senior 5 agrees on the proposal, stating that there needs to be a business case in order to rationalize any changes in the processes. For now, Senior 5 believes it is best for the IC to co-exist with the SLM, so it can feed mature ideas into the Services innovation process and hopefully improve the efficiency, speed and effectiveness of the overall innovation.

Member 7 states that the collaboration with customers that the IC enables is a valuable aspect, where Services can find and develop new solutions jointly with select customers - an avenue for idea generation and collection that wasn't present in the organization previously, especially in terms of customer involvement. Highlighting this aspect, Senior 5 values the information advantage of testing products and services directly with customers, which also speeds up the innovation process and has shown Services that there are other valuable ways to innovate than their usual innovation pipeline. However, Participant 4 believes that clearer communication between FFS and the line organization is needed to ensure that participants have the time and resources to pursue their idea. Participant 5 states that Services have to improve their communication processes for FFS to grow, as they have to raise the awareness of other departments that assist in the innovation and customer communication process, so that they are prepared to collaborate in the idea's development.

Innovative ideas that are pursued in Services does not usually come from the grassroot level, and the encouragement needed for floating such ideas as an employee were not present previously according to Senior 7. The IC is a way to reach out to grassroot level employees and listen to their ideas, and develop them in a structured way, which Senior 7 argues is important to show people that these ideas get sorted in the organization. Moreover, if a developed idea has minimal impact on safety, reputation and brand, and could potentially bring Services some benefit, Senior 8 sees no reason to impose processes just for the sake of the processes, whereas the IC could be an environment for less strict processes. Senior 5 sees the IC as a testament to the new process enabling Services to engage on broader topics and accelerate innovation.

4.4.2 Services

The processes in Services are generally geared towards incremental innovations rather than radical, which largely depends on the speed of innovation according to Member 2. The challenge for Services is to be ahead of time in terms of catering towards the increasingly high standards from customers, where their development speed is too cumbersome according to Senior 4. Senior 3 describes that their inability to innovate quickly in Services results in innovations becoming obsolete for customers once they launch. As previously argued by several interviewees; if a POC has been established, you should be able to skip some toll gates in the development process. However, for an idea to be considered a Tetra Pak product, it needs to have extensive validation through documentation in different areas, which then makes shortcuts in the development process complex according to Participant 3. Furthermore, Senior 2 elaborates on the fact that innovation processes challenge the current ways of working by interfering with the day-to-day operations, which often leads to more delays for the idea being implemented. From the moment you come to the conclusion that there is a viable business case with an idea, it has to get into the mainstream of the business, which unfortunately is when the innovation development slows down, according to Senior 2.

Tying into the high expectations, Senior 5 states that risk management is sometimes over structured and can limit the speed of innovation in pursuit of mitigating the perceived risks of innovation. According to Member 4, the layers of approval for resources and budgets affect the innovation process negatively, which not only takes time but also kills motivation. On the other hand, Senior 7 states that when things do get escalated to higher levels in the organization, solutions present themselves quickly.

Member 4 believes that Services can do more in terms of innovating than it does currently, where viable radical ideas come from markets, but there is no successful integration of these into the organization. Elaborating further, Senior 8 states that an issue in Services is their lack of ability to extract innovative capacity from all their employees, which they tried to remedy by introducing suggestion schemes and opportunity management tools, but have never managed to establish a systematic solution. In Senior 6 and 8's eyes, the growth potential for ideas is enormous from the employees in Services, but the challenge according to Senior 6 stems from lackluster communication between employees within Services. Senior 6 argues that certain employees realize customer needs very early due to their customer facing jobs, but do not speak the "engineering language" well enough for the ideas to be transferred into D&T, which ultimately creates silos. Participant 4 argues that the lack of communication acts twofold, where products developed centrally tend to fail on a local level as they fail to understand customer needs sufficiently - information which already is available in the organization.

Senior 4 sees the future benefit of more efforts in early innovation with universities, suppliers and startups, as well as customer collaborations, but the organizational processes hinder these initiatives to take place. Currently, decisions follow a top-down structure, but Participant 4 believes that enabling individuals to facilitate some kind of decentralized authority and decision-making would in turn lead to faster time-to-action. As Tetra Pak has such an immense responsibility, Senior 8 wants to have every available process for food safety in place, but this unfortunately permeates areas that do not require processes to the same degree. Senior 8 states that people in Services struggle with assessing the degree of processes required in different areas, where there is a time for processes in terms of safety, but also a time where processes are unnecessary. In the latter scenario, Senior 8 has no problem giving people complete freedom in the right place at the right circumstances. Elaborating on this, Senior 5 thinks Tetra Pak can improve in putting together the synergies and capabilities that Tetra Pak contains to optimize their efforts and to give some freedom of operations.

4.5 Structure

Ambidexterity has proven to depend to a certain degree on the structures imposed by the Services organization, ranging from time availability and resource allocation to IOs, and are thereby discussed below.

4.5.1 FFS

Member 9 states that there needs to be organizational structures put in place that enable employees to focus on exploration. Regarding the role of the IC, Senior 5 believes it could combine the innovation spirit in the company with the structure of Services, in order to make Services faster, more agile and with higher degree of participation in internal innovation. Innovation entails engaging with different organizational competencies, and it is important to have a network of people which you can utilize while solving problems in Tetra Pak according to Participant 5, which could be difficult to establish. In light of this, Participant 5 argues that the IC was a way for employees to circumvent the need for having an extensive network themselves, as the program facilitated it instead. However, this shifts the importance of being able to utilize and maintain internal networks to bridge different stakeholders from the individual employee to the FFS team, according to Participant 5, where the FFS team has to be able to provide connections to the solutions. An example of the importance of utilizing the network to reach such a connection is described by Participant 3, who faced many process related issues in the IC related to finding expertise, which the participant couldn't manage to do alone, considering the complex organizations that Tetra Pak and Services are.

Further perspectives on the structural challenges that arose during the FFS initiative is the time and resource availability for employees, according to Senior 7, where limitations in terms of funds and dedicated resources hindered the outcome. Member 5 agrees, claiming that ensuring time availability for the participants in the IC is important, as this is essential for being able to work on their project. Building on this, Member 9 also highlights the importance of autonomy for managers in their budget allocation process, which is not currently present, where managers should have some flexibility built into the budget itself to make room for exploration. Member 4 elaborates further, claiming that a reason for not being able to follow the Evolve methodology was that there was no real opportunity to employ the methodology during work hours, as the IC mostly took place outside of the ordinary work hours. Member 2 describes that as the IC took 20% of the participants' work time, it required approval from managers both in the central organization and in the specific markets, and the support from the SLT validated the request and provided the mandate required to convince managers. However, according to Member 2, despite reaching an agreement for time being allocated for employees for the initiative, this didn't end up actually being realized, as many line managers wanted employees to fit their efforts towards the initiative into their workload, rather than carving out time for it. Member 2 further explains that since the participants in the IC belong to the Services department, where many employees have customer facing jobs, they therefore need to have explicitly allocated time towards the initiative for it to actually take place. Senior 6 agrees to this point, arguing that it is naive to think that employees will be able to pursue their IC ideas in their spare time, and that employees need to have dedicated time, additional tools and authority to move things forward.

Member 4 describes that since participants were busy with their ordinary work tasks, they neglected the things that weren't absolutely necessary for the idea to develop in their perception, which removed some of the methodological elements and compromised the end result. Many succeeded to balance the IC with their regular work, however, some coaches expected their mentees to reach out once they had an issue, which did not always happen according to Senior 7, as asking for help is not always easy for employees, which needs to be considered. Furthermore, Senior 6 highlights that many of the great ideas came from very talented employees who thereby often already have a busy schedule, making it harder to squeeze in more initiatives. On the other hand, this situation is not exclusive to a minority within Tetra Pak, as Member 5 states that carving out time is essential for all employees who are to engage with exploration.

