DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 

DIVISION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY   

CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 

Gothenburg, Sweden 2023 

www.chalmers.se 
Report No. E2022:144 

Competition and Merger Management in the 

European Union  
A study in Antitrust cases against Multi-sided Platforms 

Master’s thesis in Management and Economics of Innovation 

 

 
 
CHATCHANO SCHMIDT 
 
 
 



 
 

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REPORT NO. E 2022:144 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

Competition and Merger Management in the 

European Union 
A study in Antitrust cases against Multi-sided Platforms 

 

CHATCHANO SCHMIDT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 

Department of Technology Management and Economics 

Division of Science, Technology and Society 

CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 

Gothenburg, Sweden 2022  



 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Competition and Merger Management in the European Union   

A Study in Antitrust Cases Against Multi-Sided Platforms  

CHATCHANO SCHMIDT  
 
 
 
© CHATCHANO SCHMIDT, 2023. 

 

 

 

Report no. E2022:144 

Department of Technology Management and Economics 

Chalmers University of Technology 

SE-412 96 Göteborg 

Sweden 

Telephone + 46 (0)31-772 1000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover: 

 
 
 
Gothenburg, Sweden 2023



Competition and Merger Management in the European Union 

A Study in Antitrust Cases Against Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
CHATCHANO SCHMIDT 

 

 

Department of Technology Management and Economics 

Chalmers University of Technology 
 
 
 

SUMMARY 

Multi-sided platforms are becoming an increasingly integral part of our everyday 

lives, with large companies like Google and Microsoft being some of the most well-

known. The U.S. based companies Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and 

Microsoft constitute half of the world’s ten most valuable companies at the moment. 

Such size comes with a lot of power and responsibility and multi-sided platforms have 

had a series of quarrels with the law for misusing their power. Antitrust laws in 

particular are one set of laws that multi-sided platforms, perhaps unsurprisingly, have 

continuously violated. The aim of this report is to study how the European 

competition authorities have evaluated competition and mergers against multi-sided 

platforms. Furthermore, the study aims to provide an overview on the EU with brief 

remarks on the U.S. as well as provide brief remarks on potential future implications 

within this field. The empirical findings that were derived from studying the cases 

were compared to literature on platforms and antitrust. The findings indicate a clear 

shift in the nature of the cases that can be correlated to the growth of multi-sided 

platforms.  

 

The cases in the EU become more severe as time progresses and the multi-sided 

platforms grow to become more dominant. It can also be seen that there is a similarity 

in the cases in both the EU and the U.S. but that the approaches in the two 

jurisdictions have some key differences, mainly with a slight bias towards the EU 

being stricter. Another key insight is that Antitrust law has not been able to keep up 

with multi-sided platforms both because their growth has been so rapid but also 

because the longer-term implications of these platforms are incredibly difficult to 

assess. Only recently, antitrust law is seemingly catching up but the exact strategy of 

how to move forward with regulating multi-sided platforms remains somewhat of a 

mystery. On the one hand innovation of multi-sided platforms undeniably creates 

value for consumers but on the other hand, impeding competition might be negative 

for consumers in the long term. Recently the notion of customer harm has also 

creeped into the discussion. The study concludes by acknowledging this dilemma as 

well as highlighting the importance of legislators to be educated on the impact of 

platforms and designing well balanced future regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Antitrust, Digital Economy, Multi-Sided Platforms, EU, The European Commission, 

Innovation, Competition, Dominant Position.   



 
 

 
 
  



 
 

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Acknowledgments 
 

It is now time to end this chapter of my life and move on. Before turning the page to new 

beginnings in my life, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all the people that have 

provided me with professional and personal support during the ups and downs of this 

experience.  

 

Professor Erik Bohlin, what can I say about you? I really cannot find the words to describe 

my gratitude and respect for you. When everything went dark and I was there alone, you 

were the only one extending me with an open hand and this is something I will never forget, 

and something I will always appreciate for the rest of my life. I really admire you, and you 

are a bright mind and an absolutely wonderful human being. You believed in me every single 

step of the way and I am proud and honored to say you have been my supervisor and 

examiner. I hope I made you proud as well. I wish we had more time to discuss research and 

life in general. I also want to tell you that I will be more than honored to have you as my 

supervisor if I decide to pursue a PhD.  

 

Dear mom and dad, I will always be grateful for having you in my life and for all the love 

and support you have given me since I was born. I can only hope that one day I will be half 

the parents you are. Thank you for making me the person I am today.      

 

I also want to express my absolute gratitude to my fiancé. Thank you for being the best 

person I could possibly imagine. Thank you for believing in me and for always supporting 

me. I also want to thank you for all your love that kept me more than happy to keep pushing 

forward. I am and I will always be proud of you, and I am more than happy and honored to 

have you by my side. I love you and I cannot wait for the day you will become my wife.  

 
 

Thank you, 

Chatchano Schmidt 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



 
 

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Table of Contents 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 7 

1.1 Background ...................................................................................................................................... 7 

1.2 Aim and research question ........................................................................................................... 8 

1.3 Delimitations .................................................................................................................................... 8 

1.4 Outline of the report ............................................................................................................................ 8 

2. Literature review ......................................................................................................... 10 

2.1 Antitrust policy ................................................................................................................................... 10 

2.2 Competition policy and competition law in the EU ................................................................. 11 

2.3 Innovation ............................................................................................................................................ 13 

3. Methodology ................................................................................................................. 15 

3.1 Research Design ................................................................................................................................. 15 

3.2 Research Process ................................................................................................................................ 15 

3.3 Data collection and Analysis .......................................................................................................... 15 

3.3.1 Literature Review ...................................................................................................................... 16 

3.3.2 Quantitative Data ....................................................................................................................... 16 

3.4 Ethical considerations ....................................................................................................................... 16 

4. Results ........................................................................................................................... 17 

4.1 Microsoft Case (AT. 37792) ........................................................................................................... 17 

4.1.1 Preliminary Hearings ................................................................................................................ 17 

4.1.2 Review .......................................................................................................................................... 19 

4.1.3 Secondary Hearings & Decision ........................................................................................... 20 

4.2 Microsoft Tying Case (AT. 39530) .............................................................................................. 22 

4.2.1 Preliminary Hearings ................................................................................................................ 22 

4.2.2 Secondary Hearings & Decision ........................................................................................... 25 

4.3 Google Search Shopping Case (AT. 39740) .............................................................................. 27 

4.3.1 Preliminary Hearings ................................................................................................................ 27 

4.3.2 Secondary Hearings & Decision ........................................................................................... 29 

4.4 MasterCard Inter-Regional Fees Case (AT. 40049) ................................................................ 32 

4.4.1 Preliminary Hearings ................................................................................................................ 32 

4.4.2 Secondary Hearings & Decision ........................................................................................... 34 

4.5 Google Android Case (AT. 40099)............................................................................................... 36 

4.5.1 Preliminary Hearings ................................................................................................................ 36 

4.5.2 Secondary Hearings & Decision ........................................................................................... 39 

4.6 Google Search AdSense Case (AT. 40411) ............................................................................... 40 

4.6.1 Preliminary Hearings ................................................................................................................ 40 



 
 

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4.6.2 Secondary Hearings & Decision ........................................................................................... 42 

5.  Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 45 

5.1 The Commission’s approach .......................................................................................................... 45 

5.2 The Commission’s evaluation ........................................................................................................ 48 

5.3 Approach and motives in setting fines ......................................................................................... 49 

6.  Discussion..................................................................................................................... 52 

