Safety Considerations and Fire Prevention along the Transportation Chain of Electric Vehicles Master’s Thesis in Shipping and Marine Technology Andreas Peters Samuel Stüber DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICS AND MARITIME SCIENCES CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY ___________________________________________________________________________ Gothenburg, Sweden, 2024 Master’s Thesis 2024 Safety Considerations and Fire Prevention along the Transportation Chain of Electric Vehicles Master’s Thesis in Shipping and Marine Technology Andreas Peters Samuel Stüber Department of Mechanics and Maritime Sciences Division of Maritime Studies Chalmers University of Technology Gothenburg, Sweden, 2024 II SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS AND FIRE PREVENTION ALONG THE TRANSPORTATION CHAIN OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES Andreas Peters Samuel Stüber Gothenburg, Sweden, 2024 Master’s Thesis in Shipping and Marine Technology The report’s serial number: © Andreas Peters & Samuel Stüber, 2024 Examiner: Henrik Ringsberg, PhD / Associate Professor / Instructor Maritime Logistics Supervisor: Henrik Ringsberg, PhD / Associate Professor / Instructor Maritime Logistics Master’s Thesis 2024 Chalmers University of Technology Department of Mechanics and Maritime Sciences Division of Maritime Studies 412 96 Göteborg, Sweden Gothenburg, Sweden, 2024 III Abstract From a seafarer’s perspective, one of the worst things to happen on board a vessel is a fire. Accidents in the recent past involving car carriers transporting electric vehicles have triggered the question of the safety of transporting electric vehicles on ocean-going ships. Thus, this the- sis explores the transportation chain of electric vehicles, involving the handling of electric ve- hicles at each of the steps in the export transportation chain. Additionally, risk factors along the transportation chain in addition to preventive measures are explored at each step. For this, a literature review is combined with a case study in the Gothenburg region. Literature on the fields of the management of batteries, firefighting and handling of electric vehicles, and the general management of the transportation chain is reviewed. The case study involves expert interviews with 12 interviewees from stakeholders along the transportation chain from the man- ufacturer onto the RoRo- or RoPax vessels. In the case study, the suggestions found in published literature are compared with the actual procedures in practice to reveal similarities and differ- ences. It is discovered that the handling of electric vehicles is not materially different from the handling of vehicles with an internal combustion engine. For each step in the transportation chain, individual risk factors are identified, in addition to risk factors affecting the entire trans- portation chain. These are the 12V/24V batteries in the electric vehicles, human error, and a lack of information flow between the various individual stakeholders. Similarly, preventive measures at each step in the transportation chain are identified in addition to overarching pre- ventive measures. A state of charge in the vehicle’s battery of less than 50%, training and edu- cation, and communication between stakeholders are suggested as preventive measures in order to prevent the ignition of the electric vehicles and to make the transportation chain safer. Keywords: Electric Vehicles, Transport Safety, Fire Prevention, Maritime Transportation, Transportation Chain, Multimodal Transport, Risk Factors, Safety Measures, Battery Safety IV Table of Contents Abstract __________________________________________________________________ III Table of Contents __________________________________________________________ IV List of Abbreviations ________________________________________________________ VI List of Figures ____________________________________________________________ VII List of Tables ____________________________________________________________ VIII Terminology ______________________________________________________________ IX 1 Introduction and Background ______________________________________________ 1 1.1 Purpose and Research Questions ________________________________________ 3 1.2 Delimitations _______________________________________________________ 3 1.3 Structure of the Thesis ________________________________________________ 4 2 Methodology ___________________________________________________________ 5 2.1 Research Approach ___________________________________________________ 5 2.2 Case Study ________________________________________________________ 10 2.2.1 Case Study Description ____________________________________________ 10 2.2.2 Interviews ______________________________________________________ 11 2.3 Data Analysis ______________________________________________________ 14 3 Frame of Reference _____________________________________________________ 18 3.1 Management of Batteries _____________________________________________ 18 3.1.1 Battery Fire Hazards ______________________________________________ 18 3.1.2 Battery Safety ___________________________________________________ 21 3.2 Firefighting and Handling ____________________________________________ 25 3.2.1 Fire Detection and -Fighting Systems _________________________________ 25 3.2.2 EV Fire Handling ________________________________________________ 26 3.3 Management of the Transportation Chain ________________________________ 28 3.3.1 Multimodal Transport and RoRo Operations ___________________________ 28 3.3.2 Onboard Handling ________________________________________________ 29 3.3.3 Management of Accidents and Fires on RoRo Ships _____________________ 32 3.3.4 Terminal Risk Management ________________________________________ 34 4 Results and Analysis ____________________________________________________ 37 4.1 Handling of Electric Vehicles along the Transportation Chain ________________ 37 4.2 Potential Risk Factors along the Transportation Chain ______________________ 43 4.3 Preventive Measures to Reduce the Risk of Ignition of Electric Vehicles ________ 50 4.4 Overview of Key Results concerning RQ2 and RQ3 ________________________ 61 V 5 Discussion ____________________________________________________________ 63 6 Conclusion ____________________________________________________________ 66 6.1 Managerial Implications ______________________________________________ 67 6.2 Further Research Suggestions _________________________________________ 67 Bibliography ______________________________________________________________ 68 Appendices _______________________________________________________________ 78 VI List of Abbreviations BMS Battery Management System EV Electric Vehicle ICEV Internal Combustion Engine Vehicle IMO International Maritime Organization Li-Ion Lithium-Ion MSC Maritime Safety Committee PPE Personal Protective Equipment RoPax Roll-on/Roll-off and Passengers RoRo Roll-on/Roll-off RQ Research Question SOC State of Charge SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea VII List of Figures Figure 1: Multimodal transportation chain for the export of EVs ___________________________ 11 Figure 2: Comparison of literature review and expert interviews ___________________________ 15 Figure 3: Flowchart of analysis approach _____________________________________________ 17 Figure 4: Li-Ion battery safety onion _________________________________________________ 22 Figure 5: Battery risk management system for Li-Ion batteries _____________________________ 24 VIII List of Tables Table 1: Research matrix ___________________________________________________________ 5 Table 2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria _______________________________________________ 6 Table 3: Initial literature search ______________________________________________________ 8 Table 4: Initial literature included in this thesis __________________________________________ 9 Table 5: Backward and forward search results ___________________________________________ 9 Table 6: List of interviewees _______________________________________________________ 12 Table 7: Literature review matrix ____________________________________________________ 16 Table 8: Gases released during a thermal runaway ______________________________________ 20 Table 9: Metals contained within the smoke during a thermal runaway ______________________ 20 Table 10: Overview of identified risk factors and preventive measures ______________________ 62 IX Terminology Factor “An element which enters into the composition of some- thing; a circumstance, fact, or influence which contributes to a result” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2024) Multimodal Transport “Carriage of goods by two or more modes of transport.” (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2000) Preventive risk controls “Preventive controls are designed to limit the possibility of an undesirable hazard event occurring” (Hopkin, 2018) Risk “Risk is used to signify negative consequences” (Hopkin, 2018) Risk Management “Coordinated activities to direct and control an organiza- tion with regard to risk” (ISO 31000:2018) Risk Source “Element which alone or in combination has the potential to give rise to risk” (ISO 31000:2018) Safety “The state of being protected from or guarded against hurt or injury; freedom from danger” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2024) Introduction and Background 1 1 Introduction and Background From a seafarer’s perspective, one of the worst things to happen on board a vessel is a fire. Far from civilization and help, the crew is often on their own in fighting the fire. In the summer of 2023, such a situation occurred on board the ‘MV Fremantle Highway’ (Kirby, 2023). Likely triggered by an electric vehicle, the vessel caught fire but could eventually be towed to port and safety (Kirby, 2023). In combination with new legislation by the European Union (European Parliament, 2022) an increase in the number of electric vehicles (EV) is expected. According to this legislation, no new vehicles with an internal combustion engine can be registered from 2035 onwards (European Parliament, 2022). Therefore, incidents like the one on ‘MV Freman- tle Highway’ might occur more frequently in the future. Consequently, the question is brought up how these could be prevented and the transportation of EVs made safer for the crew, the vessel and the environment. The 2023 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, abbreviated as IPCC, con- firmed that global warming has been caused by human actions, through the emission of green- house gases. The surface temperature in the observed period (2011-2020) was 1.1°C above the reference period (1850-1900). The current mitigation ambitions in place by country states make it unlikely that the global warming can be kept within the 2.0°C limit, as set in the Paris accord (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2023). The transportation industry is a key sector in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Trans- portation as a sector contributed 16.2% to global greenhouse gas emissions in 2016 [CO2eq]. Thereof, road transportation alone was responsible for ~73%, or 11.9% of global greenhouse emissions respectively (Ritchie & Roser, 2023). With the European Union aiming to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, a change in the transport sector is necessary. This sector is respon- sible for 20% of the European Union’s CO2 emissions (European Parliament, 2022). Since bat- tery electric vehicles are currently the most preferred alternative to internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs), the amount of transported EVs will increase in the future (European Parlia- ment, 2022). In order to comply with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals set out by the United Nations in 2015 (United Nations, 2015), the development of new and climate-neutral propulsion solu- tions for all kinds of road vehicles is necessary. As described above, the preferred alternative Introduction and Background 2 to the