Regarding the FFS team, Senior 5 believes that the team itself is one of the most valuable aspects of the initiative, as their enthusiasm, energy and resilience has enabled the team to surpass the obstacles that they faced and has been essential for the initiative to continue. On the other hand, Member 9 states that the FFS team worked late nights and weekends in order to develop the initiative, which is not sustainable. The picture conveyed by the team to stakeholders is that the occupation was 10%, but in reality it was much more than that, where a lot of skunk work was done outside of office hours and on weekends according to Member 8 and 9. Senior 1 would like to see a team explicitly allocated to FFS, where some employees can take care of operations, and some could look into potential business expanding ideas. Member 9 agrees that an innovation team could be the remedy for the necessary yet unsustainable skunk work being done, as they would manage and take ownership of the IC in the Services department, which would also include filling the pipeline with long-term innovation. Member 5 highlights another challenge with the next iteration will be to ensure proper knowledge transfer to the new employees that will constitute FFS 2.0, where understanding the history and the process itself is essential for them to avoid unnecessary mistakes being made.

Member 3 states that the FFS initiative has no clear place in the organization, which complicates the ownership structure and therefore the legitimacy of the initiative itself. There is still uncertainty regarding the ownership and allocation of projects that come out of the IC according to Member 3, which is exemplified by one idea that belongs to both Services and Market Operations, and can therefore not easily be attributed to one single department. This is further elaborated upon by Participant 1, who argues that FFS should create specific business areas that are susceptible to receiving the developed ideas in order to ensure that ideas are integrated into the organization. Another opportunity is that the FFS initiative could be included in the Services development process, which by integrating it as an organizational structure would enable active monitoring and cherry-picking of ideas by other departments, according to Participant 4. This would be in line with Senior 1's goal of being quick to market, failing fast and using customer input, by dedicating this specific organizational structure to this exploration.

4.5.2 Services

"There is no real space, mentally or time-wise to perform explorative activities" - Member 6

Explorative activities are structured differently between department and organizational functions according to Member 4, which partly depends on the proximity to customers, which is more prominent in Services than PS and PSE. Services is actively being pushed to innovate incrementally by their customers, considering their close proximity, which inherently becomes their innovative scope according to Member 4. Senior 7 elaborates further, and describes that organizational objectives differ between departments, where long-term strategic focus is more prominent in PS and PSE, where more operational focus permeates the Services department, therefore implying short-term objectives. Member 3 states that Services is structured for exploitation, with clear processes for employees to follow, but explorative activities come less organically.

The short-term operational focus entails that employees are evaluated on the short-term results provided, which then overshadows the desire for long-term objectives that are associated with exploration according to Senior 7. Member 6 further describes that some teams in Services have an understanding that employees should spend time on explorative activities and encourage it, but mostly, however, there is no real space, mentally or time-wise to perform these activities. If an employee structures exploration, such as FFS, into the work activities, Member 7 believes that there has to be a clear incentive structure, where employees should get recognition and exposure for their idea. Explorative activities are not structured on an individual level in Services according to Senior 3, which is something that the organization wants to change. However, Senior 1 states that the ELT is cognizant of the fact that employees are concerned about their yearly deliverables and therefore construct the 3-year plan accordingly, which Senior 1 respects and supports. An employee can say that they allocate 20% of their time towards exploration but that implies that they are not focusing on their regular deliverables according to Senior 1. Employees have to deliver on the results committed to the 3-year plan, which are based on KPIs included in the IOs, which makes it difficult to focus on issues that may lie 5 years in the future according to Senior 1. IOs will be the primary evaluation basis for an employee, and since they are based on yearly performance, there is an inherent conflict between thinking of new business and delivering on current business according to Senior 1.

Senior 2 states that D&T has a long-term focus on technological innovation that opens new business opportunities, where they have a different mindset and pursue their developments in a more agile way, which Senior 6 believes is beneficial for novel innovation. However, Senior 3 states that this department is mainly focused on exploration related to PS and PSE rather than on Services. While there previously was a team that worked with exploration in Services specifically, it has since been dissolved during a reorganization according to Member 2. Currently, Member 3 explains that Services has a team for business development, but they are only tailoring their existing internal Services portfolio to fit customer needs, rather than conducting an explorative search.

Resources in terms of manpower, funds and time is important to consider for exploration to take place according to Senior 7. However, according to Member 4 and Senior 1, there is another issue which is tied to the complex structure of the organization and the frequent reorganizations taking place. Employees generally have a hard time understanding who to turn to in an innovation development process, and as reorganizations take place frequently according to Senior 1, not only does security and stability for employees decrease, but the previous certainty of the development process also becomes confused. Building on this, Member 2 believes that explorative activities could take form in a cross-business function that can identify synergies and take ownership of innovation and spread the innovations throughout Services and Tetra Pak, which also could help sustain innovation through reorganizations.

4.6 Culture

The innovation culture within Services and Tetra Pak is a foundation for exploration, and the different aspects of how it relates to Services' ambidextrous efforts are presented below.

4.6.1 FFS

Member 7 believes that the FFS managed to change the attitude of the SLT, where the SLT realized that they could get fresh ideas from employees that already were within the organization. Senior 2 agrees with this point, and highlights the importance of everyone involved being committed, engaged and keen on seeing the results for the initiative to succeed. Furthermore, Senior 2 states that the initiative's ability to engage both participants and stakeholders proves its value for Services. According to Senior 3, a positive take away from FFS is that the organization supported employees in breaking the status quo by developing something that didn't follow the rigid processes that usually permeate initiatives within Services. The recognition of people dedicating their time to floating ideas within the organization no matter their usual job was very valuable to Senior 2. Likewise, Participant 2 valued the methodology, exposure, learning and expanded network that was gained through the initiative. Member 2 hopes that the first iteration has established a more understanding view of considering innovation in this context, which would result in a more accepting and innovative culture at Tetra Pak, which then would make the second iteration go smoother.

Another aspect which is valuable according to Senior 2 is that the methodology has proven to Tetra Pak that you can go from idea, to concept, to testing in a short time, and quickly be able to decide whether to kill, develop or exploit an idea. As the FFS initiative formation phase itself followed an experimentative approach, there was a failing and learning mindset where the FFS team altered the initiative as they developed it, but Member 2 fears that this agile way of working is lost when integrating the initiative into the organization. The aspect of maintaining an iterative learning process in the initiative is fundamental to the initiative itself, according to Member 2, and should therefore be nurtured. Member 1 further states that the FFS team can have a good process that is endorsed and kept alive by top management, but if employees don't apply for the IC, it will never be a success. Keeping the engagement and commitment around the initiative alive is also going to be a key success factor for the initiative to remain within Services according to Member 1. The challenge then, according to Member 1, would be to not fill the IC too heavily with all the existing organizational processes and corporate bureaucracy, but to keep it agile, because engagement from people will decrease otherwise. This scenario is further described by Member 4, who highlights that the motivation levels for the participants in the IC decreased during the Blue Stage, which was heavily affected by organizational processes delaying the development. Senior 6 believes that Tetra Pak has to remember that the IC is partly there to motivate people, achieve something within the organization and to celebrate the result, which might be forgotten in the process.

Member 5 believes that the cultural aspect regarding innovation needs to be changed in Services, as FFS demands an open mind towards experimenting and risk-taking, as well as the inclusion of diverse viewpoints and ideas into the organization, which enriches the innovative capabilities. Member 7 already sees that Services is becoming more open towards new ideas being brought forward, where good ideas have an opportunity to bring value both for Tetra Pak and their customers. In line with this, the several thousands of service engineers that meet customers everyday have a massive innovation capacity, with potentially great business focused ideas, and the IC was a way to tap into this potential, according to Senior 8.

As the IC enabled employees to engage with other levels of the organization, it was therefore relatively radical according to Senior 7, as this isn't always possible within Services. While employee engagement has been done previously, some ideas that were floated by employees were not translated into the organization, which led to the employees losing focus and drive for innovation. Building on this, Senior 7 argues that in order for the IC to perform at the optimal level and for ideas to survive, ownership from top management and close follow-up is needed, as the participants usually haven't interacted with that organizational level previously, and therefore need support. Participant 2 reinforces the perception of support being essential, as the support received from the FFS team was very valuable, by virtue of being available and helpful. However, this was not the case for every participant according to Participant 2, where some IC stakeholders believed reaching the end point was more important than following the methodology, which gave room for different management approaches and expectations. Building on this incongruence, Participant 4 thinks that while FFS primarily acts as a tool for employee branding, it can also be a tool to change the mindset of how to look at problems and understand customers. In this case, the FFS team shouldn't be result oriented but rather focused on the value of allowing people to explore and fail in a sandbox setting according to Participant 4.