6.1 Research problem and research questions of the study ........................................................... 52 

6.2 Key findings of the study ................................................................................................................. 52 

6.3 Limitation of the study ..................................................................................................................... 54 

6.4 Recommendation for implementation and future research .................................................... 55 

7. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 56 

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 57 

Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 81 

 

 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 

Figure 1. Annual Changes in the Number of Antitrust Cases Against Large Multi-Sided 

Platforms …………………………………………………………………………………… 53 

 

Figure 2. Parallel enforcement of EU antitrust rules ……………………………………….. 54 

 

 

 
 
 

 

 

 
 



 
 

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List of abbreviations 
 
Inc.  Incorporated 

 

US  United States 

 

LLC  Limited Liability Company 

 

EU  European Union  

 

EP  European Parliament  

 

TFEU  The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

 

EC European Commission  

 

PC  Personal Computer  

 

TEU  Treaty on European Union 

 

CEC Commission of European Communities   

 

EEA  European Economic Area 

 

MIF  Multilateral Fees 

 

SO  Statement of Objections  

 

SSO  Supplementary Statement of Objections  

 

DG  Directorate-General  

 

DG COMP  Directorate-General for Competition  

 

ECN  European Competition Network  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



 
 

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1. Introduction 

In this chapter, the reader is introduced to the master’s thesis study and the background to this 

work. The research focus and the research problem are presented together with the overall 

aim of the study and the research questions. 

 

 

1.1 Background 
 
The U.S. based companies Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft constitute 

half of the world’s ten most valuable companies (Forbes, 2019). These companies hold 

immense power in today’s business world due to their size, span of operations, and 

international impact (Överby, 2021). What brings them together is that they are all five multi-

sided platforms (Forbes, 2019). Multi-sided platforms define actors in the digital market that 

connect two or more user groups by playing an intermediation or a matching role (Abdelkafi 

et. al, 2019). Alphabet Inc. is an example of a multi-sided platform that acts as a holding 

company with a market capitalization of around two trillion dollars with Google LLC being 

their largest subsidiary. Alphabet has been able to grow by acquiring companies such as 

YouTube, Motorola and Android. Thus, it has managed to establish a wide variety of 

products and services (Alphabet Inc., 2021). Before proceeding any further, it should be 

underlined that this thesis focuses on Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft and 

on other large multi-sided platforms as well.  

 

Within the digital economy, Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft are for 

example hot topics as they are closely related to concepts such as Multi-Sided Platforms, 

Ecosystems, Value Networks et cetera. Those companies have become market leaders in their 

respective industry by connecting different user groups which increased their values. Despite 

their market leadership and increasing value, those and other multi-sided platforms have a 

long history of antitrust lawsuits against them. In recent years there has been a ramp up in 

antitrust cases against multi-sided platforms in both the U.S. and the EU. The reasons behind 

the different cases are usually different but are mostly related to the abuse of dominant 

position. One of the most recent cases concerns Google and is related to monopolistic power, 

where Google is accused of utilizing their dominant position to lock out competitors in 

various ways (Feiner, 2020).  

 

Antitrust policy is essential for the digital economy and is constantly changing due to the 

reason that the current legislation is not keeping up with all the changes in the digital 

markets. Even though the current antitrust legislation is still convicting multi-sided platforms 

infringing the legislation by imposing fines and forcing several of them to come up with 

various commitments. This policy has the power to reform the future of technology-related 

industries which in turn has a ripple effect onto many other industries that are closely 

intertwined with the tech industry. In particular, antitrust policy can change the path of 

digitalization (McGinnis, J. O. and Sun, L. 2021).  

 

The development of multi-sided platforms and the significance that antitrust policy has on 

shaping the industries of the world and what role antitrust policy will have on innovation has 

sparked an interest in a deeper understanding of the historical involvement in antitrust cases 

of dominant multi-sided platforms. To create a historical view of how the European Union 

evaluated certain actions of some multi-sided platforms regarding competition, mergers and 



 
 

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innovation, research and a mapping of the most significant antitrust cases that some of the 

most valued multi-sided platforms has been involved in during the last decade will be 

conducted. Furthermore, this master thesis aims to provide a comparison between different 

lawsuits against multi-sided platforms in the EU. This master thesis will also make brief 

remarks on potential future implications and whether or not the recently proposed legislations 

namely the DMA and the DSA will have any effect on the abilities of multi-sided platforms 

in terms of competition and innovation in the future.  

 

 

1.2 Aim and research question  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the competition authority in the EU has 

evaluated competition and mergers against large platforms. To fulfill the purpose of the 

thesis, the following question will be answered: 

 

How did the EU's competition authority evaluate competition and mergers against large 

platforms? 

 

1.3 Delimitations  
 
This report focuses on the current competition legislation within the EU and its impact on 

innovation. The report focuses on large platforms firsthand, but mostly on Google as the 

company of the study and all the different antitrust cases against them within the EU. The 

report will briefly address the current antitrust legislation policies and their important role in 

the digital markets.  

 

 

1.4 Outline of the report   
 
Chapter 1, Introduction: Presents the background of study as well as the study’s aim, research 

questions and delimitation.  

 

Chapter 2, Literature review: This chapter provides an introduction to the current antitrust 

policies. This chapter also provides a deep introduction of the European competition policy 

and competition law. This chapter provides a deep introduction to innovation in the digital 

economy.   

 

Chapter 3, Methodology: Describes how the study was conducted in terms of research design, 

research process, data collection and data analysis. The chapter also discusses ethical 

concerns and reflects on the study’s chosen methodology.  

 

Chapter 4, Result: This chapter presents the result from the different data collected regarding 

the selected antitrust cases.   

 

Chapter 5, Analysis: This chapter analyzes the selected antitrust cases based on a number of 

questions that will be answered.   

 

Chapter 6, Discussion: This chapter contains a discussion of the overall study’s result. 



 
 

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Chapter 7, Conclusions: This chapter presents the study’s final conclusions and answers the 

research questions. Recommendations for future research are also included in this chapter.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 
 

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2. Literature review  

This chapter provides an introduction to the current antitrust policies. This chapter also 

provides a deep introduction of the laws concerning competition politics, competition right 

and innovation within the EU as the main focus.    

 

 

2.1 Antitrust policy  
 
In the EU, the European Commission is the sole antitrust agency. It decides which cases to 

pursue and then decides those cases in the first instance (Schneider, 2020). Bauer and Bohlin 

(2021) argues that good policy design aligns legal and regulatory frameworks with the 

technical and economic characteristics of the sector and the broader, social visions associated 

with new technologies. Mansell & Steinmuller (2020) explain that traditional competition 

policy, in particular antitrust policy, aims to ensure consumer welfare and fair competition. 

However, Mansell & Steinmuller (2020) point out that these concepts might be problematic 

to define in a platform context. This is partly because traditional anticompetitive, 

monopolistic behavior is usually assessed based on price criteria. Platforms on the other hand 

may give rise to an anticompetitive environment based on other factors than price. Dominant 

actors can use different means to secure their power such as owning large quantities of 

personal data that can be used to gain unfair bargaining power (Mansell & Steinmuller, 

2020). Another example is given by Fox (2019) who explains that platform owners might use 

their dominant position in one market to gain an advantageous position in another market that 

they wish to enter and thus, act as a gatekeeper.  