ordinary combustion engine is the electrical power-driven vehicle. When EVs are pro- duced for export, they are usually transported via ocean-going ships to their destination. It is essential that all vehicles are handled carefully to ensure a safe journey and to deliver them undamaged at their destination. Apart from heavy weather during the sea transport, fire is one of the greatest hazards on board merchant ships. Unlike fires in ICEVs, the battery fire of an EV is much more difficult to extinguish and has a great potential for reignition (Dorsz & Lewan- dowski, 2021). Furthermore, in comparison to the fire in an ICEV, the temperature development is much higher. How difficult it is to extinguish a fire on a vessel could be witnessed at the end of July 2023 when the ‘MV Fremantle Highway’ caught fire in the North Sea (Kirby, 2023). The fire on board ‘MV Fremantle Highway’ started on 25 July 2023 in the North Sea. The source of ignition is unknown, but “an audio recording emerged of one rescue worker suggest- ing it had started in the battery of an EV and ‘it appears an electric vehicle exploded too‘” (Kirby, 2023). However, the only way to get a fire within a lithium battery under control is with excessive cooling. “Once the onboard battery is involved in fire, there is a greater difficulty in suppressing EV fires, because the burning battery pack inside is inaccessible to externally ap- plied suppressant and can re-ignite without sufficient cooling” (P. Sun et al., 2020). Since the EU decided on a ban of the possibility to register new vehicles with a combustion chamber from 2035 (European Parliament, 2022), EVs are an important step towards a more sustainable society. New systems for firefighting, handling and transporting of EVs are cost- intensive to develop and implement. Additionally, new regulations for ships and terminals to increase safety will also need to be published. This involves the International Maritime Organ- ization (IMO), especially the sub-committee Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). Despite the risk of EV fires on board, a limited number of studies have been published so far (Brzezinska & Bryant, 2022; Sturm et al., 2022; P. Sun et al., 2020). While P. Sun et al. (2020) emphasises that fires in lithium batteries are hard to extinguish, Sturm et al. (2020) investigated the temperature development of a battery fire within an enclosed space, more precisely a road tunnel. Additionally, Brzezinska and Bryant (2022) reviewed vehicle fires and simulated com- puter-based models of smoke and temperature distribution. But there is still a gap in the litera- ture on how to prevent the self-ignition of vehicle batteries in the terminals and on board of ships. This poses an increased threat to ships and terminals handling those vehicles for export and import. Therefore, it is important to explore how to prepare the firefighting departments near the terminals and to equip ships with appropriate firefighting systems. Introduction and Background 3 1.1 Purpose and Research Questions The purpose of this Master’s thesis is to explore the practice of handling EVs for export in the Gothenburg region. The main aim is to explore the current process steps in place along the transportation chain of EVs, from the manufacturers to the terminal and onto the ocean-going vessel. Secondly, the risk factors along the transportation chain, focusing on the risk for acci- dents and self-ignition of EVs, are explored. As third aim, the fire prevention measures, i.e. preventive risk controls along the transportation chain, on the shore side as well as on board of Roll-on/Roll-off (RoRo) and Roll-on/Roll-off and Passengers (RoPax) vessels are explored. Hereby, the fire prevention measures are explored with regard to their sufficiency. This shall serve as basis for the development of suggestions for changes in order to lower the risk of ignition of EVs at each step in the transportation chain and thereby enable a safer transport. In order to achieve the purpose, the following three research questions (RQ) are formulated: Research Question 1 How are electric vehicles handled along the various steps of the export transportation chain (manufacturer, road transport, terminal, ship)? Research Question 2 Which risk factors exist along the steps of the transportation chain, which could cause the ignition of electric vehicles? Research Question 3 What preventive measures could be implemented during the various steps of the trans- portation chain to reduce the risk of ignition of electric vehicles? 1.2 Delimitations In the following paragraphs the delimitations of this Master’s thesis project are presented. Based on the location of Chalmers University of Technology, the thesis is geographically lim- ited to the companies operating in the region around the City of Gothenburg. Moreover, the thesis is limited to the examination of newly manufactured vehicles for export only. Therefore, the import of vehicle parts, such as batteries, other intermediate products or raw materials is not considered. Introduction and Background 4 Additionally, the transportation chain is only examined from the manufacturer to the export terminal, and onto the ocean-going vessel. The sea part of the transportation chain is only con- sidered until the vessel enters the Vessel Traffic Service area at its port of destination. All port operations including pilotage, berthing and the discharge operations as well as the further trans- portation into the hinterland from the port of discharge are excluded from the study. The focus lies on the development of processes and risk management solutions, rather than on the development of new engineering solutions. This might include the presentation and proposal of existing, but not implemented fire prevention and/or firefighting systems. Furthermore, the study is time-limited to the spring semester of 2024, a total number of 22 weeks. 1.3 Structure of the Thesis The structure of the thesis is as follows: After the introduction and background, the methodol- ogy is explained. This includes the research approach and the description of the case study conducted in this study. In the following frame of reference, the current academic state of knowledge in the relevant research fields is presented. Thereafter, in the results and analysis section, the interview results are then linked to the academic background. The results are then further discussed in the subsequent chapter, before the RQs are answered in the conclusion chapter and an outlook on potential future research paths is given. Methodology 5 2 Methodology The research consists of a literature review in combination with a case study. With regards to the main aim of this study, the preventive measures, firefighting systems and procedures in case of a fire, that are currently in place, will be explored. Hereby, it will be investigated which different measures are implemented at the step of the manufacturer, the terminal, and the ship- ping company respectively, i.e. along the entire transportation chain. 2.1 Research Approach The research process follows mostly the abductive approach, as outlined by Spens & Kovács (2006). This is a relatively new research field, and recently, accidents on board ships involving EVs have frequently been reported in the news (Chapter 1). Therefore, the literature is being used as basis for developing answers to the RQs, while it is being acknowledged that the data from the interviews might change or expand these significantly (Andreewsky & Bourcier, 2000; Spens & Kovács, 2006). Due to the novelty of the research topic, a qualitative approach has been selected as research method for this thesis. A case study of a transportation chain (Chapter 2.2) and the RQs together form the foundation of the structure of the research process. This is depicted in the form of a matrix, with the RQs denoted on the Y-axis and the individual steps of the transportation chain on the X-axis. When aligning the RQs with the steps along the transportation chain, it becomes obvious that 4 ∗ 3 = 12 open fields (points of interest) need to be addressed (Table 1). Hereby, the processes within the manufacturer have been marked in grey in the table, since they are out of the main scope of this thesis, but still form an essential part of the transportation chain. Table 1: Research matrix  Multimodal Transportation chain of EVs → Manufacturer Road Transport Terminal and Storage Loading Sea Leg Research Question 1 Research Question 2 Research Question 3 Methodology 6 By combining different methods, in this case a literature review and interviews with experts within the field of this study, the probability to uncover unknown aspects of the studied problem is increased (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Hereby, the literature review is the foundation of this thesis and represents the academic state of knowledge. Moreover, the literature is categorized as described in detail in Chapter 2 and entered into the matrix shown in Table 1. Since the amount of identified literature is not equally distributed across the twelve points of interest, interview questions are then developed to fill the gaps of knowledge in the matrix. Additionally, the academic state of knowledge can thereby be compared to real-world practices and potential discrepancies can be identified. The literature review is the foundation on which the thesis’ theoretical framework builds upon (Webster & Watson, 2002). Hereby, a systematic literature search for peer-reviewed documents by using pre-defined keywords, so called queries, was conducted in the Scopus database. Firstly, inclusion and exclusion criteria (Table 2) were formulated, to evaluate the results from the queries. Secondly, the formulated queries were then searched within “Article title, Abstract, Keywords” on Scopus and sorted by relevance (Table 3). The purpose of this detailed docu- mentation of search patterns is to provide a comparable search process as described by Brocke et al. (2009). Table 2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria Inclusion Criteria 1 Headline is relevant for one of the Research Questions 2 Abstract is relevant for one of the Research Questions 3 Document is written in English (Swedish only accepted selectively) Exclusion Criteria 1 Not accessible through Chalmers University of Technology or Chalmers Library 2 Headlines stating vessel types other than RoRo / RoPax / Car Carrier 3 Document is of visibly low quality The initial literature search in Scopus was conducted on 23 January 2024 and delivered in total 23,289 results. It was decided to limit the screening of headlines to the first five pages for each Methodology 7 query, which led to a maximum of 50 documents. Considering this, 786 headlines were read, and with view on the inclusion and exclusion criteria, 124 documents were identified as poten- tially relevant for this study. In the next step the abstracts of the 124 documents were read and 84 papers were eliminated. The remaining 40 papers were read thoroughly. At the end of this process, 18 documents (Table 4) were included for the thesis. A further nine papers were con- sidered as relevant but were not included and therefore disregarded, as these could not be ac- cessed with the licenses from Chalmers University of Technology or Chalmers Library. Besides journal articles, conference proceedings and other relevant grey literature sources were also considered in the literature review, if they were relevant, reputable and of high quality (Webster & Watson, 2002). This was decided due to the novelty of the research topic. Methodology 8 Table 3: Initial literature search Query Results Headlines read Abstracts read Documents read ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Trans- portation 6,971 50 5 1 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Transport AND Chain 826 50 5 2 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Ship- ping 55 50 3 0 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Fire AND Prevention AND (Port OR Terminal) 1 1 1 1 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Fire AND