4.6.2 Services

Member 3 states that Tetra Pak has all the resources necessary in terms of employees and finances to be innovative, but as their incremental innovations generate revenue and growth, employees become less motivated to explore radical innovations. With this in mind, Member 1 and 5 believes that Services needs to spark innovative thoughts among employees to start a more active innovation culture.

Employee well-being is a hugely important aspect for innovation to take place in Tetra Pak according to Senior 8, which relates to the environment, working conditions and culture. However, there is a fear of risk-taking prominent in Services according to Member 9, which relates to the fundamental changes that radical innovations impose. Member 9 further elaborates that imposing a radical change could prove detrimental for the ones involved, as innovative efforts don't necessarily contribute to your IOs, which then could be considered worse than the status quo. Member 9 believes that in order to be truly innovative as an organization, employees should be able to challenge status quo, but in Services this might affect your personal career development negatively. Member 6 highlights that the culture of innovation has been altered, where the next chapter reorganization imposed an increased focus on delivering on your performance indexes, and not innovative efforts. From Senior 8's point of view, too many people are focused on results within Services, as results come from focusing on the circumstances from where they can be generated rather than the results themselves. In Participant 1's eyes, not engaging with radical changes can only last until a destructive change comes, which is why Services should pursue more exploration.

Services is an engineering heavy department and therefore strives for perfection in everything, which sometimes results in over engineered solutions where customer needs are forgotten in the pursuit of the perfect solution, according to Senior 3. Member 3 elaborates on this topic, by highlighting that the difficulty arises when trying to launch something that always has to be bulletproof from the very outset, as there is, by nature, a lot of uncertainty involved in the innovation process. Building on this, Services doesn't communicate failures within the company or externally according to Member 3, which makes employees hesitant to try out new things, as they are unable to learn from mistakes. The imposed fear of failure becomes a deterring factor for the employees that may have truly novel and necessary ideas for Tetra Pak according to Member 7. Member 9 agrees to the lack of learning culture in Services, where it affects their inclination to give employees the responsibility to explore opportunities that would result in failure, which then would enable organizational learning. By negating organizational learning, Participant 1 argues that Tetra Pak commits unnecessary mistakes.

Elaborating further, Senior 6 argues that the lack of learning culture acts twofold, where Senior 6 believes that the inability to fail fast in Services is hindering the innovation taking place, which ultimately prevents the department from pursuing new things. Senior 4 describes that with their current processes, employees rather string ideas along in the development process because they are afraid of being considered failures, instead of killing the idea and viewing it as a positive learning experience for the organization. Senior 2 believes that by utilizing MVP's, Services could become more apt for organizational learning by virtue of failing fast.

Teams are generally not multidisciplinary for projects according to Member 6, which is tied to the many processes present at Tetra Pak, and this lack of diversity results in comfortability and ultimately a weaker drive for innovation, according to Participant 2. Member 2 believes that the unwillingness to radically innovate might be down to the generally low turnover of personnel in Tetra Pak, as employees then become comfortable and less prone to challenges. A program like FT is hugely important according to Member 9, where they in Senior 5's eyes can offer new perspectives into the organization with their high energy, innovation and good spirit. Member 9 states that there is a mutual benefit for both the FTs and the experienced employees, where FTs provide new insights and questions in exchange for tacit knowledge acquired through experience. Introducing diversity in terms of new employees into existing teams is actively remedying the problem of dismissing ideas at face value, which is prominent in Services according to Member 9. Furthermore, the FT program enables the creation of a network that not even 10 years working in the organization could compete with according to Member 6 and 9, and this network facilitates problem solving in the innovation process by finding the right people more efficiently. Member 6 states that there are lower barriers to engage with more experienced employees in the organization, as people are more open to involvement as you are considered to be somewhat of an internal consultant that solves problems. The challenge then, according Member 6, is to maintain the perceived ability to pursue exploration after the FT program has concluded and you are assigned a "regular" role.

4.7 Concluding analysis

From the results and analysis presented in the previous chapters, the different theories that can be connected to overarching topics identified from the Results, which then will be categorized into discussion topics. Theories are connected with respect to the specific nuances of driving innovation in an established firm, grounded in the case and the findings from it.

Table 4.2: Theory connected to overarching findings from the Results, which serve as the basis for discussion topics.

Results & Analysis		
Theory	**Related Result**	**Discussion Title**
Sequential ambidexterity Customer orientation Strategic tensions Innovative capabilities	Varying rate of innovation	Fluctuating innovation cycles
Alignment of stakeholders Establishing a vision	Radical vs incremental Importance	Split opinions & expectations
Managerial ambidexterity Explore vs exploit	Selection criteria Control over support	Management incongruities
Boundary spanning Uncertainty mapping	Budgeting Validation Process integration	Process inefficiencies
Integration Enabling exploration Contextual ambidexterity	IOs Resource allocation	Lack of innovation structure
Prerequisites for exploration Organizational learning	Risk-averse Lack of learning culture Innovative culture	Cultural aspects

5 Discussion

The discussion chapter will connect the theoretical aspects of organizational ambidexterity with the case of FFS and how Services pursues exploration and exploitation. Divided into specific subjects of discussion is made in accordance with the thematic presentation of results, beginning with the fluctuation of innovation within Services. Lastly, future recommendations for Tetra Pak is provided for insights that may be found related to organizational ambidexterity and innovation.



Figure 5.1: Visualization of the relation between categories and discussion points.

5.1 Fluctuating innovation cycles

Throughout the interviews there have been depictions of varying intensity in ambidextrous activities in the Services department historically, being described as a pendulum going from one extreme to the other, switching between intense innovation and skepticism towards new ventures. This scenario is akin to sequential ambidexterity (Chen, 2017), where Services has fluctuated between times of exploration and exploitation, which has addressed organizational reconfigurations of processes, structures and strategies. As described by Senior 2, the initial growth stages of Services stemmed from innovating in uncharted territories, which is recognized in theory as exploration (Bierly III & Daly, 2007). Services has managed to become a lucrative business in the recent years following their successes in exploration, but has become increasingly inert and focus has shifted towards optimizing operations, which is what defines exploitation (Bierly III & Daly, 2007). The reasoning for the increased focus on exploitation has been described by the interviewees as a result of previous explorative efforts being considered as failures, due to their lack of ability to provide value to the organization, combined with an insufficient focus on their core business. Considering the previous events depicted in the interviews, there is now a skepticism towards innovations' ability to contribute towards the Services department's value offering, which explains the current focus on exploiting current business. As Chen (2017) explains, sequential ambidexterity is a way to balance the opposing logics of exploration and exploitation, but at the risk of potentially destroying core organizational capabilities with each shift between ambidextrous approaches. This remedying tactic of temporally separating exploration and exploitation has evidently left the Services organization in a disarray, as there are different capabilities required for each mode, but with each pendulum swing there are only one set of capabilities that are valued. Adopting longer timeframes instead of sequentially pursuing either exploitation or exploration, would enable pursuing flexibility and cross-fertilization synergies between the contrarian, which is a characteristic for successful ambidextrous organizations (Van Looy et al., 2005).

At the moment, the focus lies mostly on exploitation, where interviewees have explained that there is a lack of urgency to innovate or disrupt the industry within the Services department. Several interviewees have expressed a concern for this situation, as it may leave them vulnerable to changes in laws and regulations, and they may need to innovate to remain competitive and relevant. Exploitative activities might lead to short-term profits, but foster eventual stagnation, according to Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009), which open up for vulnerability to market and technological changes. Services faces complexity regarding the possibility of focusing on long-term personal growth due to customer problems and urges combined with the short-term nature of the strategy in the customer facing roles that many employees follow. Interviewees state that there is a complexity regarding the possibility to deviate from regular work activities in Services to focus on long-term development of personal growth, which can be exemplified by exploration. This description relates to the customer orientation paradox, where a tight coupling shifts the focus towards customer needs and problems, while a loose coupling encourages opportunity recognition (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), which exemplifies the complexity for Services.