 

Fox (2019) discusses the challenge of antitrust policy in the modern day by comparing how 

the EU and U.S. manage the law differently related to digital platform companies. Fox (2019) 

explains that one major difference is that U.S antitrust violations are more difficult to prove 

compared to the EU. The reason being that, in the U.S., the accuser has to essentially prove 

that the accused party misused its power. Whereas in the EU this is not directly necessary, 

instead it has to be shown that it would be worth it for the accused party to misuse their 

power. 

 

Mansell & Steinmuller (2020) also present some of the remedies that authorities may employ 

in the case of violations. One such remedy is the power to stop an acquisition or merger that 

is deemed to harm competition. In more severe cases authorities can also commission a 

break-up of a company but Mansell & Steinmuller (2020) stress that a break-up might 

actually worsen the situation, partly because of the resource intensive practice of monitoring 

and regulating each of the resulting, smaller companies. Different jurisdictions have different 

values and guiding principles relating to how they should act in these cases of misconduct. 

The U.S. in particular, is known to have a relatively mild standpoint in the sense that they 

value entrepreneurship highly and allow innovation to flourish freely, actively limiting their 

interference unless necessary (Bauer, 2021). The EU approach on the other hand focuses 

strictly on safeguarding the public interest and competition. Furthermore, the EU has the 

DMA which outlines behavioral criteria aimed at gatekeeper companies such as Google 

(Bauer, 2021). It can be argued that Bauer implies that the EU has stricter antitrust and 

competition policy vs the U.S. This theme can be seen in other literature as well, Manne & 

Wright (2011) being a more explicit example, stating the opinion that the European 

Commission has turned into a hostile leader against the misuse of dominance power. 



 
 

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There seems to be a theme in the analyzed literature that legislation is moving towards being 

harsher. Frieden (2021), states that antitrust and competition policy has been rather mild in 

the past but that it is expected to become stricter, especially in the EU. Mansell & Steinmuller 

(2020) also state that the size and dominance that certain platforms have reached has 

bolstered concern of potential harmful implications and that both the EU and the U.S. have 

called for more sophisticated investigations and policies to be put in place. A serious problem 

is that this is an incredibly challenging issue as confirmed by Frieden (2021) who states that 

platform intermediaries have reached a degree of market dominance at a rate that legislators 

simply cannot keep up with. The problem is even further magnified by the fact that it is 

unclear what effect certain policies might have which means that it is essentially an 

experimentative process on a large scale with high uncertainty as well as high risk for 

undesirable outcomes (Bauer, 2021). Many policy suggestions have been made and a more 

rigorous presentation of these is outside of the scope of this report. However, to provide a 

general framework, Fox (2019) has proposed a useful spectrum with the extreme point of 

“doing nothing” on the one end and “breaking them up” on the other end. There are clear 

issues with both extremes and the challenge is to find the right balance. 

 

Schneider (2020), argues that the recent European antitrust policy and enforcement are based 

on a series of economic and legal misunderstandings of how markets work, and are driven by 

an activist agenda, and can have protectionist effects. Bauer and Bohlin (2021) however, 

argues that there is evidence that reliance on prevailing approaches can result in the retention 

of inappropriate policies, and that previous experience with the regulation of interdependent 

information and communication technologies showed that most regulatory interventions have 

differing effects on players.  

 

 

2.2 Competition policy and competition law in the EU  
 
The EP (2022) states that the main objective of the EU competition rules is to enable the 

proper functioning of the EU’s internal market as a driver for the wellbeing of EU citizens, 

businesses and society as a whole. They further state that an effective competition enables 

businesses to compete on equal terms across the Member States, while continuously putting 

them under pressure to strive to offer the best possible products at the best possible prices for 

consumers (EP, 2022). This is intended to drive innovation forward to achieve a higher 

degree of innovation and long-term economic growth by achieving a free and dynamic 

internal market and promoting general economic welfare. EU competition policy also applies 

to non-EU businesses that operate in the internal market. The Treaty on the Functioning of 

the European Union (TFEU, 2022) contains rules that aim to prevent restrictions on and 

distortions of competition in the internal market. This is done by prohibiting anti-competitive 

agreements between undertakings and abuse of market position by dominant undertakings, 

which could affect trade between Member States.  

 

However, mergers and takeovers with an EU dimension are monitored by the Commission 

and may be prevented if they would result in a significant reduction of competition. Societal, 

economic, geopolitical and technological changes constantly pose new challenges to EU 

competition policy (EP, 2022). Such challenges compel policymakers to assess whether the 

current competition policy toolbox still provides the effective tools to achieve its overarching 

objective or whether it needs adjustment. The EU competition policy includes rules on 

antitrust, merger control, State aid, and public undertakings and services. The antitrust branch 



 
 

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aims at restoring competitive conditions after the formation of cartels or when a company 

abuses its dominance. The merger control aims at pre-empting potential distortions of 

competition by assessing in advance whether a potential merger or acquisition could have an 

anti-competitive impact. The State aid rules aim to prevent undue state intervention wherever 

preferential treatment of given undertakings or sectors distorts, or is likely to distort (EP, 

2022). 

  

One of the tools to restrict competition is Article 101 of the TFEU which bans anti-

competitive agreements (TFEU, 2022). The article prohibits agreements between two or more 

operators to restrict competition. The article covers both horizontal agreements which take 

place between competitors operating at the same level of the supply chain and vertical 

agreements which take place between a manufacturer and its distributor (TFEU, 2022). In 

such cases the companies agree to reduce competition instead of competing with each other. 

This would distort the playing field and in turn harm consumers and other businesses. This 

includes actions such as explicit agreements and concerted practices for fixing prices or 

limiting production output, or dividing the market among the companies. Those types of 

agreement are considered harmful to competition and are thus prohibited (TFEU, 2022). On 

the other hand, other types of agreements may be exempted, if they contribute to improving 

the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress. 

Those could be agreements on cost or risk sharing between companies, or on accelerating 

innovation through cooperation in research and development.  

 

Another tool that aims to prohibit the abuse of a dominant position is Article 102 of the 

TFEU (TFEU, 2022). This tool aims at companies that hold a position of dominance in a 

particular market and to abuse that position. A dominant position is ‘a position of economic 

strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being 

maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 

independently of its competitors, customers and consumers (TFEU, 2022). Examples of 

behavior that would amount to abuse of dominant position include setting prices at below 

cost level, charging excessive prices, tying and bundling, refusing to innovate and refusal to 

deal with certain counterparts. One of the most prominent cases of abuse of dominant 

position occurred in the year 2004 with Microsoft. The Commission found that Microsoft had 

abused its dominant position in PC operating systems by withholding critical interoperability 

information from its competitors making the providers of rival operating systems unable to 

compete effectively (European Parliament, 2022). 

 

Yet another tool is the merger control. Mergers or acquisitions can be beneficial for 

companies as they can create efficiencies, synergies and economies of scale (Tetenbaum, 

1999). However, if they result in strengthening market power or increasing market 

concentration, they can also weaken competition. which is why certain mergers and 

acquisitions must be reviewed and may not be completed until authorization is granted 

(European Parliament, 2022). The Commission must be notified of planned mergers if the 

resulting company would exceed certain thresholds. The merger control rules apply to 

companies based outside the EU, if they do business in the internal market. The review 

process is triggered when control is acquired over another undertaking (European council, 

2004). After an assessment of the likely impact of the merger on competition, the 

Commission may approve or reject it, or it can grant an approval, subject to certain 

conditions and obligations (European council, 2004). In 2014, the European Commission 

carried out a consultation to EU merger control rules aiming to improve the combined 

effectiveness of the rules at EU level and at national level (European commission, 2014). 