Prevention AND (Car OR Bus OR Truck) 7 7 2 2 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Fire AND Prevention AND (Vessel OR Ship OR Ferry OR RoRo OR RoPax OR Car Carrier) 0 0 0 0 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Fire AND Firefighting 7 7 2 1 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Fire AND Handling 17 17 9 5 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Han- dling AND (Terminal OR Vessel OR Ship OR Ferry OR RoRo OR RoPax OR Car Carrier) 4 4 0 0 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Fire 598 50 16 4 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Igni- tion 757 50 14 4 ((Electrical AND Vehicle) OR EV) AND Risk AND Factor AND Transport 54 50 10 2 Risk AND Management AND (Port OR Termi- nal) 7,938 50 12 5 Risk AND Management AND (Car OR Bus OR Truck) 4,644 50 1 0 Risk AND Management AND (Vessel OR Ship OR Ferry OR RoRo OR RoPax OR Car Carrier) 193 50 7 1 Firefighting AND System AND (Vessel OR Ship OR Ferry OR RoRo OR RoPax OR Car Carrier) 1 1 1 0 Firefighting AND System AND (Port OR Ter- minal) 49 49 5 1 Firefighting AND System AND Road 81 50 12 8 Firefighting AND System AND (Car OR Bus OR Truck) 58 50 0 0 Logistics operations AND Port Terminals 525 50 14 3 Logistics operations AND (Vessel OR Ship OR Ferry OR RoRo OR RoPax OR Car Carrier) 116 50 4 0 Port operations AND (Vessel OR Ship OR Ferry OR RoRo OR RoPax OR Car Carrier) 357 50 1 0 Methodology 9 An overview of the results and included documents from the initial search is given in Table 4. Table 4: Initial literature included in this thesis Queries Results Headlines read Abstracts read Documents read Documents included 22 23,289 786 124 40 18 Additionally, backward- and forward-snowballing were conducted between 26 January and 14 February 2024 in order to capture further relevant documents in this research field, which were not found by the initial search in Scopus. This focused only on the 18 documents which were actually included for the thesis. The term snowballing describes the backward- and forward search by using a document’s reference list or the citations of that specific document after pub- lication in order to find more papers within a field (Webster & Watson, 2002; Wohlin, 2014). Hereby, the ‘cross-reference snowballing’ method as described by Geissdoerfer et al. (2018) was applied. The snowballing process was hence built up as follows: A screening of the titles in a document’s reference list in view of which keyword appeared in the headlines was done. Afterwards, the as potentially relevant identified documents’ abstracts were read and based on the pre-defined criteria presented in Table 2, included or excluded from this study (Geissdoerfer et al., 2018). This process is to be repeated in a loop with the newly found documents until no new relevant documents are found anymore (Geissdoerfer et al., 2018). This was slightly adapted for the thesis. Due to time constraints, only two backward loops and one forward snow- balling loop were conducted. During the forward loop, the focus laid on the most relevant doc- uments and to fill remaining gaps. Within all stages of the literature search, duplicates were immediately filtered out. The result of the further search is presented in Table 5. Table 5: Backward and forward search results Abstracts read Documents read Documents included Backward Search 107 73 41 Forward Search 14 8 7 Methodology 10 Through the Scopus search with the pre-defined search terms, in combination with the snow- balling process, a total of 66 documents were obtained. 2.2 Case Study Gothenburg combines the needed key industries, port facilities, and with Chalmers University of Technology a supporting academic institute to conduct this Master’s Thesis. Specifically, in Gothenburg the following companies are located: the manufacturers of electric vehicles, Volvo Buses in Viared, Volvo Car AB in Torslanda, Volvo Trucks in Tuve, and additionally the Gothenburg RoRo Terminal AB and Logent AB on the northern bank of the river Göta Älv, which provide the terminal infrastructure for global export. Less than one hour north of Gothen- burg, the terminal of Wallhamn AB is located on the island of Tjörn which also facilitates the export of vehicles. Moreover, Stena Line’s RoPax terminals are located on the southern bank of the river Göta Älv, offering connections from Sweden towards Germany and Denmark. Therefore, this work will examine the transportation chain from the manufacturer to the termi- nal, onto the ocean-going vessel, and on the sea leg. 2.2.1 Case Study Description The case study within this thesis is based on the aforementioned literature review, combined with interviews. The aim of the case study is to generate detailed insights by thoroughly exam- ining the transportation chain of EVs in practice (R. K. Yin, 2018). The transportation chain has been selected as means of graphic representation of the transport work, since it facilitates a good visualization. Furthermore, it serves as structure for the litera- ture review as well as the primary research, and helps to structure the following sections along the transportation chain and the RQs. The transportation chain is especially useful for the de- piction of intermodal transports, when goods are transported from a customer or factory via truck, rail or barge to the terminal and then loaded onto the ocean-going vessel (Lumsden et al., 2019). The book chapter as well as the figure from Lumsden et al. (2019) and from Pencheva et al. (2022) served as foundation for the development of Figure 1. This was however expanded to incorporate also the work from Jansson & Shneerson (1982), who put more emphasis on the processes within the terminal, which are also relevant for this thesis. Since this thesis is delim- ited to the export side and ocean leg only, and does not consider the influence of legislators and other authorities on the transportation chain, the multimodal transportation chain can therefore be visualized as follows: Methodology 11 Figure 1: Multimodal transportation chain for the export of EVs Adapted from Jansson & Shneerson (1982, p.10), Lumsden et al. (2019, p.414), Pencheva et al. (2022, p.63) For this thesis, this is regarded as a multimodal transportation chain instead of an intermodal transportation chain, since the goods (vehicles) are handled themselves rather than in inter- modal loading units (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2000). 2.2.2 Interviews Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total of twelve (12) experts, divided into eight (8) interviews. Of the interviewees, two (2) were female and the remaining ten (10) were male. The interviews took place in interviewees’ offices (5), via Microsoft Teams (2), or via telephone (1), and some were supported by a walk around in the different facilities. The duration of the interviews varied between 8 min and 36 min. The participants were selected based on the relevant experience they possessed concerning the field of the study and were affiliated to one step in the transportation chain (Table 6). Semi-structured interviews are also referred to as qualitative interviews and are therefore a good choice for a qualitative research (Blumberg et al., 2011). The interviewer has a set of questions which he/she wants to ask the interviewee, but this interview style also leaves room for the interviewee to delve into other topics, which could also be relevant for the researcher (Blumberg et al., 2011). Methodology 12 Table 6: List of interviewees Interview number Date Person [anonymised] Company [anonymised] Position in the company Years of expe- rience in that position 1 11.03.2024 Interviewee A1 Company A (RoRo Shipping Line) Cargo Officer 7 Years 1 11.03.2024 Interviewee A2 Company A (RoRo Shipping Line) Chief Mate 2.5 Years 2 11.03.2024 Interviewee B1 Company B (Terminal Operator) Terminal Admin- istration 8 Years 3 12.03.2024 Interviewee A3 Company A (RoRo Shipping Line) Chief Mate 14 Years 4 14.03.2024 Interviewee C1 Company C (EV Manufacturer) Intro Engineer 10 Years 4 14.03.2024 Interviewee C2 Company C (EV Manufacturer) Intro Engineer 5 Years 5 15.03.2024 Interviewee D1 Company D (RoPax Shipping Line) Naval Architect 5 Years 6 19.03.2024 Interviewee E1 Company E (Logistics Operator) Finished Vehicle Logistics 2 Years 6 19.03.2024 Interviewee E2 Company E (Logistics Operator) Operators Manager for Logistics 3 Years 6 19.03.2024 Interviewee E3 Company E (Logistics Operator) Foreman 8 Years 7 21.03.2024 Interviewee F1 Company F (EV Manufacturer) Finished Vehicle Distribution 2.5 Years 8 11.04.2024 Interviewee B2 Company B (Terminal Operator) Stevedore 10 Years According to (Bryman et al., 2022, p.431) Methodology 13 As a first step, an interview guide was developed (Blumberg et al., 2011). An interview guide ensures that the researcher always asks the same questions in the single interviews and thereby covers all relevant areas. But, as described above, in semi-structured interviews there is also room to ask follow-up questions based on the flow of the conversation and the background of each interviewee (Blumberg et al., 2011; Bryman et al., 2022). Additionally, towards the end of each interview, the interviewee was offered the opportunity to add whatever he/she would like to add which had not been covered by the questions. This way, additional important areas could be detected (Patton, 2015). When formulating an interview guide, it should be ensured that the interview guide covers all questions that need to be addressed in the interviews, that the questions asked are not too narrow but rather give the interviewees the opportunity to elaborate and that the questions are formulated in an easily understandable language (Blumberg et al., 2011; Bryman et al., 2022). The interview guide includes all areas to be covered in the inter- views, and can be provided to the participants beforehand so that they can prepare for the inter- view (Bryman et al., 2022). In this work, an interview guide has been developed in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Before each interview, the relevant questions were selected based on the interviewee’s position and background. The spreadsheet helped to ensure that after all inter- views were conducted, all questions were covered and no blank spots remained. The complete set of questions, assigned to the different steps of the transportation chain / interviewees and sorted according to the RQs, is available in Appendix I. To ensure a high quality of answers during the interview, the questions were sent in advance to the participants. On one hand it informs the interviewees about the purpose and aim of the interview, on the other hand it enables them to prepare themselves (Bryman et al., 2022). The authors were not interested in assessing spontaneous reactions of participants on certain ques- tions. The focus laid on gaining knowledge about specific processes and routines in the handling of EVs along the transportation chain (Bryman et al., 2022). Furthermore, prior the interview started, each interviewee was informed about the ethical considerations related to their personal data and the voice recording. This includes the confidential treatment of sensitive personal data as name, company and voice recording with limited access to the authors only, to inform about the purpose and ensure that the interviewee appreciated her/his contribution to the research (Bryman et al., 2022). The ethical treatment of interview data and personal information was ensured through a consent form which was signed by all interviewees prior the interview re- cording. Methodology 14 The interviews were conducted by the authors themselves. This can be classified as an interview being conducted by “insiders” (Demirci, 2024) due to the previous knowledge and industry experience from the authors. The advantage of that is that interviews by insiders usually deliver more meaningful data (Demirci, 2024). In this research, the interviews were recorded with a mobile phone recording app for both in-person interviews and digital/telephone interviews. Re- cording and transcribing interviews ensures that all important areas are covered. E.g. when tak- ing notes, important aspects might be omitted (Bryman et al., 2022). When recording the inter- views, the interviewer can focus completely on the conversation and ask follow-up questions, where necessary. Therefore, a digital recording, with the interviewees’ consent was selected. Furthermore, in each interview, relevant information of the participant, such as position, years of experience in that position and company (anonymised) were noted (Blumberg et al., 2011; Bryman et al., 2022). After the interview, the transcribed text file was sent to each participant for validation and comments. 