Being market driven in terms of providing continuous product improvements to serve customers can be effective for innovating incrementally, but Utterback (1996) suggests that this strategy is unsuitable for generating radical innovation. Furthermore, Utterback (1996) stresses the importance of ongoing adaptation of the innovation strategies in organizations in order to avoid becoming a provider for current needs while neglecting future business opportunities. The customer orientation tension can be managed by entertaining ideas that may seem unviable at first glance, while also being courageous enough to refrain from initiatives that result in a compromise to your positioning towards customers (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Throughout the IC, there was a tendency to gravitate towards ideas that served current business and seemed feasible to perform given current conditions, which also resulted in selecting ideas that would end up serving current customers rather than new. Managing this tension of strategic intent, which alludes to balancing creativity and profitability in firms (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), could be done by entertaining both explorative and exploitative projects simultaneously, in order to secure funds to allocate towards explorative efforts while also gaining a positive reputation to build a customer base (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Interviewees have depicted that entertaining both exploration and exploitation simultaneously is desired to some degree, but the fundamental purpose of Services is perceived as the more operationally focused department, and therefore always considers exploitation the most important for their business growth. Tensions that arise from balancing exploration and exploitation should be taken advantage of (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Van de Ven et al., 1999; Garud et al., 2011), and therefore Services should view the tension as an energizing source of innovation rather than an organizational conflict that is to be resolved. An example of this energizing ability of the tension between explore and exploit is the FFS initiative creation itself, as it stemmed from the perceived cyclical nature of innovation and dissonance between what Services did and what they could achieve.

Seniors have pointed out the value of being able to exploit the current business and the innovations that arise from exploration, as they enable Services to explore further. As exploitation provides more clarity through delivering consistent and reliable results to a higher degree than exploration (March, 1991), it is reasonable to believe that exploitation is considered more favorable for an organization with ambitious growth targets, and therefore shapes managerial practices in this way (Chen, 2017). As Services has seen a steady growth from their ability to exploit their previous exploration, the managers that have been instrumental for this development would therefore have been further championed in the organization, and hence believe that exploitation is to be favored. Furthermore, companies that focus their efforts on exploitative activities perform better in short-term returns and costs (Van Looy et al., 2005; Chen, 2017). Considering the transitional effect that exploitation has had on Services as an organizational department in terms of importance for the core business, it is evident that their ability to exploit is extensive and substantial. According to Senior 2, innovation is a way to avoid commoditization and to gain a differentiation advantage and incremental innovation is many times enough to stay relevant as an organization in the competitive landscape. This incremental innovation strategy has been the degree to which exploration has been pursued in Services, which then have been exploited effectively. Nevertheless, companies that perform ambidextrous activities reinforce the long-term sustainability of their business by exploring new opportunities, and continuously creating radical innovations (Van Looy et al., 2005). Therefore, Services has to consider radical innovations as a part of their exploration strategy, which then could bridge the gap between organic growth and their ambitious growth targets.

Throughout the interviews, there has been a depiction that Services follows a low-risk approach to innovations, and that the department is considered a "legacy business" within Tetra Pak. Services has fewer external pressures to innovate, as rules and regulations that normally force Tetra Pak to innovate do not apply to the Services offering to the same degree as Processing and Packaging experience, according to the interviewees. Considering the low pressure, in conjunction with the view of Services mainly being a legacy business - supporting the other two functions - Services do not intend to introduce more risk to an already high-performing department, according to several interviewees. Low-risk exploration entails pursuing projects that align with current business, where O'Connor et al. (2006) state that following this strategic intent results in developing limited organizational systems for radical innovations, where radical efforts become seen as an obstruction to the current business. By leaning towards increased exploitation and decreased exploration, a hindrance to adaptive processes could develop, according to March (1991) which ties into the tendency for business models to become increasingly resistant to change over time (Christensen et al., 2016). Business model innovation is lacking in the Services department according to some interviewees, which most established firms align with (Koen et al., 2011). However, this is no justification for shying away from pursuing explorative activities, which aim to stretch, transform or develop new capabilities (Chen, 2017) as well as encourage leaving behind the confirmation bias of previous success (Koen et al., 2011). As stated by Senior 8, companies have to be able to change themselves to stay competitive and relevant, which ties into the concept of sustained exploration being essential for the continued intelligence of an organization (March, 1991). Considering the described substantial growth potential in Services exploiting their current business, there is an opportunity to shift the focus towards exploring the new business that can become the next target of exploitation for Services.

5.2 Split opinions and expectations

Different goals call for different approaches for reaching those goals. It is therefore important to establish a common vision in order to align stakeholders and jointly establish the correct line of action to reach that common vision. However, from the interviews it is evident that quite different goals and perceptions of the initiative exist between all organizational levels, leading to dissonance in how to approach the initiative as well as what is considered a success. This ties into expectation management, where successful ambidextrous organizations express clear visions and values through a cogent strategic intent, in order to align stakeholders both within and around the initiative (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2011). By establishing a strategic intent for the initiative, there could be a common understanding of its place in the organization for the long-term development of innovation within Services, and its importance to the organization could therefore be positioned in accordance with the strategic intent.

There was a common understanding that the FFS initiative related to innovation and improving Services' offerings, as well as the Innovation Challenge provided a platform for employees to float and test ideas within Tetra Pak. On the other hand, views differed regarding the way in which Services would be enriched with innovations and how innovations should be received within the organization. Members within the FFS team had the ambition for the IC to generate relatively radical ideas that would be fast-forwarded into the innovation portfolio in Services, and be exempted from certain processes and validations that delay and constrain initiatives in their development. However, opinions among the other interviewee categories varied slightly and leaned towards that the IC should consider radical innovations, but had the expectation of more incremental ideas actually being accepted into the innovation portfolio. In this conundrum, tensions developed throughout the organization since the difference in perception of what the IC should deliver affected the initiative itself as a result of the different logics required for developing either radical or incremental innovations. Managing radical innovation programs call for establishing an articulated vision for the development (Leifer et al., 2000), where differences in how FFS is viewed as a means of achieving its goals, such as Senior 6's focus on closing the loop and ensuring that engagement brings results, compared to Participant 2's focus on changing the approach to problem-solving showcase that there was a lack of an established common vision. Some view the process of surfacing bottom-up innovation and allowing any employee to drive innovative projects as the valuable aspect, while others do not perceive value until successful integration into the innovation portfolio has been achieved. Is it the process itself that is valuable, the results coming out of it, or the value for employees to be able to explore? Reaching a common view on this purpose of the initiative becomes essential in order for stakeholders to strive towards the same results.

Apart from the selection criteria that was used in the evaluation of Red Stage applicants, there was no explicit framing of the type of ideas that should be submitted for the IC. This is something that Senior 8 views as beneficial, as introducing themes would constrain the initiative and its potential outcome, while others see an absence of theme as a complexity, as common guidelines and understanding of the initiative aren't established. As there is a plan for the second iteration of the IC to use "Sustainability" as a theme, there will be a framing of the initiative and thereby the types of ideas that should be submitted. One could make the case for this being constraining, as truly radical innovations within Services would not need to be attributed to a certain theme or framework but rather accepted for the potential of the idea itself, which is similar to Senior 8's perspective. However, some of the interviewees have expressed the framing as beneficial, as this would then enable coherent judgment of ideas within the designated area, as well as the potential of focused radical ideas that could be considered, as their adherence to the suggested theme increases the possibility of it being considered viable. Furthermore, by employing a theme, the reasoning for why selection has favored a certain idea will be more consistent, and therefore more easily understood by all parties involved. Framing the initiative could be related to the importance of resolving uncertainties in radical innovation business models (Leifer et al., 2000), where a sustainability theme could partly be an articulated vision of the initiative and could resolve uncertainty by ideas aligning more with the organizational purpose and goals.

Interviewees had different opinions on how radical the FFS initiative actually was, where some believed that their new innovation process and tools made for a completely novel way of working within Services of the innovative ideas generated by FFS. Further, the opportunity for any employee to pitch and pursue an idea within the organization was considered radical by the majority of interviewees, as it differs vastly from the innovation processes currently in place. Regarding the outcome, views differ greatly from the outcome being considered purely incremental innovations to completely novel projects. Some attributed the IC's incremental outcome to that employees only are able to generate incremental improvements to their tasks, whereas others saw the selection phase of ideas as the funnel in which radical ideas were filtered out. Moreover, as the ideas that were advanced into Blue Stage had to develop a business case, radical ideas would inherently struggle to do so, considering the uncertainty that characterizes radical innovations. Furthermore, support is therefore vital according to several of the interviewees, but some Seniors believed that the support should be minimized with the rationale that an idea that is good enough should be able to convince stakeholders of its importance, and therefore develop accordingly. There is a tendency for radical innovation systems to deviate from the initial purpose of pursuing ambitious projects while the initiative is increasingly dependent on delivering tangible outcomes (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005), which many interviewees have depicted. This development towards more certain and conventional ideas undermines some reasoning for the initiative itself, as some interviewees even believed that the innovations that were developed in the IC could have been a part of the usual innovation process anyway due to the cumbersome execution.