 
 

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The Commission is the main body responsible for ensuring the correct application of these 

rules and has inspection and enforcement powers (ECA, 2020). The Commission serves as a 

platform for the exchange of information aimed at improving the enforcement of competition 

rules (European Parliament, 2022). Since 1 May 2004, in the context of the Articles 101 and 

102 the competition authorities of the Member States have assumed some competition 

enforcement functions. Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 allowed an enhanced 

enforcement role of national antitrust authorities and courts, which was reinforced by 

Directive (EU) 2019/1 (European Parliament, 2019). In the area of antitrust law, the Actions 

for Damages Directive was adopted in 2014 in order to heighten the deterrent effect against 

prohibited agreements (cartels and abuse of a dominant position) and to provide better 

protection for consumers. It facilitates the process for obtaining compensation for harm 

caused to individuals or other businesses by an infringement of competition law. 

 
 

2.3 Innovation 
 
According to Rogers, (1983) innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new 

by an individual or other unit of adoption. Taylor, (2017) argues it is the creation and 

implementation of new processes, products, services and methods of delivery. Resulting in 

significant improvements in outcomes, efficiency, effectiveness or quality. Which reinforces 

the argument of Eriksson-Zetterquist et al., (2011) that innovation is the pathway to survive 

in a rapidly changing environment. In order for the innovation to be effective, the innovation 

must start small and simple, but also that it has to be focused (Drucker, P. 1985). Schreier and 

Sorescu, (2021) argues that research on innovation has focused on providing a potential 

problem solution that fulfills an existing need or creates new needs that consumers had not 

articulated. Some innovations might result in a monopoly in an industry, Bauer & Bohlin 

(2021), argues that temporary monopoly power is good for innovations that require high 

investment and high risks. They further argued that innovation for firms in monopolistic 

market position replaces existing profits.   

 

According to Malerba and Orsenigo, (1997) there are two patterns of innovative activity. The 

first one is characterized by creative destruction with technological ease of entry and where 

entrepreneurs play the major role creating new firms conducting innovative activities.  

Entrepreneurs enter an industry with new ideas and innovations, launch new enterprises 

which challenge established firms, disrupt the ways of production, organization and 

distribution and wipe out previous innovations. Here, even leading firms with big market 

shares get different incentives to innovate in order to protect their profits and to protect the 

future of the firm. The second pattern is characterized by creative accumulation with the 

prevalence of large established firms and the presence of relevant barriers to entry for new 

innovators. Those companies create barriers to entry through monopoly or by other means to 

new entrepreneurs and small firms with their stock of knowledge in specific technological 

areas, their competencies in R&D, production and distribution and their relevant financial 

resources (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997). Bauer & Bohlin (2021), argues that the innovation 

will increase when the intensity of competition increases. However, the innovation incentives 

will decline when the intensity of competition increases further.  

 

Matyunina, (2019) argues that the digital economy promotes innovation activities and 

facilitates technological diffusion in the whole society. Innovation theory suggests that 



 
 

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economic, technical, and regulatory innovation opportunities will be positively related to 

innovation activity (Bauer & Bohlin, 2021). They also argue that an improved appropriability 

of innovation rents also increases innovation activity. For firms, innovation has been seen as 

a demand expanding engine of growth. In the digital economy however, innovation not only 

presents in what firms sell, but also in how they sell it (Schreier and Sorescu, 2021). Which 

have transformed the industrial structures from traditional labor- and capital-intensive 

industries to data intensive and technology intensive sectors (zhang et. al, 2022). This has led 

to the digital economy being characterized by high innovation, powerful penetration, and 

rapid diffusion which helps industries from both upstream and downstream to have better 

communication without conflicts. Zhang et. al, (2022) further explains that the digital 

economy has promoted the transformation of the intelligence of enterprises and digitalization 

in the process of integrating with conventional industries with its information and digital 

data. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 
 

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3. Methodology  

In the following chapter, the method used in the study is presented. First, the research design 

and the research process are outlined. Following, the data collection method and data analysis 

and how it was performed is also presented. Finally, the following chapter ends with a brief 

discussion regarding ethical concerns and a reflection on the chosen methodology. 

 

 

3.1 Research Design  
 
This study has utilized a qualitative research approach. According to Anderson (2010), 

Qualitative research has the strength of examining issues in depth and in detail. A more 

hybrid approach including both qualitative and quantitative methods was not of interest. This 

is due to the reason that the research question can be answered by only using a qualitative 

approach. According to Bailey et al. (2020), a qualitative approach is used to understand 

Why? and How?, while a quantitative approach is used to measure, count or quantify a 

problem. Which indicates that a quantitative approach would not add anything to or even 

change the result of the conducted study.  

 

 

3.2 Research Process  
 
The topic for this study was proposed by the supervisor of this master thesis. In the fall of 

2021, a similar topic regarding the antitrust cases of Google in the EU and the US was 

written as a report in a previous course. In late May the topic was suggested and more 

developed to make it suitable for a master thesis. In parallel with this an initial literature 

review was conducted to gain knowledge about the topic and the previous research. This 

enabled the proposal of suitable research questions within the field. In July a methodology for 

the study was developed. Additional literature review, as well as additional data collection 

and analysis was conducted with the purpose to answer the research question and draw 

conclusions. In January, the thesis was presented and opposed at Chalmers University of 

Technology, and the report was thereafter finalized.   

 

 

3.3 Data collection and Analysis  
 
The primary data for this study was collected from qualitative data from the EU and from 

different studies and investigations done on this topic. The data from the EU provides a more 

detailed description of their current legislation when it comes to competition policy and 

competition rights. The data also provides information regarding why those cases appeared 

and whether or not there is a pattern or if there is something in common between the studied 

cases. The primary data also includes data regarding general antitrust policy. The collected 

data was further presented in a literature review. To complement the primary data, secondary 

data was collected. The secondary data included different antitrust cases against Google. Bell 

et al. (2018) states that secondary data collection is a beneficial method for research projects 

with time restriction and limited data availability. Due to the use of the same research method 

throughout the study, the data collection and data analysis were conducted in the same way. 

This will be further described in the sections below. 



 
 

16 
 

 

 

3.3.1 Literature Review  
 
An initial literature review was performed to get a notion of competition policy, competition 

right and innovation. During the literature review different sources were utilized including 

reports from the European Union, books, as legal cases in the EU. Key words such as 

Competition policy, Competition right, Innovation, Antitrust, Google, EU and Multisided 

Platforms were used to find relevant literature. The literature review also included studying 

different scientific publications to get a notion of how the recently proposed, namely the 

Digital Market Act and the Digital Service Act will affect the abilities of the large platforms 

in terms of competition and innovation in the future. Another literature review was performed 

regarding general antitrust policies. This literature review was performed to provide an 

overview of antitrust policies and their important role in the digital markets.  

          

 

3.3.2 Quantitative Data  
 
To complement the primary data, secondary data was collected. The secondary data was 

collected by performing research dealing with the chosen antitrust cases against Google and 

other large platforms in the EU during the past 22 years. During the quantitative data 

collection different sources were utilized including reports from the European Union, 

academic papers, news reports, as well as different legal cases concerning the chosen cases in 

this report. Key words such as Antitrust, multisided platforms, Google and EU were used to 

find relevant data dealing with the chosen cases. The study of all the chosen cases made it 

easier to see how the antitrust policies in the EU had evolved during the time between each 

antitrust case. It also gives a better overview of how Google and other large platforms have 

utilized their monopolistic position over time. The data collected from both the quantitative 

data collection and the literature review resulted in a better overview. Which enabled 

answering the research question of how did the EU's competition authority evaluate 

competition and mergers against large platforms? It also addresses whether the recently 

proposed legislation namely the DMA and the DSA will affect the abilities of the large 

platforms in terms of competition and innovation in the future. 