2.3 Data Analysis In this thesis, the major risk factors at each of the steps of the transportation chain are investi- gated. The focus is hereby on risk factors which can lead to immediate or delayed ignition of the electric vehicles during the transport. The identified risk factors and the current preventive measures are compared with each other, and potential mismatches and discrepancies are iden- tified. For this purpose, a literature review and interviews with experts from every step in the transportation chain are conducted. The ability to compare and combine key elements from different qualitative sources is of es- sential importance. Since this study remains within the qualitative sphere of research, the blended design explained by Fusch et al. (2018) is appropriated. Hereby, a comparison between the literature review and held interviews is conducted. The aim is to find aspects where the theoretical knowledge from the literature and the practical routines are matching, but more in- terestingly, where mismatches are revealed. An illustration of the comparison is shown in Fig- ure 2. Methodology 15 Figure 2: Comparison of literature review and expert interviews Own illustration (indicative only, the graphic does not represent actual ratios) In the literature review, thematic analysis has been used for analysis of the documents, as it offers a useful tool for the analysis of large sets of sources and for the identification of so-called ‘themes’. For this purpose, a spreadsheet was constructed in Microsoft Excel to structure the reading and to assign ‘concepts’ or ‘themes’ to each article (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Webster & Watson, 2002). The setup of the table was based on Webster & Watson (2002). The phases of the thematic analysis as described by Braun and Clarke (2006) have been followed during the thematic analysis of the literature. A similar approach has been described by Webster and Wat- son (2002). In a ‘concept-centric’ literature review, the results are grouped around concepts discovered among the different articles (Webster & Watson, 2002). Since a similar approach to a literature review analysis has been described by Gupta and Sharma (2022) and Jones et al. (2011), which are both economic/business research papers, it was regarded as suiting to this study. Based on the literature, eight different themes were defined and the documents sorted respec- tively. In alphabetic order these themes are (1) Battery Fire Hazards [3.1.1], (2) Battery Safety [3.1.2], (3) Fire Detection- and -Fighting Systems [3.2.1], (4) EV Fire Handling [3.2.2], (5) Multimodal Transport and RoRo Operations [3.3.1], (6) Onboard Handling [3.3.2], (7) Man- agement of Accidents and Fires on RoRo Ships [3.3.3] and (8) Terminal Risk Management [3.3.4]. To visualize the literature review process and clarify how the documents contribute to answering the RQs, a matrix (Table 1) was designed. The transportation chain is labelling the Methodology 16 X-axis and the three RQs are labelling the Y-axis. Afterwards, suitable themes were assigned to every XY-position, i.e. point of interest (Table 7). Table 7: Literature review matrix  Multimodal Transportation chain of EVs → Manufacturer Road Transport Terminal and Storage Loading Sea Leg How are electric vehi- cles handled along the various steps of the ex- port transportation chain (manufacturer, terminal, ship)? (4) (4), (5) (4) (4) (4), (6) Which risk factors exist along the steps of the transportation chain, which could cause the ignition of electric vehi- cles? (1) (1) (1), (8) (1), (8) (1), (6), (7) What preventive measures could be im- plemented during the various steps of the transportation chain to reduce the risk of igni- tion of electric vehicles? (2) (2) (2), (3) (2) (2), (3), (6) In order to fill the gaps left in the transportation chain matrix and to confirm the findings from the literature review, expert interviews were conducted. The results from the literature review were compared with the results from the interviews, as to develop recommendations for making the transportation chain safer (the purpose of this work). Qualitative interviews produce a large quantity of text which needs to be analysed. For the analysis, e.g. thematic analysis or grounded theory can be used (Bryman et al., 2022). For this research, thematic analysis has been selected, since it has already been used in the literature review stage and hence warrants a solid foundation for this work. Similar to the literature re- view, in the transcripts of the interviews, first ‘codes’ were assigned to the text passages and later from these ‘codes’, overarching ‘themes’ (‘clusters’) were derived (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Bryman et al., 2022). Afterwards, the extracted information was used to contribute to filling the transportation chain matrix. Methodology 17 For the analysis of the interviews, NVivo 12 software was employed. The above-mentioned steps were translated to the software and data processing as follows: Firstly, the transcribed interviews were uploaded into NVivo. Then, the interviews were coded by assigning codes which represented certain sentences/paragraphs and at the same time contributed to the thematic RQs. After all interviews had been coded, the codes were assigned to the three RQs. Within each RQ, afterwards the codes were grouped into clusters. Hereby, the code with the highest frequency was assigned to cluster one. Then the following code was compared to the first one and if covering a similar topic, grouped in the same cluster. If not, it was assigned to cluster two. This process was continued until all codes were assigned to clusters. In the end the clusters were reviewed and a name assigned to each. Afterwards, the underlying information for the codes from the interviews was downloaded from NVivo. This was facilitated in the form of a matrix (‘framework matrix’), where the Y-axis contained all interviews and the X-Axis con- tained all clusters of the RQ. This matrix was generated and downloaded for each RQ and then facilitated the writing process of the results and analysis chapter. The approach is illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 3: Flowchart of analysis approach Own illustration Frame of Reference 18 3 Frame of Reference In this chapter, the frame of reference is presented. 3.1 Management of Batteries In the sub-chapters, battery-related topics are presented. 3.1.1 Battery Fire Hazards The greatest hazard of a Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) battery is the thermal runaway. This phenomenon describes an increase in temperature of the battery’s internal cells, which may lead to an exo- thermic reaction and an uncontrolled rise of the battery’s temperature (Baird et al., 2020; Bisschop et al., 2019; Held et al., 2022; Kong et al., 2018; Larsson, 2017). The temperature range at which a thermal runaway starts is 150-200°C (Kong et al., 2018; Larsson, 2017). Such a thermal runaway can have serious consequences such as the release of smoke and gas, or even lead to an explosion which results in a fire (Baird et al., 2020; Bisschop et al., 2019; Larsson, 2017; Willstrand et al., 2020). While the temperature rises, the pressure inside the battery rises, too. To prevent the battery from exploding, an overpressure release valve is built in which re- leases the gases from the battery (Sturk & Hoffmann, 2013). More details on the internal safety measures are described in Chapter 3.1.2. A fire in a Li-Ion battery mainly starts due to an “internal cell short circuit” (Bisschop et al., 2019), as a result of one of the following events. In the literature three main events are identified which can result in an internal short circuit and therefore lead to a thermal runaway. It is either a (1) thermal-, (2) electrical- or (3) mechanical event (Baird et al., 2020; Bisschop et al., 2019; Feng et al., 2018; Sturk & Hoffmann, 2013; P. Sun et al., 2020; Taylor et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2022). Another event is a defect of the battery due to manufacturing failures (Baird et al., 2020; Bisschop et al., 2019; Kong et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2012). (1) Thermal events: When the surrounding temperature, the external temperature, of a Li-Ion battery is higher than the internal temperature, the battery may be triggered to heat instead of cool (Bisschop et al., 2019; Willstrand et al., 2020). A source which triggers a battery to heat up can be a nearby fire (Bisschop et al., 2019; Gehandler et al., 2017). Circumstances which favour the rise of the internal temperature can be a poor design of the battery or insufficient ventilation (Christensen et al., 2021). Moreover, besides high temperatures, even too low tem- Frame of Reference 19 peratures can lead to an increase of the battery’s internal resistance which might trigger a ther- mal runaway (P. Sun et al., 2020). The optimal temperature for the Li-Ion battery to work at is between 20°C and 30°C (P. Sun et al., 2020). (2) Electrical events: The charging level of a Li-Ion battery is defined as “state of charge (SOC)” (Bisschop et al., 2019) with an optimal operational level between 0-100%. Nevertheless, due to the capacity of the battery, it is possible to exceed the operational level, above as well as below. This overcharging or over-discharging of the Li-Ion battery can lead to an internal circuit and start a thermal runaway (Bisschop et al., 2019; Taylor et al., 2012; Willstrand et al., 2020). An internal “Battery Management System” (BMS) (Christensen et al., 2021; P. Sun et al., 2020) shall prevent the battery from exceeding its operational limits. When the BMS fails, an over- charging or over-discharging is possible (Christensen et al., 2021). (3) Mechanical events: A mechanical deformation, which describes a permanent deformation, of the Li-Ion battery can lead to an internal circuit and start a thermal runaway (Bisschop et al., 2019). Such deformation can occur in a “crash or ground impact” (Bisschop et al., 2019). How- ever, P. Sun et al. (2020) state in their paper that the batteries are well enough protected not to take serious harm in a crash, but that a high acceleration can result in a fire. Besides a car crash, objects on the road can damage the battery and even high G-forces can trigger a thermal runa- way (Christensen et al., 2021). As mentioned above, in the event of a thermal runaway smoke and gases are released from the battery. More precisely, a wide range of various toxic, corrosive and flammable substances are set free (Long et al., 2013). The type and amount of leaked gases is highly dependent on the battery’s SOC (Held et al., 2022; J. Sun et al., 2016). A list of the gases is presented in Table 8. Frame of Reference 20 Table 8: Gases released during a thermal runaway Compound Formula Reference Carbon-Monoxide CO (Baird et al., 2020; Held et al., 2022; Larsson et al., 2017; P. Sun et al., 2020) Carbon-Dioxide CO2 (Baird et al., 2020; Held et al., 2022) Methan CH4 (Baird et al., 2020; Held et al., 2022; P. Sun et al., 2020; Willstrand et al., 2020) Polyvinylidene Fluoride C2H2F2 (Larsson et al., 2017) Propane C3H8 (Baird et al., 2020; Held et al., 2022) Hydrogen H (Baird et al., 2020; Larsson et al., 2017) Dihydrogen H2 (Held et al., 2022; P. Sun et al., 2020; Will- strand et al., 2020) Hydrogen Fluoride HF (Larsson et al., 2017; Willstrand et al., 2020) Phosphorus Pentafluoride PF5 (Larsson