5.3 Management incongruities

Organizational ambidexterity entails a higher collective ambidexterity than all individual efforts combined (Raisch et al., 2009), which is facilitated by ambidextrous managers' opportunity to orchestrate exchanges between benefits derived from exploration and exploitation (M. L. Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996) which FFS was an example of. By providing a platform for internal innovation, Senior 6 stated that managers had the responsibility of minimizing the difference between individual and collective intelligence in order for innovation to flourish. Building on this, management involvement in ambidextrous efforts has been described as a centerpiece in the success of such efforts by all interviewee categories. As projects' access to corporate resources are facilitated through management (Burgelman, 1991; Kaplan, 2008), by acting as either critics, sponsors or stakeholders for the initiative (Van De Ven & Grazman, 1997), their influence over the idea development is substantial. The importance of managers for innovation has been evident not only in the IC, but also in the development of the FFS initiative, being the cornerstone for the inception.

Senior 6 described the relative importance of employees being a part of a winning team as being much higher than monetary compensation, where the FFS initiative is an opportunity for managers to help define this for employees, and therefore guiding them towards a vision. Explorative initiatives, such as FFS, should be managed by emergent strategies (Chen, 2017), where guided evolution enables managers to influence the development direction of an initiative by continuously developing the strategy as the initiative evolves (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000). By being adaptable in the strategic management of the FFS initiative and the IC, resource allocation for the new FFS team could be tailored to suit the organizational timelines, as well as the possibility to manage expectations by employing a theme for the IC that aligns with the organization's interests and visions. Furthermore, initiatives like the IC that generate radical innovations can be managed by middle-level managers continuously affirming the importance of innovating radically according to O'Connor & Ayers (2005), which then introduces a multilevel approach as an effort to reduce mixed messages and enable optimal innovative idea development (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). While this increases the potential influence a Senior level manager can have over directions and developments, they consequently also take on major responsibilities in innovation taking place in their respective department.

Considering the ambitious growth targets set for Services during the past and coming years, managers are responsible for delivering results in their respective departments, which consequently places an importance on the type of measurements used to evaluate growth. Simultaneously, many interviewees stated that it is up to Senior level management to enable and pave the way for innovation, as they have the mandate to introduce exploration into the rather exploitative day-to-day work for Services employees. Courage to sacrifice short-term growth to allow for uncertain long-term commitments has to be present in Senior leadership according to O'Connor et al. (2005). Some Seniors agree with this point, and believe that they could have done more for the FFS initiative, which could have improved the outcome, but other Seniors state that there needs to be more incentives communicated from the top level of management for innovation. Thereby, there are conflicting opinions on where the responsibility for innovation lies, but the importance of it being continuously acted upon is commonly understood within Services, and therefore this responsibility should be clearly established.

All interviewee groups have acknowledged that management's involvement in the selection phase in the IC affected the outcome of which projects that were undertaken, where there was a preference for strategy-aligned ideas over the initially intended open-minded selection criteria being the basis. In order for a company to preserve their competitive positioning and advantage it is essential to consider their selection criteria for which innovations to pursue according to Goodman et al. (1994), where firms that only pursue strategically aligned projects develop organizational inertia towards investing in capabilities for managing radical innovation projects (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). If an organization implements an initiative to encourage radical innovation that already aligns with its current strategy, questions arise as to how radical these ideas actually are (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005), which many employees have expressed during interviews.

Selection of ideas were done in conjunction with a SLT-appointed reference group, which consisted of managers from different business units within Services. Given their expertise in their respective departments, there were strong incentives for managers to promote and champion ideas that would benefit their organizational function, but also the opposite, where lack of value for the managers department negatively affected their inclination to contribute. This concept is described by Leifer et al. (2000) as a challenge with engaging senior managers in a selection phase for radical innovations, as their experience primarily lies within exploiting the current business, exactly representing Member 9's quote: *"Some business leaders are put in place to deliver short term gains, and should therefore not evaluate long term ideas"*. As the measurements used for incremental innovations are vastly different from the ones used for radical innovation (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005), the fact that managers don't realize the value is reasonable. Nevertheless, if there is an ambition to develop radical ideas, the selection criteria should consider that the tendency to exploit rather than explore results in unfair portrayal of radical ideas' value (Christensen et al., 2008; Janos & Rich, 2013; Benner & Tushman, 2002), which consequently requires safeguarding radical innovations (Janos & Rich, 2013). However, interviewees have expressed that even if Seniors were to fully commit to supporting radical innovations, there is still uncertainty as to whether these actually would convert into projects if strategic directions diverge.

As managers of a radical innovation system within established firms have to manage stakeholders and the competition for internal resources (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005), it is essential to be able to convey the importance of a radical innovation (Markides, 1998), as they inherently require high amounts of acceptance to develop (Damanpour, 1991). If managers possess an inconsistent view on the importance of radical innovation, as many interviewees have depicted, employees within Services will become increasingly resistant towards engaging with ambidextrous initiatives as the lack of a common vision on the value of innovation undermines the incentive to collaborate (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2011). Interviewees have argued that innovation has to be reinforced and expressed continuously by Executive level management in order for cementing the intent and vision of innovation within Services, which would allow Senior level managers to be more focused on pursuing future potential needs. Whether FFS remains a tool for exploring future business or not depends on management's depiction of the strategic importance it has for Services. The expressed uncertainty of FFS's longevity has resulted in misalignment and lack of organizational awareness of the FFS initiative, ultimately affecting the outcome and process negatively.

5.4 Process inefficiencies

Interviews have depicted complex organizational structures and responsibilities as a hindrance for idea generators to float their ideas into the organization, especially in terms of radical innovations. Contrary to how incremental innovations are generated, radical innovations surface through boundary spanning individuals by inserting it into the organizational network (Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1982; Cooper, 1990; Griffin, 1997; Reid & de Brentani, 2004). Not being able to traverse the organizational landscape to address the appropriate stakeholder therefore has proven complicated, and served as one reason for the FFS initiative's creation. While an employee generates an idea that is to contribute value, the inherent steps towards approval from the decision makers include explorative search and structuring the opportunity connected to a problem definition, concerting the boundary interface (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; P. G. Smith & Reinertsen, 1991; Leifer et al., 2000; March, 1991; Cooper, 1990; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986; Crawford, 1980; Urban & Hauser, 1980).

Varying degrees of success has been described within the boundary interface between decision makers and radical innovators, where both the FFS and IC development process has been negatively affected by the lack of permeation of information with other stakeholders in the organization, which ultimately affects the firms involvement in radical innovation (Drucker, 1999; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1999; Veryzer Jr, 1998). Senior 7 exemplified the notion that when ideas are escalated by decision makers, the process that previously was cumbersome is suddenly expedited and runs smoother, implying a presence of negative effects on processes from gatekeeping. By information regarding an initiative being withheld from relevant stakeholders, establishing a common understanding becomes increasingly difficult, and therefore affects the decision makers' inclination to align with the initiative, consequently stagnating the process (Burgelman & Sayles, 1988; Fusfeld, 1978; Khurana & Rosenthal, 1997). Moreover, as a consequence of information asymmetry among stakeholders, evaluating the idea in terms of benefit relative to risk often results in a higher perceived risk, which then entails risk management by introducing processes to ascertain the value.

There is a balance between processes providing valuable quality assurance and them becoming obstacles for innovation to take place - a balance which needs to be managed for the important momentum to be sustained (Leifer et al., 2000). A loss in momentum affected the IC for many participants, where the cumbersome budget approval process resulted in compromised pilots, delays, and ultimately participants abandoning their projects. This constraint in financing that came from slow approval processes often hamper innovative activities (Savignac, 2008). For the FFS initiative to become a more successful and understood organizational function, the information asymmetry has to be addressed by continuously spreading awareness of FFS's purpose and vision. Considering that the IC initially had more than 150 ideas submitted, and 27 months later only a few have managed to convert into the end phases, there is evidence to process inefficiencies within the affected organizational functions, considering the time spent and amount of ideas filtered. Filtering out ideas is an integral component of pursuing the innovation funnel, but the essence is for organizations to be able to rapidly iterate in this filtration process for innovation to develop.