 

 

3.4 Ethical considerations  
 
The study has been conducted according to Chalmers University of Technology’s regulations 

for master thesis projects, föreskrifter för examensarbete på civilingenjörs-, arkitekt- och 

masterprogram (Chalmers University of Technology, 2016). According to the regulations the 

students should consider that the study is performed in an ethical way. The ethical aspects 

have mainly been considered during the data collection and the data analysis process, to make 

sure that the risk of deception and conflicts of interest is held to a minimum. 

 



 
 

17 
 

4. Results 

In the following chapter, A number of lawsuits was further selected by defining different 

selection criteria and was later studied. The selection criteria were cases where the platforms 

were condemned and where the platforms were obliged to pay fines. Each lawsuit is provided 

with its case number, as well as with a description of each of the cases. Each of the cases was 

divided into three different parts namely preliminary hearings, review and secondary hearings 

& decision. These parts describe the different actions carried out by the European 

Commission in the cases and which eventually led to the condemnation of the selected multi-

sided platforms. The decision of each of the lawsuits is also provided. A table representing all 

the different lawsuits related to multi-sided platforms in the EU is presented in the Appendix.  

 

The first case was conducted against Microsoft, where Sun alleged that Microsoft enjoyed a 

dominant position as a supplier of a certain type of software product called operating systems 

for personal computers. Sun further alleged that Microsoft reserved to itself information that 

certain software products for network computing, called work group server operating 

systems, needed to interoperate with Microsoft’s PC operating systems. The second case was 

conducted against Microsoft regarding two cases of abuse of dominant market position. The 

first case was in the field of interoperability as a response to a complaint made by the 

European Committee for Interoperable Systems. The second case was in the field of tying 

separate software products. The third case was conducted against Google following 

complaints by search service providers about being unfavorably treated in Google's unpaid 

and sponsored search results coupled with a preferential placement of Google's own services. 

The fourth case was conducted against MasterCard who maintained a set of cross-border 

acquiring rules, which created an obstacle to cross-border trade in acquiring services within 

the EEA. The rules made acquirers offering services in Member States where the domestic 

MIF were lower were prevented from offering cheaper services. The merchants were also 

prevented from taking advantage of the internal market and benefiting from less expensive 

services from card acquirers established in Member States where MIF were lower. The fifth 

case was conducted against Google who breached EU’s Antitrust laws by forcing various 

requirements onto partners such as Android mobile device manufacturers as well as network 

providers that sell Android phones. In order for Android phone manufacturers to get a license 

to use the Play Store, a criterion was that they needed to agree to pre-install Google Chrome. 

The sixth case was conducted against Google who included exclusivity clauses in their 

contracts. Prohibiting publishers from placing any search adverts from competitors on their 

search results pages. Google had begun replacing the exclusivity clauses with so-called 

“Premium Placement” thus preventing Google's competitors from placing their search adverts 

in the most visible and clicked on parts of the websites' search results pages.  

 

 

4.1 Microsoft Case (AT. 37792) 

4.1.1 Preliminary Hearings 
 

In this case, Sun complained to the Commission pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No 17 

for the initiation of proceedings against Microsoft (EC, 2004). Sun alleged that Microsoft 

enjoyed a dominant position as a supplier of a certain type of software product called 

operating systems for personal computers and further alleged that Microsoft infringed Article 



 
 

18 
 

82 of the Treaty by reserving to itself information that certain software products for network 

computing, called work group server operating systems, needed to interoperate fully with 

Microsoft’s PC operating systems (EC, 2004). Sun further argued that the withheld 

interoperability information was necessary to compete as a work group server operating 

system supplier (EC, 2004). 

 

After a first investigation of the complaint, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to 

Microsoft to give Microsoft the opportunity to comment on its preliminary findings of facts 

and law (EC, 2004). The Statement of Objections mainly focused on the interoperability 

issues that formed the basis of Sun’s complaint (EC, 2004). The Commission had previously 

launched an investigation into Microsoft’s conduct on its own initiative, under Regulation No 

17 and concerned more specifically Microsoft’s Windows 2000 generation of PC and work 

group server operating systems and Microsoft’s incorporation of a software product called 

Windows Media Player into its PC operating system products (EC, 2004). That investigation 

resulted in the Commission sending Microsoft a second Statement of Objections concerning 

issues of interoperability and the incorporation of Windows Media Player in Windows (EC, 

2004). The Commission joined the relevant findings set out in the first Statement of 

Objections in the case that followed the complaint of Sun (EC, 2004).  

 

As a response to the first and the second Statements of Objections, Microsoft submitted 46 

statements from customers and system integrators, purportedly supporting its responses to the 

Commission’s objections concerning interoperability (EC, 2004). The Commission sent a 

round of requests for information to those 46 customers, with a view to obtaining quantitative 

data on those customers' use of products relevant to the Commission’s investigation (EC, 

2004). 

 

Following the second Statement of Objection, the Commission engaged in a wider market 

enquiry for interoperability, on the basis of an independent sample of organizations that use 

PC and work group server operating systems (EC, 2004). The Commission sent requests for 

information to 75 companies based in the EEA. The companies were randomly selected and 

operated in different sectors and also varied in size (EC, 2004). Some of the 71 companies 

that responded provided answers for their subsidiaries or sister-companies in the same group, 

making the total number of responses over 100, covering more than 1.2 million PC clients 

(EC, 2004). Their answers generated additional queries, and a follow-up questionnaire was 

sent to the 62 organizations that had responded to the requests for information (EC, 2004). 46 

requests for information were also sent to companies active in areas relevant to the issues 

raised by the incorporation of Windows Media Player into Windows generating 33 responses 

(EC, 2004). In the light of the findings of the market enquiry and how they related to the 

Commission’s existing objections, a supplementary Statement of Objections was sent to 

Microsoft (EC, 2004). It did not cover abusive practices different from the ones set out in the 

first two Statements of Objections, it rather refined and consolidated the legal considerations 

(EC, 2004).  

 

Microsoft replied to the supplementary Statement of Objections and submitted supplementary 

material, containing two surveys carried out by Mercer Management Consulting on behalf of 

Microsoft (EC, 2004). At Microsoft’s request, an oral hearing took place in which Microsoft 

was given an opportunity to submit material following the hearing, and to comment on the 

issues raised by the Commission services, the complainant and the interested third parties 

who attended the hearing (EC, 2004). The Commission granted Microsoft access to the files 

five times throughout the procedure and sent Microsoft a letter inviting it to provide 



 
 

19 
 

comments on the conclusions stated in the letter which drew on documents not mentioned in 

the statements of objections (EC, 2004).  

 

The Advisory Committee sent its report to the Commission agreeing with the Commission’s 

analysis that Microsoft had a dominant position in the client PC operating systems market for 

purposes of Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (EC, 2004). 