et al., 2017) Phosphoryl Fluoride POF3 (Larsson et al., 2017) Furthermore, not only gases are released, but the smoke also contains “specific metals […] depending on the battery cell chemistry“ (Willstrand et al., 2020). These metals are presented in Table 9. Table 9: Metals contained within the smoke during a thermal runaway Element Formula Reference Cobalt Co (Held et al., 2022; Willstrand et al., 2020) Lithium Li (Willstrand et al., 2020) Manganese Mn (Held et al., 2022; Willstrand et al., 2020) Nickel Ni (Held et al., 2022; Willstrand et al., 2020) An EV fire consists of several threats to the people who are designated to extinguish the fire. One discussed issue is the question if a battery electricizes the water which is used by the fire- fighters. Sturk and Hoffmann (2013) could not find any evidence for a such a threat in their study. But a proven threat are the toxic substances to which the firefighters are exposed during Frame of Reference 21 their duty. The reason is that the firefighters’ personal protective equipment (PPE) is not de- signed for such a duty and therefore the substances contaminate their clothing (Szmytke et al., 2022). Szmytke et al. (2022) could prove by blood samples from firefighters that even if the clothes were washed after the duty they were still contaminated. The recommendation is to decontaminate them with chemicals. Moreover, Hydrogen Fluoride is potentially dangerous due to its ability to be absorbed by the skin (Willstrand et al., 2020). The ordinary firefighters’ PPE is designed to withstand flames and high temperatures but not toxic substances, for such case chemical protection suits are designed. For the situation in which flames and high temper- atures occur simultaneously to toxic gases, none of the suits is sufficient (Willstrand et al., 2020). The toxicity of the released substances is dependent on the SOC, and the literature shows that the higher the SOC is, the greater is the potential danger (J. Sun et al., 2016). Nevertheless, Larsson (2017) suggests not to overestimate the risk of Li-Ion batteries, the topic is just very large in the media. To the same conclusion comes a study conducted by Bisschop et al. (2020), EVs do not cause a higher fire hazard compared to ICEVs. Hassan et al. (2023) studied car fires in Australia and came to the conclusion that EV fires are “significantly lower than the average fire frequency for all vehicle fires” (Hassan et al., 2023). 3.1.2 Battery Safety As described in Chapter 3.1.1, a wide range of different events can lead to a battery fire. This is only the case if the Li-Ion battery is not correctly protected (Honey et al., 2013). When Li- Ion batteries are used in different kinds of vehicles, they are exposed to a potentially hazardous environment for the battery itself, such as e.g. a frequent change in humidity and temperature (Larsson et al., 2016). Therefore, it is important that the battery is protected accordingly by using different safety measures (Larsson et al., 2016). The literature states that in most of the cases where a Li-Ion battery catches fire spontaneously, the reason is “related to poor manufacturing and design procedures and/or inadequate electronic control systems, BMS, and power transmission control systems” (P. Sun et al., 2020). Never- theless, the battery needs to be protected against different kinds of threats, the safety measures preventing the battery from damage must be installed in different stages. This reaches from the cell’s chemistry to outer case of the battery and these layers can be illustrated as an onion pre- sented in Figure 4 (Larsson et al., 2016). Frame of Reference 22 Figure 4: Li-Ion battery safety onion Adapted from Larsson et al. (2016, p. 11) At the cell level it is distinguished between the chemical part and the physical part. The chem- ical part of the battery cell contains all three elements the fire triangle consists of (Gehandler et al., 2017; Larsson & Mellander, 2017; Zhang et al., 2022): with the flammable organic electro- lyte it contains combustible material (Larsson & Mellander, 2017), the cathode releases oxygen (Bisschop et al., 2019) and a thermal runaway provides the needed heat for self-ignition. There- fore, it is important to choose the electrolyte wisely because it has an influence on the battery’s safety. Hereby, the reviewed literature emphasizes to use a “non-fluorine salt” (Larsson et al., 2016), “adding flame retardants to the electrolyte” (Kong et al., 2018) and to use a “high flash point electrolyte” (Kong et al., 2018) or, simply to use a “less flammable or non-flammable electrolyte” (Bisschop et al., 2019). Willstrand (2022) writes that much research on the cell level has been conducted, but it is important to continue the improvement of safety. The next safety measure at the cell level is the physical design and package of the cell. Three designs are commonly used: the cylindrical, the hard prismatic or the pouch one (Bisschop et al., 2019; Larsson & Mellander, 2017; P. Sun et al., 2020; R. Yin et al., 2023). Hereby, it is important to consider the location of the cells in relation to each other and its wiring to prevent the transmis- sion of heat from one cell to another (Bisschop et al., 2019). Frame of Reference 23 Furthermore, the Li-Ion battery is equipped with many different technical safety installations which shall protect the battery in case of a malfunction. Besides electrical components like fuses (Kong et al., 2018), current interruption devices (Ouyang et al., 2019) and shutdown sep- arators (Kong et al., 2018), Li-Ion batteries have a BMS (Bisschop et al., 2019; Christensen et al., 2021; Larsson & Mellander, 2017; P. Sun et al., 2020). Due to the relatively small range in which the battery operates at its best, a temperature between 20°C to 30°C, SOC between 0% to 100%, and the fact that the battery contains flammable liquids, the installation of a BMS is important (Larsson & Mellander, 2017). The purpose of the BMS is not to protect the battery from thermal- or mechanical abuse, but against electrical abuse (Bisschop et al., 2019; Gehandler et al., 2017; Larsson & Mellander, 2017). Christensen et al. (2021) divide the BMS duty into four main tasks: (1) monitoring, (2) protection, (3) computation and (4) communica- tion. (1) Monitoring: The BMS continuously controls the battery’s operation to ensure that it stays within the safe limits (Christensen et al., 2021). (2) Protection: This function prevents the battery from exceeding the safe limits of operation by receiving information from the monitoring system (Christensen et al., 2021). (3) Computation: At this level the collected data from the monitoring system are processed and, in case it is necessary, transferred to the protection system which triggers its activation (Chris- tensen et al., 2021). (4) Communication: The communication system logs the collected data from the monitoring system and provides the user with the information (Christensen et al., 2021). Besides the safety measures on a chemical base and the technical overwatch of the systems functions, Li-Ion batteries are additionally equipped with mechanical safety installations. At this point the safety vent is to name (Kong et al., 2018; Ouyang et al., 2019). In case of a thermal runaway, the pressure inside the battery rises and the safety vent will be activated and the over- pressure released (Ouyang et al., 2019). Additionally, Li-Ion batteries are equipped with a “Pos- itive Temperature Coefficient” element (Ouyang et al., 2019). The working principle is as fol- lows: in case a high current flows through the element, its temperature will rise and generate a high resistance until the current drops to normal again (Ouyang et al., 2019). This prevents the Frame of Reference 24 battery from any harm caused by an abnormal electrical event. All four parts contributing to the safety of a Li-Ion battery are illustrated in Figure 5. Figure 5: Battery risk management system for Li-Ion batteries Adapted from Christensen et al. (2021, p. 11) Additionally, the topic of re-ignition is widely discussed in the literature. There is a consensus that a re-ignition might occur when the flames are extinguished but the temperature inside the battery is still high (Kong et al., 2018), or the battery did not burn out completely during the event of a fire (Bisschop et al., 2019). Such a re-ignition can even start days after the original fire is extinguished (Bisschop et al., 2020). The aspect of safety considerations during the marine transport of Li-Ion batteries is explored by Yin et al. (2023). If the Li-Ion battery is not mounted to a vehicle and transported on a car carrier respectively on a RoRo- or RoPax vessel, it is shipped on a container vessel. In order to prevent an abnormal electrical event from occurring, the Li-Ion battery is transported “in an open circuit state” (R. Yin et al., 2023). This leaves the remaining threats to a thermal- and mechanical event. Thermal events are caused by heat transfer from outside of the container to the inside (R. Yin et al., 2023), e.g. a high air temperature or a heated fuel oil tank in the vicinity. Frame of Reference 25 Mechanical events are triggered by external forces impacting the Li-Ion battery (R. Yin et al., 2023), e.g. high G-forces caused by heavy sea or the rough handling of containers during the loading and discharging operation in the port. 3.2 Firefighting and Handling In the sub-chapters, fire detection and -fighting system-related objects are presented. 3.2.1 Fire Detection and -Fighting Systems Every vessel is equipped with fixed fire detection and -fighting systems in accordance with Safety of life at sea (SOLAS) Chapter II-2, Construction - Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction (International Maritime Organization, 2002; The Standard Club Ltd, 2021). In the “Fire safety on ferries” Master‘s guide by The Standard Club Ltd (2021) the authors explain that the car decks are monitored by smoke detectors instead of flame- or heat detectors. Fur- thermore, the car decks of ferries are equipped with “high expansion foam” extinguishing sys- tems, while RoRo ships have a fixed CO2 system (The Standard Club, 2021). The design of a road tunnel and the car deck of a ship are quite similar in terms of that both are a longitudinal space which is confined to both sides and the top. Therefore, some findings of the fire safety of road tunnels can also be adopted to RoRo ships. The literature highlights that a tunnel is a special environment with unique challenges when it comes to the detection and extinguishing of fires (Kashef et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010). Both articles investigate the ad- vantages and disadvantages of the following fire detection systems: (1) Fiber optic heat detec- tor, (2) Optical flame detector, (3) Heat detector, (4) Smoke detector and (5) Camara observa- tion. To enable valid evaluation, full-scale experiments were conducted. The performance of the five systems differed depending on a wide range of variables like location, source, size and expansion rate of the fire (Kashef et al., 2009). Besides the fire detection in confined spaces as described above, others investigated in experi- ments the efficiency of different fixed firefighting systems for onboard use to extinguish battery fires inside the engine room. Andersson et al. (2018) concluded that a fixed sprinkler or water mist system is not enough to extinguish a fire which started inside a battery cell, simply because the water cannot reach the source of the fire. If a high-expansion foam or nitrogen gas is added to the water, it might increase the possibility of extinguishing the fire, but the cooling effect which prevents the fire from spreading further would be reduced (Andersson et al., 2018). This Frame of Reference 26 is backed by the findings of Magdolenová (2021), who found out that a fixed high pressure water mist system in a road tunnel reduces the temperature significantly, which disables the fire’s ability to spread further. Bisschop et al. (2021) performed a similar experiment with a fixed firefighting system on gaseous base. They found out that the risk for the fire to spread from one module to another module was reduced and it is therefore a good approach. However, the scene of fire needs still to be cooled by water (Bisschop et al., 2021). Ditch and Zeng (2019) conducted full-scale fire experiments with energy storage systems based on Li-Ion batteries. Their findings show that a fixed sprinkler system is capable of keeping even a large scale fire under control (Ditch & Zeng, 2019). The findings of Andersson et al. (2018) and Bisschop et al. (2021) are proven by the work of Zhang et al. (2022). Every firefighting system has its own advantages and disadvantages, e.g. if the cooling effect is high, the ability to extinguish the fire is low, some agents are electrically conductive and others produce toxic gases (Zhang et al., 2022). The best-performing fire extin- guishing agent in the experiments conducted by Zhang et al. (2022) was liquid nitrogen. It can reach the inside of the Li-Ion battery cell, has a good cooling effect, does not produce toxic gases and is, compared to other gases, inexpensive. The disadvantage of liquid nitrogen is the storage and transportation (Zhang et al., 2022). However, since Li-Ion battery fires are coming along with a wide range of challenges, Bisschop et al. (2021) raise the question if every EV fire needs to be extinguished in view of the flammable gases which might be produced in contact with water and the risk of explosion. 