The previously described balance between managerial control and freedom in processes tends to lean towards more focus on stage-gate processes being the basis for validation and acceptance within Services. It has even been described as a hindrance towards introducing new sources of ideas into the innovation process, where interviewees argue that innovation efforts are not seen as enriching but rather interfering with the day-to-day operations. By basing the innovation process on entrepreneurial concepts instead of formal stage-gate processes, uncertainty, that normally is perceived as risks, is instead being considered a fundamental aspect of idea development, and can therefore be mapped (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005; Leifer et al., 2000). Utilizing complementary tactics in terms of innovating with both incremental and radical processes could be a way to reduce the inherent defensiveness which arise when risks appear (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), and communicating the risks can instead be seen as contributing to the development of collective intuition (Eisenhardt, 1999). Hence, it is imperative to examine potential frameworks or procedures that support organizations in managing early innovation processes (Davenport, 1993), where there is an expressed desire for increased communication within Services to enable synergies to be explored. A significant asset that Services possess is the knowledge that their employees gather daily from their inherent proximity to customers, and being able to leverage this collective knowledge could both generate more ideas, but also improve the understanding of customer needs.

FFS acts as a bridge between idea generators and organizational decision makers in terms of communication, but optimally processes for integrating ideas into the organization should also be established (Leifer et al., 2000). For there to actually be radical innovations adding value to an organization, integration, which ultimately enables exploitation of the exploration, is the defining aspect of successful radical innovation processes (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). It has been evident that integration has been a difficult part of the innovation process for Services, and has to be addressed in order for them to leverage their exploitative capabilities to the degree that they historically have. The experimentative activities that the IC practiced are essential for assessing the technological, market and strategic fit (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005), and should therefore be seen as a valid approval process for integrating ideas into the organization, instead of it being seen as an inferior validation that requires additional follow-up. In this way, the IC could become an integral part of Services in terms of providing additional processes for exploring new ideas in new ways.

5.5 Lack of innovation structure

Throughout the interviews, there have been statements of organizational structures imposing a complexity when pursuing innovation as an employee, both in the IC and in general. Depending on the role within the organization, there are varying opportunities to allocate time towards innovation in the day-to-day work, which in turn affected their respective view on the ability to be innovative in Services. The ability to act on perceived untapped potential within an organization contributes towards organizational learning (Reid & de Brentani, 2004), and these explorative activities are more likely to emerge once there is encouragement through motivation and time allocation (Amabile, 2018; Angle & Van de Ven, 1989; Damanpour, 1991; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). The IC aimed to provide both motivation and time for employees to engage with innovation for the benefit of Services, where they would be able to provide valuable innovation information to the organizational knowledge accumulation. Such knowledge flows are, according to Mom et al. (2007), a solution for increasing the organizational ambidexterity, as the IC provided a structure that accommodated innovation as a separate platform. The initiative served as several types of organizational ambidexterity, as it was sequential in its iterative execution, contextual for the employees becoming participants as everyone could apply and receive resources for pursuing innovation, and structural in terms of it being an entity assigned to innovate (Chen, 2017). Therefore, the FFS initiative and the IC serves as the epitome of pursuing organizational ambidexterity in an established firm, with its multiple layers and characteristics serves to enable both exploration and the exploitation that follows.

Organizational ambidexterity is structured differently between departments and organizational functions within Tetra Pak as an organization, where D&T serves as the leading exploring function that spans across the core business units. Based on the interviews, D&T as a structural ambidextrous function (Chen, 2017) is utilized to a higher degree in the PS and PSE, as they experience higher pressure to innovate relative to Services, which then becomes more exploitative as a result. Some interviewees have tied this to Services being closer to customers, which then has positioned them to be an incremental innovator for their customers rather than the trailblazing organizational function that PS and PSE have been described as. The positioning of Services as an exploitative function resembles the implicit underlying forces that affects the decisions to favor exploitation over exploration (March, 1991), where managers in charge of implementing organizational ambidexterity also have to consider the rather exploitative nature of Services while deciding on explorative ambitions.

As employees are evaluated on their performances through their respective Individual Objectives, the degree to which an employee can pursue innovation relates to how much innovation the IOs allow for. The vast majority of FFS members never managed to include innovative goals into their IOs, and were therefore largely evaluated on their performance in other areas than the initiative itself. In order for individuals to engage in innovation, reward systems and career paths must be constructed appropriately (Leifer et al., 2000), where many interviewees argue for integrating KPIs relating to exploration as a solution to the tension between focusing on short-term performance over long-term innovation. For innovation to be seen as value-adding to performance rather than deviating from it, IOs that incorporate innovative performance criteria could encourage employees to innovate, as their efforts would be more fairly represented and recognized. Interviews have conveyed a widespread ambition amongst employees to pursue innovation in Services, and as organizational ambidexterity being present on all levels in the organization is essential for leveraging long term ambidexterity (Kohn Rådberg, 2005), there is a massive opportunity to convert the creative ambitions towards organizational assets.

Simultaneously, the underlying tension that Services' positioning within Tetra Pak imposes has to be considered by the managers that decide between exploration and exploitation, as the customers are central to Services and therefore determine their ability to explore. Implementing organizational structures for innovation requires establishing a harmonious coexistence between exploration and exploitation (Markides, 1998), as the very presence of exploitative functions might hinder exploration (Van Looy et al., 2005), but there is an inherent risk of cannibalizing on your own products in the pursuit of exploring new business. Neglecting the success that Services has had from the rather exploitative organizational structure could become the detrimental act that removes the opportunity to venture into exploration, as the efficient exploitation of such ventures would be reduced. Managers have depicted this situation as complex, which further confirms the major responsibility that structural ambidexterity imposes on managers (Chen, 2017). Therefore, establishing structural ambidexterity to the extent where employees from all levels are cognizant of the structure that is needed for Services enables the strategic intent to be escalated into a more organizational responsibility, rather than it being dependent on managers' efforts.

The FFS initiative has contributed to the organizational ambidexterity in Tetra Pak, considering its massive engagement within Services and the widespread opportunity for employees to innovate, which raises the question of how it could become a structural innovative function. For leveraging long term organizational ambidexterity, repeatedly allocating resources towards ambidextrous activities is essential according to O'Reilly III and Tushman (O'Reilly III & Tushman, 2008), and several interviewees have described FFS as a long term driver for innovation in Services. Building on this, the nature of the IC, where applicants receive resources to champion their ideas, while seniors acts as critics, sponsors and stakeholders, combined with the rotating FFS team, is inherently a way to continuously orchestrate resources towards ambidextrous activities. Interviewees have argued for the need to define the specific roles that the FFS initiative engages to a higher extent in order to enable innovation and consequently integration across departments and functions, which is echoed by Leifer et al. (2000). The fluent roles and responsibilities has been described as both beneficial and confusing during the interviews, which depicts the need of achieving a balance between organic and mechanistic organizational structures during ambidextrous efforts (Chen, 2017). The rotation of FFS team members is beneficial in many aspects, as the structure continuously accumulates organizational learnings from each introduction of a truly diverse and unbiased individual to the system (March, 1991). Interviews have described the tacit knowledge retention as vital for FFS's longevity, specifically considering the novelty of the initiative itself, where a formalized structure facilitates the retention (March, 1991). Structurally allocating employees to innovate could serve as the foundation for intra-organizational communication and stakeholder mapping, which all interviewee categories have depicted as important for ideas to develop internally.

Furthermore, the initiative provides an environment where innovations could incubate and be exempted from the usual detrimental evaluation criteria that incumbent firms employ (Christensen et al., 2008). FFS as a structure could act as an intermediary for where innovations should reside in the organization, facilitating a connection between the innovation and its potential receiver, either within current or new business (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005). Interviews have portrayed the importance of where innovations should reside as essential for the initiative to be considered valuable, since innovations need to be received by the appropriate stakeholder and department for it to mature into an exploitable asset. By implementing a parallel structure such as FFS in order to increase the organizational ambidexterity, opportunities in switching between bureaucratic and organic structures for employees arise (Adler et al., 1999), but complexities as well, in terms of pursuing opposing goals to the main organization (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), as well as requisite integration and independence (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Interviews have cemented the importance of balancing the initiative to be as radical as possible in order to generate such ideas while also maintaining the alignment required for approval and integration to commence for an idea. Nevertheless, Services acknowledging the FFS initiative as an integral part of its' efforts to pursue ambidexterity could act as the environment that enables the department to successfully maintain exploration as a capability.