This was both in the interoperability element and the media player element of the case. In the 

interoperability element the Advisory Committee agreed with the Commission that Microsoft 

abused its dominant position by refusing to supply its competitors with interoperability 

information necessary for them to compete in the work group server operating system market 

(EC, 2004). Microsoft’s refusal possessed a risk of elimination of competition in the work 

group server operating systems and limits development to the prejudice of customers (EC, 

2004). The Advisory Committee also agreed that Microsoft did not have a justification for 

refusing to supply the interoperability information to its competitors (EC, 2004). With regard 

to the media player element of the case, the Advisory Committee agreed that Microsoft 

abused its dominant position by tying the Windows media player to the PC operating system 

(EC, 2004). The Advisory Committee also agreed that the tying of the media player in the PC 

operating system poses a risk of foreclosing competition and stifling innovation in the market 

for media players (EC, 2004). The Advisory Committee also agreed that Microsoft did not 

have a justification for tying its Windows media player with its client PC operating systems 

(EC, 2004). The Advisory Committee agreed that the remedy of requiring disclosure of 

interoperability information and the mechanism for ensuring its implementation and 

compliance is appropriate (EC, 2004). The Advisory Committee also agreed that the remedy 

of requiring Microsoft to offer to purchasers a version of its client PC operating system 

without Windows media player, and that the mechanism for ensuring its implementation and 

compliance is appropriate (EC, 2004). Finally, the Advisory Committee agreed that imposing 

a fine on Microsoft is appropriate and agreed that the Commission’s proposed fine against 

Microsoft is appropriate (EC, 2004).   

 

 

4.1.2 Review 
 

The Commission further adopted a decision related to the proceedings pursuant to Article 82 

of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (EC, 2004). The Commission rejected 

the arguments of Microsoft and ordered them to disclose the information that it refused to 

share and allow its use for the development of compatible products (EC, 2004). The 

disclosure was limited to protocol specifications and to ensure interoperability to the extent 

that the decision might require Microsoft to refrain from fully enforcing its intellectual 

property rights (EC, 2004). Microsoft may not impose restrictions as to the type of products 

in which the specifications may be implemented (EC, 2004).  

 

Regarding the tying abuse, Microsoft had to offer users and OEMs for sale in the EEA a full-

functioning version of Windows which does not incorporate Windows media player (EC, 

2004). Microsoft also had to refrain from using any means that would have the equivalent 

effect of tying Windows media player to Windows, and from giving OEMs or users a 

discount conditional on their obtaining Windows together with Windows media player (EC, 

2004). The Commission considered Microsoft’s action to constitute an infringement of 

Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (EC, 2004). Therefore, the 

Commission set the fine at €165 732 101 in order to reflect the order of the gravity of the 

infringement. Due to Microsoft’s economic capacity and in order to ensure a deterrent effect 



 
 

20 
 

on Microsoft, the fine was multiplied with a factor of two to €331 464 203. In order to take 

the duration of the infringement into account the amount of the fine was increased by 50% to 

€497 196 304 (EC, 2004).  

 

Following the set fine, the Commission market tested the proposals from Microsoft regarding 

how the company intends to implement the Commission's decision in the field of 

interoperability (EC, 2004). The decision required Microsoft to disclose complete and 

accurate interface documentation which would allow non-Microsoft workgroup servers to 

achieve full interoperability with Windows PCs and servers (EC, 2005). Subject to the results 

of the market test, work group server developers interested in receiving interoperability 

information from Microsoft will be able to develop and sell their products (EC, 2005). 

Microsoft also recognized the need to enhance the options available to recipients by creating 

a range of packages of information from which they can choose according to their needs (EC, 

2005). In order for the Commission to make a final assessment a trustee foreseen by the 

Decision would, as part of its mandate in assisting the Commission in monitoring Microsoft's 

compliance, provide technical advice to the Commission, including evaluating the innovative 

character of the protocols at stake, and identifying appropriate comparable to verify whether 

the remuneration that Microsoft proposes to charge is reasonable (EC, 2005). 

 

The Commission appointed Professor Neil Barrett, as the Trustee to provide technical advice 

to the Commission on issues relating to Microsoft's compliance with the Commission's 

decision (EC, 2005). The Decision foresaw a Monitoring Trustee to assist the Commission in 

monitoring Microsoft's compliance with the Decision. The Decision required that the 

Monitoring Trustee must be independent of Microsoft and must possess the necessary 

qualifications to carry out his mandate and have the possibility to hire expert advisors to 

assist him in carrying out tasks within his mandate (EC, 2005). The Monitoring Trustee's role 

is to provide impartial expert advice to the Commission on compliance issues (EC, 2005). In 

accordance with the terms of the Decision, Microsoft submitted several candidates for the 

position of Monitoring Trustee. The Commission examined the candidates in terms of 

expertise and impartiality and determined that Professor Barrett was the most qualified (EC, 

2005). 

 

 

4.1.3 Secondary Hearings & Decision 
 

The Commission issued a Statement of Objections against Microsoft for its failure to comply 

with certain of its obligations under the Commission decision (EC, 2005). One of the 

remedies imposed by the decision was for Microsoft to disclose complete and accurate 

interface documentation which would allow non-Microsoft workgroup servers to achieve full 

interoperability with Windows PCs and servers (EC, 2005). The Statement of Objections 

indicated that the Commission's preliminary view, supported by two reports from the 

Monitoring Trustee, was that Microsoft has not provided complete and accurate 

specifications for the interoperability information (EC, 2005). After giving Microsoft an 

opportunity to reply to the Statement of Objections, the Commission may impose a daily 

penalty (EC, 2005). Since the decision, Microsoft has revised the interoperability information 

that it is obliged to disclose. However, the Commission took the preliminary view that this 

information is incomplete and inaccurate. This view is supported by the report of the 

Monitoring Trustee (EC, 2005). The commission gave Microsoft five weeks to respond to the 

Statement of Objections and has a right to an oral hearing. The Commission may then, after 

consulting the Advisory Committee of Member State Competition Authorities, decide 



 
 

21 
 

pursuant to Article 24(2) of Regulation 1/2003 imposing a fine on Microsoft for every day 

between 15 December 2005 and the date of that Article 24(2) decision (EC, 2005). The 

Commission may then take other steps to continue the daily fine until Microsoft complies 

with the decision (EC, 2005). As regards the second issue highlighted in the decision was the 

obligation for Microsoft to make the interoperability information available on reasonable 

terms, the Commission with the input of the Monitoring Trustee evaluated additional 

information provided by Microsoft (EC, 2005). 

 

As a result, the Commission imposed a penalty payment of €280.5 million on Microsoft for 

its continued non-compliance with some of its obligations under the Commission's Decision 

(EC, 2006). If Microsoft continues to fail to comply, the decision also increases the amount 

of the daily penalty payment to €3 million per day (EC, 2006). The Commission based its 

conclusion on the advice of the Monitoring Trustee, who gives technical assistance to the 

Commission as regards Microsoft's compliance with the decision and the Commission's 

external technical advisors (EC, 2006). Of the two elements of non-compliance identified, the 

provision of complete and accurate interoperability information is a prerequisite for 

interoperable work group server operating systems to be developed (EC, 2006). Microsoft's 

non-compliance eliminated the effectiveness of the remedy, the Commission took the view 

that Microsoft's failure to comply in this respect should constitute the larger part of the daily 

penalty payment of €1.5 million for the element of non-compliance (EC, 2006). 