3.2.2 EV Fire Handling A common problem which firefighters are facing when they arrive to a scene of a fire involving vehicles, is to identify if it is an EV or ICEV, since there is no industrial standard for that (Long et al., 2013; Stave & Carlson, 2017). The different types of vehicles vary in the characteristics of how they behave during an event of fire. Moreover, the location of the Li-Ion battery pack differs between the various manufacturers (Stave & Carlson, 2017). During the study of Stave and Carlson (2017), they interviewed among others the fire brigade in Gothenburg with a focus on how EV fires are handled and if they are well-prepared for the challenges connected to EV fires. The response was that they receive good and useful information from Volvo Cars, but their knowledge about the other manufacturers is limited to their own experience. Besides the mentioned problem, Stave and Carlson (2017) highlight the lack of information about how to extinguish EV fires, what kind of gases develop during a fire and the risks occurring when the Frame of Reference 27 Li-Ion battery comes into contact with salt water. While Long et al. (2013) ascertain that no best practices exist in how to handle EV fires, Stave and Carlson (2017) verify that water be- came the standard procedure for firefighting. Hoffmann (2014) conducted an experiment in which he investigated the different reactions of a Li-Ion battery when it comes into contact with fresh- and salt water. Due to the internal safety measures of the battery, the main conductor is switched off when a battery comes in contact with fresh water, while the electrical power remains stored inside (Hoffmann, 2014). A com- pletely different behaviour is noted when the battery gets in contact with salt water. Hoffmann (2014) found out that the battery discharges its complete electrochemical energy within 15 minutes while the flammable electrolyte remains. Furthermore, different hydrogen chlorine compounds are formed during this process (Hoffmann, 2014; Willstrand et al., 2020). Further- more, the salt water is contaminated by Zinc-, Iron-, Copper- and Aluminium-Ions after its contact with the Li-Ion battery (Hoffmann, 2014). The above-presented study by Stave and Carlson (2017) identified the potential risks of an EV after the contact with salt water as a problem. The lack of information on how to extinguish or control an EV fire is explained by Kong et al. (2018). It is highlighted that the conducted research focuses on how to ensure a safe transpor- tation of batteries, therefore they are tested under extreme conditions in terms of mechanical-, thermal- and electrical abuse (Kong et al., 2018). Furthermore, Kong et al. (2018) suggest that the aim should shift towards answering the question how the flammability of batteries can be brought under control and to identify potential firefighting suppressants. Moreover, to deal with a fire which has its source of ignition inside a Li-Ion battery is very difficult. As described earlier, it contains all three elements which are required for a fire to burn on its own (Zhang et al., 2022). The only solution is either to ensure that a thermal runaway is prevented from happening or to limit its damage (Gehandler et al., 2017). Therefore, the fire triangle must be interrupted, which means one of the three elements needs to be eliminated (Gehandler et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2022). A possible solution for this problem is given by Bisschop et al. (2020), they suggest to install a fixed firefighting system inside the Li-Ion bat- tery. The big advantage would be to hinder the fire to reach very high temperatures (Bisschop et al., 2020). However, the continuous development of gases inside the battery cannot be limited by this device. The design of the Li-Ion battery pack is optimized to protect the battery from external damage, but limits the access to its core in case of a fire (Gehandler et al., 2017). Frame of Reference 28 3.3 Management of the Transportation Chain In the sub-chapters, transportation chain-related objects are presented. 3.3.1 Multimodal Transport and RoRo Operations ‘Intermodal transport’ has been defined as “the movement of goods in one and the same loading unit or road vehicle, which uses successively two or more modes of transport without handling the goods themselves in changing modes” (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2000). The successful implementation of intermodal transport requires the standardization of infrastructure, handling units and technical solutions (Mindur & Mindur, 2022). A transport can be referred to as ‘multimodal transport’, if the goods are carried by two or more different transport modes (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2000). Furthermore, it should be noted that “the adoption of standards improves logistics efficiency in the management of cargo, control, and service marketing, and it facilitates access to port terminal users in the maritime sector” (Ringsberg & Lumsden, 2016). When introducing standards in the handling of RoRo cargo, such as trailers, the communication of the company management to the em- ployees impacts their response to the new standard (Ringsberg & Lumsden, 2016). In their paper, Flodén and Woxenius (2021) analyse the stakeholders involved in the (land) transportation of dangerous goods and how these can contribute to the overall safety of the entire system. When handling dangerous goods as general cargo, the operators (of e.g. trucks) often are unaware that they are picking up dangerous goods before they reach the client’s load- ing zone and only then receive that information (Flodén & Woxenius, 2021). Their research further reveals that a large number of stakeholders is involved in the transportation of dangerous goods cargo. The primary stakeholders (e.g. consignor, consignee, intermodal transport opera- tors) are required in order for the system to work (Flodén & Woxenius, 2021). In case of inci- dents, the crucial role of rescue and emergency services has also been highlighted. Good coop- eration and communication between all stakeholders increases the safety of the system and fur- ther prepares for emergency situations (Flodén & Woxenius, 2021). It is however pointed out, that information technology and communication systems are often insufficient for the handling of dangerous goods (Flodén & Woxenius, 2021). In the following, the RoRo processes are explained in more detail. In RoRo shipping, the cargo is rolled onto the vessel either via its own wheels (in the case of vehicles) or on special chassis or trailers (Kaptan, 2022). The vessels usually have ramps either at the bow, at the side, or at Frame of Reference 29 the stern of the vessel, sometimes also in multiple locations. On board the ship, the cargo is driven or pulled to its stowage position and cargo deck via internal ramps or lifts. There, the cargo is lashed to the vessel, e.g. with chains or tensioners (Kaptan, 2022). The sequence of activities in the terminal in the RoRo process can be categorized into three overarching steps: First, the planning considers the availability of human and material resources. Second, the ac- tual import and export, i.e. loading and unloading are conducted. Third, the clients are billed and the payment is received (Mabrouki et al., 2013, 2014). Since the handling of trailers and cars on RoRo vessels has certain similarities (since they are transported on the same vessel), it is reasonable to also look at this process in more detail. When managing export trailers, the logistics process chain is made up of the following consecutive steps within the RoRo terminal: “arriving, transporting, receiving, inspecting, outbound staging, loading, and shipping opera- tions” (Ringsberg & Lumsden, 2016). 3.3.2 Onboard Handling When transporting EVs on RoRo ships, a failure in a Li-Ion battery presents a significant fire hazard. Additionally, failure by staff to follow set-out procedures and heavy sea state can also contribute to onboard fires (Fu et al., 2023). In line with the literature reviewed in Chapter 3.1.2, a fire in a Li-Ion battery emits toxic gases, is very hard to extinguish, and reaches high temper- atures (Germanischer Lloyd, 2013). Therefore, appropriate loading-, onboard handling-, and oversight procedures are required which enable safe transportation of the EVs (Bao et al., 2023; Fu et al., 2023; Kaptan, 2022; NTSB, 2021). In the summer of 2023, the IMO MSC, during its 107th session, approved for future adoption an amendment to SOLAS Chapter II-2 (International Maritime Organization, 2023a). This took place, after the IMO ‘Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE)’ completed the review of Chapter II-2 of the SOLAS regulation in the beginning of 2023. This included the ‘Fire Safety Systems’ code, which should reduce the number of incidents, and their conse- quences, on board RoRo- and RoPax ships to a minimum (International Maritime Organization, 2023b). According to the proposal, passenger ships constructed after 01 January 2026 are re- quired to have the following installed: “a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system to be pro- vided for the area on the weather deck intended for the carriage of vehicles; an effective video monitoring system shall be arranged in vehicle, special category and ro-ro spaces for continuous monitoring of these spaces; structural fire protection in passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers, including fire insulation of boundary bulkheads and decks of special category and Frame of Reference 30 ro-ro spaces; and a fixed water-based fire-extinguishing system based on monitor(s) to be in- stalled in order to cover weather decks intended for the carriage of vehicles” (International Maritime Organization, 2023b). In their report, compiled for the German Federal Ministry of Transportation, the Germanischer Lloyd (2013) distinguishes between two kinds of electric vehicles during the transportation on board ships: Those that are transported without their batteries being charged during the ocean transportation and those, whose batteries are being charged during the ocean transportation (Germanischer Lloyd, 2013). The latter hereby present a higher risk for ignition and fire (Ger- manischer Lloyd, 2013). EVs should therefore not be allowed to charge during the ocean transport, as to prevent fire and potentially explosions (Wu et al., 2021). In case the EVs are nevertheless being charged during the transport, the power supply to the entire deck should be accessible from outside so that it can be switched off from a safe distance in case a fire