5.6 Cultural aspects

Innovation both in Tetra Pak and Services is perceived as fundamental to the organization, as depicted by the interviews, and is a major reason for why many employees choose to work at Tetra Pak. The majority of interviewees share the view of Tetra Pak as having a rich culture of innovation, which is the foundation on which breakthrough innovation lies (Vitasovic, 2014), but as O'Connor and Ayers (2005) state, an innovative culture doesn't implicitly entail success in pursuing radical innovations. As much as there is an innovative spirit that permeates the entire organization, there is also the established-firm mindset that inherently introduces inertia towards ambidexterity, according to interviewees.

Interviews have described that all prerequisites for innovation are in place, but the tendency to incrementally innovate deters employees from venturing into radical innovations, which partly is derived from a risk averse behavior, as well as lack of learning culture. As explorative activities introduce escalated risks into an organization (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), the reasoning is valid, considering Services development from supportive to standalone function in just a few years, with close proximity to customers. However, Seniors have highlighted the importance of pursuing more risky endeavors, as this enables Services to explore new opportunities outside of their current business, which relates to Chen's (2017) description of explorative activities. In order for escalated risk to be justified, they either have to succeed, or be able to learn from their failures, where the latter proves difficult for Services, according to the interviewees.

A large part of Services comprise of engineers, who have a tendency to focus on problem-solving rather than the solution's viability itself, and rather follow an unviable idea to its bitter end than abandoning the idea early, according to the interviewees. This behavior has been described as the unwillingness to fail, pointing at an environment where failures are seen more as defeat than an opportunity for accumulating organizational knowledge. An essential aspect of exploration is the tolerance of failure within an organization (Chen, 2017), which must be appropriately conveyed in order for employees to dare to innovate and explore, as there is a risk for only innovating incrementally otherwise. If Services would employ a more lenient view on innovations and their viability, there would be increased opportunities for learning synergies throughout the organization, which is essential for sustaining long term ambidexterity (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). By iteratively inviting failure into the organizational learning process, employees would be able to contribute their very best ideas at no cost, as it either is a learning experience, or the next business opportunity for Services or Tetra Pak. This open environment for radical innovations require there to be a collective understanding for how radical innovations are communicated internally (O'Connor & Ayers, 2005), since it otherwise is deterred from. It is important for both Services and Tetra Pak to consider what innovative efforts, such as FFS and the IC, contribute to the organization rather than the resources they consume, if Services want to foster an innovative culture for exploration (March, 1982; Schrage, 1999).

Many Seniors have acknowledged how impressive it is that the FFS initiative has been carried through the development despite the trials and tribulations that the FFS team faced, which showcases strong passion for innovation. Since individuals are more likely to be the driver of radical innovations than the organization itself (Reid & de Brentani, 2004), the tension that ambidexterity imposes in terms of passion relative to standardization (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009) should be considered a force to be reckoned with, as the pursuit of organizational control shouldn't be at the expense of passion for innovation. Considering the impressive engagement shown from participants, members and stakeholders, it is especially important to tap into the energizing potential that this tension generates (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Van de Ven et al., 1999), as the powerful innovative branding that Tetra Pak has portrayed has resulted in a highly innovative workforce.

Interviewees have had a divided perception on the FFS initiative and the IC, but it is evident that the FFS team tried to combine their passion for innovation into the standardization that structural ambidexterity imposes, as an effort to address the ambidextrous tension. Managing the innovation culture by behavioral integration could serve as a powerful tool towards being able to leverage a cohesive innovation culture, which in turn could be shaped and steered in the desired organizational direction that managers impose (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). As goal alignment for employees that resemble clans can be done through trainee-programs (Ouchi, 1980), such as FT, considering that FTs were the ones who initiated FFS, there is an opportunity to align organizational goals with personal goals implicitly through the onboarding of employees. FFS and the IC could be the platform for contextual ambidexterity, and by actively setting and managing expectations (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Ghoshal et al., 1997), Services could utilize the initiatives as cultural engines within the organization to drive exploration.

5.7 Future recommendations

For delving into the topic of innovation in established firms further, there could be a deeper analysis on the innovation process that currently is in place in Services (SLM) and see how the different steps could be compared to the theoretical innovation process. This could be done by a specific comparison each element of the process and see how each step contributes or hinders innovation taking place within Services. Moreover, as depicted throughout the interviews, Packaging Solutions and Processing Solutions & Equipment excel in innovating continuously, and could therefore be an interesting source of knowledge when studying how to innovate in Tetra Pak. By investigating the specific strengths and weaknesses in the respective departments, a common blueprint for how to organize for innovation as well as execute innovation could be found and prove valuable.

Another aspect is the internal communication between organizational units and functions, which could reveal interesting insights in terms of innovative capabilities. Interviews have showcased a complexity in how information permeates the organization between the different layers and functions, and could become a valuable asset for both Tetra Pak and Services, considering the vertical integration that their business model enables. Furthermore, the proximity to customers as well as their customers' needs for innovation could also be investigated, in order to more accurately represent the necessity of solving customer needs relative to pursuing new customers by exploring.

The Future Talent program could be an interesting tool for becoming more innovative as a company, and many interviewees have praised its contribution to Tetra Pak, and an investigation into which specific aspects that enable FTs to contribute towards innovation could enable Tetra Pak to leverage on of its major strengths, culture.

Lastly, an interesting aspect to consider would be to analyze the IC and FFS initiative from an open innovation theoretical perspective, in order to unearth which benefits and drawbacks can be derived from the two, as well as investigate the potential success in revising the IC.

6 Managerial implications and conclusions

In this chapter, conclusions drawn from the discussion will be made, as well as the managerial implications that they entail.

6.1 Managerial implications

With a holistic perspective in mind, the FFS initiative has been driven successfully thanks to major engagement and commitment from several stakeholders, which has managed to convert it from a vision to a tangible organizational asset. Areas for improvement have however been identified, which affect both the initiative itself and the outcome of it, which will be presented below.

By dismissing the sequential ambidextrous approach that Services has historically showcased, the destructive effects that inconsistency has had on the innovative capabilities and outlook could be avoided. Furthermore, including exploration to a higher degree from a strategic point of view could shift some of the responsibilities that managers face in terms of balancing the growth targets with innovative efforts, thereby establishing a more open environment towards exploration. This cogent vision could aim to cement exploration as being the gateway to exploitation, an organizational capability that has proven successful historically, where the exploration could catapult Services into their new business areas.

Considering that the FFS initiative and the IC tap into many aspects of organizational ambidexterity, it could become an interesting exercise for Services to entertain. Taking a stance on the FFS initiative and the IC could also be another opportunity for Services to align expectations and leverage their strengths, as they could become integral parts of the Services department's ambidextrous efforts. By establishing the value of the IC, in terms of the process that it offers, the innovations that are generated, or the employee benefits that come with it, the stakeholders involved can be more efficiently integrated and on board with what is to be expected. Employing themes into the IC could also be a powerful way to steer the Services department towards the desired area of innovation, intertwining with the benefits of the behavioral integration opportunity that the IC offers.

In order to pursue organizational ambidexterity to a higher degree, allocating specific resources to exploration could enable Services to transcend the organizational boundaries that may arise in established firms, and could become a valuable centerpiece structurally integrated into the department. Furthermore, the IC process could open up the opportunity to innovate in new ways, such as by co-collaboration with customers by virtue of their MVP tests, and then develop them quicker to reach their customers sooner.

Another aspect to consider is the strengths that Services possess, which could be further elaborated upon, such as the tension between exploration and exploitation that exists inherently from the departments organizational positioning. As this tension has proved to generate interesting initiatives, such as FFS, there is energy to be harvested from ambidexterity, where their rather exploitative nature also entails massive amounts of valuable information and ideas available internally in the organization. In order to further build on the information and idea sharing, inviting learning culture into the innovation environment could showcase the true potential and innovative culture that Services and Tetra Pak have.

6.2 Conclusions

Findings enforce the view that driving ambidextrous initiatives leads to complexities and frictions in several organizational functions, while challenging the current exploitative focus. Overall, literature on ambidexterity depicts a similar perspective on how difficult it is to conduct explorative initiatives in an established firm.