 

Due to the failure, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Microsoft for failing to 

comply with certain of its obligations under the Commission decision (EC, 2007). The 

Statement of Objections indicated the Commission's preliminary view that there is no 

significant innovation in the interoperability information, rejecting 1500 pages of 

submissions by Microsoft from December 2005 onwards, and that the prices proposed by 

Microsoft were unreasonable (EC, 2007). Microsoft was given four weeks to reply to the 

Statement of Objections, after which the Commission might impose a daily penalty for 

failure to comply with the March 2004 decision. The issue of whether the interoperability 

information is complete and accurate was still under consideration (EC, 2007). Microsoft 

provided two separate licensing arrangements to companies wishing to obtain the 

interoperability information as foreseen by the 2004 Decision's remedy (EC, 2007). The first 

allowed licensees to use the protocols, but without taking a license for patents which 

Microsoft claims necessary. The second combined the first license with a license for the 

disputed patents (EC, 2007). Microsoft divided the protocols into Gold, Silver and Bronze 

price categories based on the claimed degree of innovation (EC, 2007). Microsoft agreed that 

there is a fourth category of protocols, not necessarily innovative, for which there will be no 

royalty. The Commission viewed that there is no innovation in the 51 protocols in the No 

Patent Agreement where Microsoft has claimed non-patented innovation, and that Microsoft's 

current royalty rates for this agreement are therefore unreasonable (EC, 2007).  

 

This resulted in the Advisory Committee agreeing with the Commission that the workgroup 

server protocol program pricing principles appropriately reflect the rationale of the 2004 

decision (EC, 2008). The Advisory Committee also agreed with the Commission that 

Microsoft’s remuneration schemes for the No Patent were not reasonable (EC, 2008). They 

further agreed that the Commission may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty 

payment for the non-compliance and on the period of non-compliance (EC, 2008). Finally, 

the Committee agreed on the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment for 

Microsoft’s failure with its obligation to disclose interoperability information (EC, 2008).     

 



 
 

22 
 

The Commission decided to impose a penalty payment of €899 million on Microsoft for non-

compliance with its obligations under the Commission's March 2004 decision (EC, 2008). 

The decision was adopted under Article 24(2) of Regulation 1/2003 and found that Microsoft 

charged unreasonable prices for access to interface documentation for work group servers 

(EC, 2008). The 2004 decision found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position under 

Article 82 of the EC Treaty and required Microsoft to disclose interface documentation which 

would allow non-Microsoft workgroup servers to achieve full interoperability with Windows 

PCs and servers at a reasonable price (EC, 2008). The Commission's Decision of 2004 

required Microsoft to disclose complete and accurate interoperability information to 

developers of work group server operating systems on reasonable terms (EC, 2008). Initially, 

Microsoft demanded a royalty rate of 3.87% of a licensee's product revenues for a patent 

license and of 2.98% for a license giving access to the secret interoperability information 

(EC, 2008). In a statement of objections, the Commission set out its concerns regarding 

Microsoft's unreasonable pricing and Microsoft reduced its royalty rates to 0.7% for a patent 

license and 0.5% for an information license within the EEA (EC, 2008). As from 22 October 

2007 Microsoft provided a license giving access to the interoperability information for a flat 

fee of €10 000 and an optional worldwide patent license for a reduced royalty of 0.4 % of 

licensees' product revenues (EC, 2008). The current decision concluded that the royalties that 

Microsoft charged for the information license were unreasonable and therefore failed to 

comply with the March 2004 Decision for three years, thus continuing their illegal practices 

(EC, 2008). 

 

4.2 Microsoft Tying Case (AT. 39530) 

4.2.1 Preliminary Hearings   
 

In this case the Commission initiated a formal investigation against Microsoft in two cases of 

suspected abuse of dominant market position (EC, 2008). Thus, allegedly infringing Article 

82 of the European Commission Treaty rules on abuse of a dominant market position (EC, 

2008). Since it involved two cases, two proceedings were opened. The first opened 

proceedings were in the field of interoperability as a response to a complaint made by the 

European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS). The second proceeding was opened 

in the field of tying of separate software products following among other things a complaint 

made by Opera (EC, 2008).    

 

As for interoperability, the Court of First Instance confirmed the principles that must be 

respected by dominant companies as regards interoperability disclosures (EC, 2008). In the 

complaint by ECIS however, Microsoft is alleged to have illegally refused to disclose 

interoperability information across a broad range of products, including information related 

to its Office suite, a number of its server products, and also in relation to the so-called .NET 

Framework (EC, 2008). Due to that, the focus of the Commission was on all these areas, 

including the question whether Microsoft's new file format Office Open XML, as 

implemented in Office, is sufficiently interoperable with competitors' products (EC, 2008). In 

the tying of separate software products, the Court of First Instance confirmed the principles 

that must be respected by dominant companies (EC, 2008). In the complaint by Opera (a 

competing browser vendor), Microsoft allegedly engaged in illegal tying of its Internet 

Explorer product to its dominant Windows operating system. The complaint alleged that 

there is ongoing competitive harm from Microsoft's practices, in view of new proprietary 

technologies that Microsoft has allegedly introduced in its browser that would reduce 



 
 

23 
 

compatibility with open internet standards, and therefore hinder competition (EC, 2008). In 

addition, allegations of tying up other separate software products by Microsoft, including 

desktop search and Windows Live have been brought to the Commission's attention (EC, 

2008). Due to that, the focus of the Commission was on the allegations that a range of 

products have been unlawfully tied to sales of Microsoft's dominant operating system (EC, 

2008). 

 

In order for the Commission to open and proceed with the case, the Commission used Article 

11(6) of Council Regulation No 1/2003 and article 2(1) of Commission Regulation No 

773/2004 as the legal base of this procedural step (EC, 2008). Article 11(6) of Regulation No 

1/2003 provides that the initiation of proceedings relieves the competition authorities of the 

Member States of their authority to apply the competition rules laid down in Articles 81 and 

82 of the Treaty (EC, 2008). Article 16(1) provides that national courts must avoid giving 

decisions that conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in their initiated 

proceedings (EC, 2008). Article 2 of Regulation No 773/2004 provides that the Commission 

can initiate proceedings with a view to adopting at a later stage a decision on substance 

according to Articles 7-10 of Regulation No 1/2003 at any point in time, but at the latest 

when issuing a statement of objections or a preliminary assessment notice in a settlement 

procedure (EC, 2008). In this case however, the Commission chose to open proceedings 

before those further steps (EC, 2008). 

 

As a result, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Microsoft outlining the 

Commission's view that Microsoft's tying of its web browser Internet Explorer to its 

dominant client PC operating system Windows infringes Article 82 of the TFEU (EC, 2009). 

The Commission set out evidence and outlined its preliminary conclusion that Microsoft's 

tying of Internet Explorer to the Windows operating system harms competition between web 

browsers, undermines product innovation and ultimately reduces consumer choice (EC, 

2009). From the evidence gathered during the investigation the Commission concluded that 

the tying of Internet Explorer with Windows, making Internet Explorer available on 90% of 

the world's PCs, distorts competition on the merits between competing web browsers as it 

provides Internet Explorer with an artificial distribution advantage which other web browsers 

are unable to match (EC, 2009). The Commission’s concern was that the tying shields 

Internet Explorer from head-to-head competition with other browsers which is detrimental to 

the pace of product innovation and to the quality of products which consumers ultimately 

obtain (EC, 2009). The Commission also concerned that the ubiquity of Internet Explorer 

created artificial incentives for content providers and software developers to design websites 

or software primarily for Internet Explorer which undermines competition and innovation 

(EC, 2009). Microsoft had 8 weeks to reply to the Statement of Objection and had the right to 

be heard in oral hearings if they wished. If the preliminary views expressed in the SO are 

confirmed, the Commission might impose a fine on Microsoft, require Microsoft to cease the 

abuse and impose a remedy that would restore genuine consumer choice and enable 

competition on the merits (EC, 2009). 