breaks out (Germanischer Lloyd, 2013). When loading EVs on board a RoRo- or RoPax vessel, it is imperative, that the stevedores and longshoremen follow the loading procedures set out by the ship operator. This was one of the recommendations by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (2021) after the fire on Höegh Xiamen (Chapter 3.3.3). Nevertheless, the ship operator (in the form of the chief mate and crew) should also check and monitor these operations (National Transportation Safety Board, 2021). It was further suggested that ship operators and technical managers should ensure that their lashing procedures contain detailed instructions on the handling of batteries (in that case referring to regular car batteries in ICEVs) (National Transportation Safety Board, 2021). Bao et al. (2023) advise for the loading and unloading procedure of EVs, that special attention should be placed on the prevention of collisions or impacts involving EVs in order not to po- tentially damage the battery (Bao et al., 2023). Furthermore, the battery should ideally be dis- connected once the EV has been parked on the loading deck and the cables should be secured and covered. Additionally, extra lashings should be placed on EVs, so that movement and shift- ing during the transport can be prevented. Lastly, charging during the journey should be pro- hibited (Bao et al., 2023). This however rather concerns RoPax vessels than pure RoRo vessels. When loading vehicles on board a RoRo ship, accidents can occur e.g. when drivers bump against the steel walls on board the vessel or scrape loading ramps with the bottom of the car. A typical cause for these accidents is human error due to fatigue (Kaptan, 2022). Kaptan (2022) hence gives the following recommendations (excerpt) in order to prevent accidents during the Frame of Reference 31 loading operations on board RoRo vessels: An “electronic fatigue risk assessment procedural infrastructure” should be implemented in order to prevent accidents caused by fatigue of dock- workers and/or crewmembers(Kaptan, 2022). Secondly, the communication during the loading process should be clear and concise. Standardised hand gestures and verbal expressions are recommended and continuous training should ensure that everybody involved in the operation has the same knowledge. Lastly, vehicle drivers should be educated on a ship-by-ship basis. Since each ship has its own design, the important points to consider when driving the vehicles on board should be highlighted to the drivers for each individual ship (Kaptan, 2022). As per suggestions by the Germanischer Lloyd (2013), EVs should be marked, both visually and in the cargo manifest/loading plan, so that the crew and emergency responders can quickly identify those cars in an emergency. Thereby, the crew could also change their approach, e.g. regarding the choice of PPE and firefighting tactic, in case a fire breaks out (Germanischer Lloyd, 2013). EVs should be parked in special lanes, so that the identification of the vehicle type is made easier. That way, the fire detection and firefighting systems in that area could be adjusted to match the needs of that cargo. Moreover, they should be parked separately from any dangerous goods on board (Germanischer Lloyd, 2013). The International Union of Marine Insurance (2017) also recommends to screen and secure the cargo, to mark the areas where EVs are parked on deck, and to ensure that the crew is trained in fire detection and fire response (International Union of Marine Insurance, 2017). Rodero and Marrero (2023) developed an algorithm which should assist during the stowage planning and loading of EVs. Their “cargo distribution algorithm” (Rodero & Marrero, 2023) calculates the stowage plan with the lowest possible overall risk for an onboard fire, based on vehicle types. Hereby, the information whether a vehicle is “an alternative fuel vehicle or not”, presents the first step and a very relevant information for the process (Rodero & Marrero, 2023). However, they acknowledge that often the information required, such as the propulsion type for a vehicle, is missing since the space on board is booked per lane meter and customers are hesi- tant to share further information (Rodero & Marrero, 2023). On board the RoRo vessels, fire detection systems should be sensitive in order to detect gases being released from defect Li-Ion batteries, even before the thermal runaway process has concluded and set the battery on fire. This way, a potential fire can be detected quite early and the affected vehicle can be cooled down, before the fire has the chance to spread over to other vehicles in the proximity (German- ischer Lloyd, 2013). Nonetheless, it is difficult to detect gases on open or weather decks and Frame of Reference 32 furthermore, the firefighting operations on these decks are challenging due to the flow of air (Germanischer Lloyd, 2013; International Union of Marine Insurance, 2017). 3.3.3 Management of Accidents and Fires on RoRo Ships On RoRo- and RoPax ships, there are four main types of hazards: Collision, grounding, capsiz- ing and fire or explosion (Antão & Guedes Soares, 2006). With regard to the location, where the incidents happen, in the period from 2014-2021, ~45% of incidents or casualties involving ships within the European Union occurred during the port stay of the vessels. This includes the mooring and unmooring, loading and unloading and other alongside operations (European Mar- itime Safety Agency, 2022). While the occurrence of fires on board ships is relatively seldom, the consequences can potentially be severe, especially on ships also transporting passengers (Antão & Guedes Soares, 2006; Wang et al., 2021). In order for a fire to start, oxygen, a flammable substance or fuel, and heat are required. This is referred to as the “fire triangle” (Antão & Guedes Soares, 2006; Gehandler et al., 2017; Larsson & Mellander, 2017; Zhang et al., 2022) (Chapter 3.1.2). When all three of those components are available, a fire can start. As soon as one of them is removed, this can cause the fire to be extinguished (Antão & Guedes Soares, 2006). From a time perspective, ship fires can be clas- sified into three different categories: “Catching fire, fire spread and fire out of control” (Wang et al., 2021). A fire can have many different causes or starting points. According to Baalisam- pang et al. (2018), the causes of fire on board ships can be categorized as human error, thermal reaction, mechanical failures and electrical fault. They further highlight that human error is responsible for 48% of onboard accidents and hence reducing human errors for accident pre- vention is crucial (Baalisampang et al., 2018). Their findings revealed that human actions that triggered fires on board ships usually occurred during maintenance activities, such as welding. They hence suggest the design of equipment in a way that reduces the probability of human error, as well as the location and design of workspaces which increases human reliability (Baalisampang et al., 2018). However, Antão & Guedes Soares (2006) argue that human error has a lesser impact on fire incidents than e.g. on groundings or collisions. In a different paper, the causes of fire on board are discovered to be “improper loading vehicle condition, lack of understanding and structural limitations of fixed fire extinguishing systems, failure to detect fire in a timely manner, inadequate fire patrols” (Kim & Jeon, 2023). The movement and shift- ing of cargo during the transport hence presents a relevant ignition hazard. This can be caused by e.g. heavy rolling and swell on board the ship. In the observed period between 2005-2016, Frame of Reference 33 10-20% of fires on RoRo-, RoPax- and Car Carrier vessels broke out due to shifting of the cargo (DNV GL, 2016). Generally, underwriters for marine insurance could observe an increase in the number of fires on RoRo- and RoPax vessels and it has also been pointed out that these vessel types are more prone to fires than others (International Union of Marine Insurance, 2017). Additionally, higher speed during the sea leg of the transportation chain can lead to higher operational risks (Antão & Guedes Soares, 2006). Marrero et al. (2022) conducted an analysis of fires on board RoRo vessels in order to identify risk categories and causes of ignition on board. Their focus had been on fires originating in the cargo space and starting in the vehicles or cargo being transported. One risk category has been identified as EVs with spontaneous ignition due to thermal runaway. A second risk category is cargo involving dangerous goods which is not properly stowed and lashed and could therefore be subject to movement during the sea transport. A third risk category centres around recrea- tional vehicles which pose multiple fire hazards (Marrero et al., 2022). Furthermore, owing to the design of RoRo vessels, the firefighting operations on board are aggravated. This is due to the fact that the vehicles are tightly loaded, enabling a fire to spread quickly while on the other hand making the detection of a potential fire harder (Kim & Jeon, 2023). Moreover, the trans- portation of EVs and the potential for thermal runaway exacerbates the situation (Kim & Jeon, 2023). In order to give an example from a real incident, the fire on board the car carrier Höegh Xiamen will be shortly described. As this incident occurred during the loading operations in the port of Jacksonville, Florida, the US government National Transportation Safety Board has published a detailed accident report on the incident (National Transportation Safety Board, 2021). The fire broke out in the aft section of the ship, on a cargo deck and during loading operations while the ship was moored in port. It was caused by a not properly detached battery in a used car. The situation was exacerbated, since the fire detection system had been switched off during the loading operations and had not immediately been switched on again. Additionally, the CO2 fire extinguishing system was employed too late and was therefore ineffective, as the fire had al- ready spread further (National Transportation Safety Board, 2021). It has been reported that the risk for a fire to start in a new car (ICEV) that is being transported is fairly low. The risk in a used car however is higher (DNV GL, 2016). This is also what caused the fire on the Höegh Xiamen (National Transportation Safety Board, 2021). The stevedores did not follow the es- Frame of Reference 34 tablished loading protocol and especially not with regard to the battery disconnection proce- dures. Furthermore, the oversight of the loading operations was inadequate (National Transpor- tation Safety Board, 2021). The fact that used vehicles are exempted from the hazardous mate- rials regulations increased the risk for the ship and crew (National Transportation Safety Board, 2021). The National Transportation Safety Board (2021) also puts forth recommendations for vessel operators. The recommendations target mostly the procedures, e.g. during loading, lash- ing and battery securing. The main recommendation is the development and improvement of the processes, involving the crew and stevedores (National Transportation Safety Board, 2021). When it comes to countermeasures in response to fires, additional recommendations to opera- tors can be found in the literature. Through an analysis of fires on RoRo-, RoPax- and Car Carrier vessels, the classification society Det Norske Veritas (then still under the old name DNV GL) developed recommendations for vessel operators. Among the recommendations put forth is that the charging of electric vehicles on board should be prohibited, cargo should be checked before loading and specific focus should be placed on old and/or used cars. Additionally, the crew should be familiarised with the firefighting procedures and these should be practiced reg- ularly (DNV GL, 2016). Based on the identified causes to fires, Kim & Jeon (2023) suggest the following for the prevention of fires in cargo holds and for the improvement of countermeas- ures: “random checks of the condition of the vehicles scheduled for shipment, improvement of fixed fire extinguishing system, improved fire detection systems and fire patrols” (Kim & Jeon, 2023). Moreover, the cabin, i.e. the section of the ship where the fire broke out, should be sealed off as soon as possible after the fire starts, and ventilation of that part of the ship should be switched off. Additionally, emphasis has been put on crew training (Wang et al., 2021). 