What the study has shown is that organizational ambidexterity is a difficult concept for established companies to understand and pursue, considering the paradoxical detriment that the ambition of achieving growth might infer to an organization. Furthermore, the research has shown that there is a hindrance that exploitation infers on exploration for established firms, where both implicit and explicit decision making steers the organization to favor more and more exploitation.

Building on this, explorative initiatives that are pursued within established firms have a tendency to transition from their initial ambitious vision towards becoming more focused on fitting in with the current business to enable exploitation, in the pursuit of organizational acceptance and validation. The structure of initiatives also become increasingly similar to the already existing organizational structures in place, which not only compromises the ability to make decisions, but also the speed of which these are taken.

The lack of conveying a consequent and cogent vision for ambidexterity within established firms leads to more uncertainties being prominent in the balancing act, which by nature already is tied to uncertainty. A sense of ambiguity affects management's positioning towards ambidexterity, as they become somewhat responsible for both driving exploration and exploitation simultaneously, making them susceptible for pressure from both higher and lower levels of the organization.

Research has implied that the organizational structures that established firms employ require boundary spanning individuals to remedy the challenge regarding information asymmetry, where the individuals being able to cross these boundaries are often managers. The importance that the diffusion of information that these managers are responsible for is essential to actively counteract the occurrence of silos, as these people have extensive networks and authority to leverage them. Furthermore, the information diffusion becomes critical in maintaining the momentum for idea development, as the antithesis results in process stagnation and the organization ultimately becoming less susceptible to the idea.

Incentive structures have shown to be vital in the encouragement of exploration in established firms, especially for those who possess an innovation culture that permeates the workforce, as the recognition and acceptance has proven to be a deciding factor in employees engaging. The described tolerance also extends to the ability to cope with failures as an organization, where the inability turn them into learning experiences become a deterring factor for the employees, who will then comply with the risk-avoidance behavior that the organization conveys. Tied to the risk avoidance, gaining acceptance for a novel explorative initiative in an established firm requires extensive commitment and convincing actions from the individuals who drive the initiative, as the POC serves to showcase the value of ambidexterity.

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Appendix A

Table A.1: Interview questions used as the basis for interviewing with Member level interviewees. (Continued on the next page)

Interview Template - Member
Introduction
What is your name? What is your current role within Tetra Pak? Have you had any previous roles within Tetra Pak and/or other firms?
Foundation of FFS
Which factors led to the creation of FFS? What is the goal of FFS? Why did you engage with the FFS program? What was your main responsibility or role within FFS? Which parts of the FFS program did you find most valuable? What was different with FFS compared to other initiatives within Tetra Pak? Do you believe that FFS is a radical or incremental innovation within Tetra Pak? What was the foundation for deciding upon choosing the Evolve methodology for FFS? Who were your most important stakeholders? What type of result did you need to provide to gain stakeholder acceptance?
Looking back on FFS 1.0 and ahead to FFS 2.0
How did you perceive the reactions and feedback to the FFS initiative? Do you believe that you were supported in pursuing the FFS initiative? How did support from the organization affect the development of the initiative? What could Tetra Pak have done better in terms of giving support? Were there alterations to the FFS programme that you think compromised with the original concept? Did organizational processes affect the initiative negatively? During which phases did you experience friction from within Tetra Pak to your initiative? What were the selection criteria for Red stage applicants? How do you believe that FFS has been received within Tetra Pak? What are the major changes from FFS 1.0 to 2.0? Which challenges do you see with the next iteration of FFS (2.0)? Will Tetra Pak have to change its processes in order for FFS to grow?

Tetra Pak and Innovation
How would you describe Tetra Pak's ability to be innovative?
What are the challenges, as you see it, when it comes to innovation?
How much do Tetra Pak explore new ideas, services etc?
How would you describe the culture of innovation at Tetra Pak?
To which extent does this culture align with your perception of support given to innovative initiatives?
How would you describe the Future Talent programme?
Has the Future Talent program provided benefits in terms of achieving an innovative culture within Tetra Pak?
How important do you perceive the Future Talent program to be?
How are explorative activities structured into the work activities at Tetra Pak?
How important is innovation to Tetra Pak?
If you were to select three major issues that are important for Tetra Pak in continuing striving to become innovative – what would that be and why?

Table A.2: Interview questions used as the basis for interviewing with Senior level interviewees. (Continued on the next page)

Interview Template - Senior
Introduction
What is your name? What is your current role within Tetra Pak? Have you had any previous roles within Tetra Pak and/or other firms?
Foundation of FFS
What is the goal of FFS? Why do you think the FFS initiative was created? Why did you engage with the FFS program? How would you describe your role for FFS? What is included in being a stakeholder for FFS? Which parts of the FFS initiative do you find most valuable? What was/is different with FFS compared to other initiatives within Tetra Pak? Do you believe that FFS drives radical or incremental innovation within Tetra Pak? Should FFS drive radical or incremental innovation within Tetra Pak? What type of result did you expect from FFS?
Looking back on FFS 1.0 and ahead to FFS 2.0
How did you perceive the reactions and feedback to the FFS initiative throughout the organization? In what areas/phases did you perceive support being necessary for the FFS initiative? What could Tetra Pak have done better in terms of giving support? How did support from the organization affect the development of the initiative? Has there been significant alterations to the first iteration of the FFS initiative? During which phases did you experience friction from within Tetra Pak as a stakeholder? On what basis did ideas get selected in the Innovation Challenge? What are the major changes from FFS 1.0 to 2.0? What are the opportunities and challenges with the next iteration of FFS (2.0)? Will Tetra Pak have to change its processes for FFS to grow and become better? Who in the organization is responsible for ensuring a successful FFS 2.0?

Tetra Pak and Innovation
How would you describe Tetra Pak's ability to be innovative?
Does the ability to be innovative differ between departments?
Has the ability to be innovative changed during Services' transition from being a supportive function to being a standalone business unit?
What are the challenges for Tetra Pak, as you see it, when it comes to innovation?
How much do Tetra Pak explore new ideas, services etc.?
How important is the FFS initiative to Tetra Pak?
How important is innovation to Tetra Pak?
How would you describe the culture of innovation at Tetra Pak?
Do you see any difference in the culture of innovation between Services and other departments?
To which extent does this culture align with your perception of support given to innovative initiatives?
How are explorative activities structured into the work activities at Tetra Pak?
Has the Future Talent program provided benefits in terms of achieving an innovative culture within Tetra Pak?
What are the innovative capabilities in Services?
How does Services leverage on innovation as a part of your growth strategy?
If you were to select three major issues that are important for Tetra Pak in continuing striving to become innovative – what would that be and why?

Table A.3: Interview questions used as the basis for interviewing with Participant level interviewees.

Interview Template - Participant
Introduction
What is your name? What is your current role within Tetra Pak?
Foundation of FFS
What is the goal of FFS? Why do you think the FFS initiative was created? Why did you engage with the FFS program? How would you describe your journey in the Innovation Challenge? Which parts of the FFS initiative do you find most valuable? What was/is different with FFS compared to other initiatives within Tetra Pak? Do you believe that FFS drives radical or incremental innovation within Tetra Pak? What type of result did you expect from FFS?
Looking back on FFS 1.0 and ahead to FFS 2.0
How did you perceive the reactions and feedback to the FFS initiative throughout the organization? In what areas/phases did you perceive support being necessary for the FFS initiative? What could Tetra Pak have done better in terms of giving support? How did support from the organization affect the development of your initiative? Has there been alterations to FFS during the first iteration that you find significant? During which phases did you experience friction from within Tetra Pak as a participant in the Innovation Challenge? On what basis did ideas get selected in the Innovation Challenge? What are the opportunities and challenges with the next iteration of FFS (2.0)? Will Tetra Pak have to change its processes for FFS to grow and become better?
Tetra Pak and Innovation
How would you describe Tetra Pak's ability to be innovative? What are the challenges for Tetra Pak, as you see it, when it comes to innovation? How much do Tetra Pak explore new ideas, services etc? How important is the FFS initiative to Tetra Pak? How important is innovation to Tetra Pak? How would you describe the culture of innovation at Tetra Pak? To which extent does this culture align with your perception of support given to innovative initiatives? How are explorative activities structured into the work activities at Tetra Pak? If you were to select three major issues that are important for Tetra Pak in continuing striving to become innovative – what would that be and why?

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