3.3.4 Terminal Risk Management It can be distinguished between two types of risk sources in seaport terminals, those risks caused by natural disasters and risks from operational and safety causes (Nagi et al., 2021). Risk man- agement in ports “is a strategic, capital, and inescapable process, as it affects all aspects of the professional activity” (Dhahri et al., 2022). Through a literature review of the supply chain risk management and the port risk management literature, Dhari et al. (2022) conclude that the risk management in port operations has only seldomly been addressed in the literature. This stands in contrast to supply chain risk management, which has been covered more extensively by ac- ademia (Dhahri et al., 2022). Furthermore, the research in the field of the loading and unloading Frame of Reference 35 operations, as well as on the risk assessment of the handling of dangerous goods in seaports is limited (Nagi et al., 2017). Generally, risk should be reduced since this improves the overall safety and reduces potential negative effects on humans. But there is a balancing between the risk and the potential benefits, and moreover, different stakeholders have different interests and attitudes to risk (Kristiansen & Haugen, 2022). When managing risk, we firstly need to understand what the risk exactly is, and which accidents can be caused by it and in which frequency (Kristiansen & Haugen, 2022). Risk management plays a key role in ensuring effective operations at seaports and terminals (Dhahri et al., 2022; Mabrouki et al., 2014). An important part of the risk management process is the evaluation of risks (Mokhtari et al., 2012). For the risk management, knowledge of the risk variables (also referred to as risk factors) is imperative. For example, the risk variables in the terminals in the port of Sfax, Tunisia, have been identified and prioritized by Dhahri et al. (2022). The focus hereby lay on the man-made risks. For the port of Sfax, their results show that, “the highest-priority risk variables are the manual handling, disregard for safety aspects, unsafe storage of goods, absence of a prevention system and a rescue organization, neglect of the regulatory aspects of handling equipment, ignorance of good handling practices during the operation of loading and unloading, and inadequate lifting accessories” (Dhahri et al., 2022). According to John et al. (2014), sources of disruption in seaports can be categorized into oper- ational-, security-, technical-, organisational- and natural risk factors (John et al., 2014). Within the operational risk factors, human error in port operations is a major factor which can lead to the disruption of maritime operations and substantial economic losses. Further, lack of equip- ment maintenance and resulting equipment failures are another source of potential disruption (John et al., 2014). Mokhtari et al. (2012) classify the operational risk factors into six sub- categories on a lower level, namely (1) safety risk factors (e.g. weather conditions), (2) security risk factors (e.g. personal safety), (3) pollution risk factors (e.g. pollution by the ship), (4) legal risk factors (e.g. regulatory changes), (5) human error risk factors (e.g. errors by stevedores or the ship’s personnel), (6) technical risk factors (e.g. lack of equipment maintenance) (Mokhtari et al., 2012). Human errors can be related to lack of knowledge, bad decision-making or missing communication (Trbojevic & Carr, 2000). In their paper, Mabrouki et al. (2013) classify the operational risks into the five categories (1) unloading and storage, (2) unloading and direct delivery, (3) delivery of stored vehicle, (4) loading directly, and (5) planning and preparation Frame of Reference 36 (Mabrouki et al., 2014). Among the most critical risks discovered in the RoRo terminal pro- cesses, the ones most relevant for this thesis are infrastructure sizing and capacity sizing, infor- mation system failure, error entry, routing plan, a not provided information or not exact infor- mation (Mabrouki et al., 2014). Decision makers within terminals should pay specific attention to the critical risks (Mabrouki et al., 2014). When it comes to the existing risk management concepts in organizations, Nagi et al. (2021) mentioned that there are no clearly distributed responsibilities between the actors and stake- holders in seaports with regards to operational and safety risks. The response to risks is rather decentralized, driven by the variety of risks that exist in this realm (Nagi et al., 2021). Addi- tionally, the risk management often only focuses on the own organization, with a lack of coop- eration and collaboration with other organizations and other actors within the ecosystem (Pi- leggi et al., 2020). There are different models proposed for risk management within the actors of the seaport eco- system as well as across the entire system. For example, Trbojevic and Carr (2000) developed a step-by-step approach for risk management in seaports, focusing on hazard management and quantitative assessment of risks in port operations, considering both probabilities and corre- sponding consequences of risk events. Mokhtari et al. (2012) also developed a step-by-step approach to risk management in ports, however using fuzzy set theory and evidential reasoning approach. Pileggi et al. (2020) propose an ontological model for risk management in seaports. It is suggested that the roles between the different stakeholders in the port environment are clearly distributed and defined, also in order to facilitate easier collaboration between those (Nagi et al., 2021). Additionally, personnel within the different organizations should be well- educated in the field of risk management and procedures and information should be equally available to all members of the organizations (Nagi et al., 2021). When “risk owners” are de- fined in each organization, the collaboration between the various stakeholders in the port is also enabled and simplified (Nagi et al., 2021). Results and Analysis 37 4 Results and Analysis This chapter depicts the results of the interviews in connection with the literature presented in Chapter 3. The results are divided into three sub-chapters, wherein the interviews are analysed and linked to the results from the literature review. The presentation follows the steps and ac- tivities of the transportation chain as introduced in Chapter 2 (Figure 1). 4.1 Handling of Electric Vehicles along the Transportation Chain The analysed results are presented based on the four created clusters (1) No distinction between EVs and ICEVs, (2) Loading and storage on board ships, (3) Terminal operation and (4) Road transportation, to represent the codes assigned to them (Appendix II). It should foremost be noted that the interview results revealed that there was no material differ- ence in handling EVs compared to handling ICEVs or other vehicles at each respective step in the transportation chain. This was stated in all eight interviews, even despite the fact that the main question asked was how EVs are handled, and in the question it was not asked for a com- parison with ICEVs. Thus, the results show that along the entire transportation chain, there is no material difference in handling these different types of vehicles, according to the interviews. This was also confirmed by the following two interviewees (B1, F1): “We don't treat EVs differently in the terminal, for us it's just a car.” (Interviewee B1) “It's not really a difference compared to how we ship or operate with a combus- tion engine. I would say so independently if it's an electric [Vehicle] or a non- electric [Vehicle] then it's the same.” (Interviewee F1) In line with this, it was mentioned during one of the interviews with an intro engineer (Inter- viewee C1) from an EV manufacturer (Company C) that they do not differentiate between EVs and ICEVs in production. Nevertheless, there are certain requirements when the battery of an EV is being connected for the first time, since the personnel doing this job would need special training. Additionally, as mentioned by the foreman of the logistics company (Interviewee E3), the handling of EVs is slightly different for the loading and unloading on the truck for transport between the manufacturer and the terminal, due to different torque of the electric engine in lower gear and the higher weight of the EVs compared to ICEVs. Results and Analysis 38 In three of the eight conducted interviews (Interviewees A1, B2, E1), it was also addressed that the number of EVs has been increasing in the recent past. This is in line with the goal from the EU to increase the amount of EVs on European roads, as highlighted in the introduction (Chap- ter 1). The two following quotes support this finding: “Now more or less all cars are hybrid or fully electric” (Interviewee A1) “A lot of cars, it’s electric for today” (Interviewee E1) The increase of EVs was even positively appreciated by the interviewed stevedore (Interviewee B2), due to the technical aspects and the handling of this type of vehicles, when driving them in the terminal and onto the ship. With regards to the details about the handling of EVs at different stakeholders in the transpor- tation chain, the clusters 2 to 4, which were derived from the interview results, were assigned to the individual steps, manufacturer, road transport, terminal/storage, loading and sea leg (Fig- ure 1). Step 1, the manufacturer, marks the beginning of the transportation chain. This information was included in cluster 1. According to interviews with the intro engineers (Interviewees C1, C2), the EVs and ICEVs are mixed in production in the factory, they are produced on the same line. There is also no distinction between who can work on these vehicles, as all factory workers can assemble all types of vehicles. However, as soon as the battery is connected, the staff working on these vehicles need special training. In the interview with the finished vehicle distributor (Interviewee F1) from another EV manufacturer (Company F), it was mentioned that from their logistics perspective, they do not distinguish between EVs and ICEVs in terms of shipping or operating the vehicles for export. Thus, according to logistics management of EVs, the vehicles are received when factory complete, so there was no additional information about the produc- tion processes before that. In step 2, after the vehicle leaves the factory, it is transported to the export port by truck, which was addressed during interviews at both EV manufacturers. According to the interviews with the staff from the EV manufacturers (Companies C, F), the road transportation (Cluster 4) from the manufacturer to the export terminal begins with the interface between the manufacturer and the transport operator. The finished vehicle distributor (Interviewee F1) also gave a detailed Results and Analysis 39 description of the export process from the perspective of an EV manufacturer. Conducted in- terviews thus show that finished EVs are stored in a yard outside the factory, until they are assigned to a load and the logistics company is coming for picking up the vehicles. The logistics staff from the manufacturer themselves are actually not allowed to move the EVs. Instead, the loading and lashing of the truck is the responsibility of the logistics operator/carrier but needs to be done according to the manufacturer's rules and standards. Of the conducted interviews, one finished vehicle logistics operator (Interviewee E1), highlighted that before a vehicle is loaded, the truck drivers have a routine to check the vehicles for visual damages. The interview with staff