 

The Commission noted Microsoft's plans for Windows 7, particularly the separation of 

Internet Explorer from Windows in the EEA. The Commission has suggested that consumers 

should be offered a choice of browser, not that Windows should be supplied without a 

browser at all (EC, 2009). In the Commission's Statement of Objections, the Commission 

suggested that consumers should be provided with a genuine choice of browsers since over 

95% of consumers acquire Windows pre-installed on a PC (EC, 2009). Which makes it 

particularly important for ensuring consumer choice through the computer manufacturer 



 
 

24 
 

channel (EC, 2009). Since the retail sales stood for less than 5% of the total sales, the 

Commission suggested that consumers should be provided with a choice of web browsers 

(EC, 2009). Microsoft on the other hand decided to supply retail consumers with a version of 

Windows without a web browser at all, which rather than giving more choice to the 

consumers, Microsoft chose to provide less (EC, 2009). The Commission concluded that 

Microsoft's proposal may potentially be positive for sales to computer manufacturers by 

noting that computer manufacturers would be able to choose to install Internet Explorer 

which Microsoft will supply free of charge (EC, 2009). In the fields where the Commission 

concluded that Microsoft's behavior has been abusive, the Commission had to consider if the 

proposal would be sufficient to create consumer choice on the web browser market (EC, 

2009). The Commission would, among other things, take into account the long-standing 

nature of Microsoft's conduct and whether the step of technical separation of Internet 

Explorer from Windows could be negated by other actions by Microsoft (EC, 2009). 

 

The Commission viewed the development of new online services makes web browsers an 

important tool for businesses and consumers, and that the lack of consumer choice on the 

market would undermine innovation (EC, 2009). The specific circumstances of Microsoft's 

tying of IE to Windows in this case would in the Commission’s view lead to significant 

consumer harm (EC, 2009). The Statement of Objection set that if the Commission concluded 

that Microsoft's conduct was abusive, any remedy needs to restore a level playing field as 

well as enabling consumer choice between Internet Explorer and third-party web browsers to 

bring the infringement to an end (EC, 2009). The Commission considered a remedy in the SO 

which would not require Microsoft to provide Windows to end-users without a browser and 

which would allow consumers to choose from different web browsers presented to them 

through a ballot screen in Windows (EC, 2009). 

 

As a response to the SO Microsoft offered several commitments to the Commission. 

Regarding the Browser Choice Microsoft offered (EC, 2009):  

 

● To make available a mechanism in Windows Client PC Operating Systems within the 

EEA that enables OEMs and end users to turn Internet Explorer off and on.  

● OEMs will be free to pre-install any web browser of their choice on PCs they ship and 

to set any browser as the default web browser. 

● Within Microsoft’s PC Productivity Applications distributed in the EEA, Microsoft 

shall not include any icons, links or short-cuts or provide any other means to start a 

download or installation of a Microsoft web browser. Microsoft shall not use 

Windows Update to offer any new version of a Microsoft web browser to users within 

the EEA unless Internet Explorer is turned on the user’s computer.   

● Microsoft shall not retaliate against any OEM for developing, using, distributing, 

promoting or supporting software that competes with Microsoft web browsers, in 

particular by altering Microsoft's commercial relations with that OEM, or by 

withholding Consideration.  

● Microsoft shall not enter into any agreement with an OEM that conditions the grant of 

any Consideration on the OEM’s refraining from developing, using, distributing, 

promoting or supporting any software that competes with Microsoft web browsers. 

● Microsoft shall not terminate a direct OEM license for Windows Client PC Operating 

Systems without having first given the OEM written notice of the reasons for the 

proposed termination and not less than thirty days' opportunity to cure.  

 

With regards to the Browser Ballot Screen, Microsoft offered (EC, 2009): 



 
 

25 
 

 

● To distribute a Ballot Screen software update to users within the EEA of Windows 

XP, Windows Vista and Windows Client PC Operating Systems, by means of 

Windows Update. 

● The Ballot Screen will give the users who have Internet Explorer set as their default 

web browser an opportunity to choose whether and which competing web browsers to 

install in addition to the ones they already have. 

● The Ballot Screen software update will be distributed and installable via Windows 

Update in a manner that is designed to bring about installation of this update at a rate 

that is as least as high as that for the most recent version of Internet Explorer offered 

via Windows Update.  

● That nothing in the design and implementation of the Ballot Screen and the 

presentation of competing web browsers will express a bias for a Microsoft web 

browser or any other web browser or discourage the user from downloading and 

installing additional web browsers via the Ballot Screen and making a web browser 

competing with a Microsoft web browser the default.   

● The Ballot Screen will be populated with the 12 most widely used web browsers that 

run on Windows based on usage share in the EEA as measured semi-annually by a 

source commonly agreed between Microsoft and the Commission.  

● The Ballot Screen will in a horizontal line and in an unbiased way display icons of 

and basic identifying information on the web browsers.  

● The Ballot Screen will prominently display the final releases of the five web browsers 

with the highest usage share in the EEA. 

● Microsoft would provide means for the contents of the Ballot Screen, to be updated 

monthly.     

● To ensure that all the Windows APIs on which Internet Explorer relies are disclosed 

in a complete, accurate and timely manner. 

 

The duration of the commitments was 5 years, and the Commission welcomed the proposals 

and would further investigate its practical effectiveness of ensuring consumer choice (EC, 

2009). The Commission believed that the offered commitments had the potential to give 

European consumers real choice over how they access and use the internet.  

 

4.2.2 Secondary Hearings & Decision  
 

The Commission also invited comments on the commitments from consumers, software 

companies, computer manufacturers and on an improved proposal by Microsoft to give 

present and future users of the Windows PC operating system a greater choice of web 

browsers (EC, 2009).  

 

Following the comments of the Commission, the Commission conducted a market test to 

decide to adopt a decision which would make the commitments legally binding on Microsoft. 

Following the market test, the Commission came to the conclusion that there are no grounds 

for action and that the proceedings should be brought to an end (EC, 2009). The Advisory 

Committee agreed with the Commission that the commitments offered by Microsoft are 

suitable, necessary and proportionate to meet the Commission’s concerns (EC, 2009). Under 

the commitments approved by the Commission, Microsoft would make available for five 

years in the EEA a Choice Screen enabling users of Windows XP, Windows Vista and 

Windows 7 to choose their own web browsers in addition to, or instead of, Microsoft's 

browser Internet Explorer. The commitments also provided that computer manufacturers 



 
 

26 
 

would be able to install competing web browsers, set those as default and turn off Internet 

Explorer (EC, 2009).  

 

PC users would get to choose between Internet Explorer and competing web browsers, 

ensuring competition on the merits and allowing consumers to benefit from technical 

developments and innovation (EC, 2009). The commitments allow the Commission to review 

the commitments for a period of two years. Microsoft would also report to the Commission 

on the implementation of the commitments and under certain conditions make adjustments to 

the Choice Screen upon the request of the Commission (EC, 2009). 

 

The Commission reopened its proceedings against Microsoft to investigate if Microsoft failed 

to comply with the commitments they offered to the Commission, offering users a choice 

screen enabling them to easily choose their preferred web browser (EC, 2012). The 

commission received information that Microsoft failed to roll out the choice screen with 

Windows 7 Service Pack 1. Microsoft indicated in its annual compliance report to the 

Commission that it was in compliance with its commitments. Millions of Windows users in 

the EU have not seen the choice screen (EC, 2012).  

 

A Statement of Objections was sent by the Commission to Microsoft on non-compliance with 

browser choice commitments, after the Commission's view that Microsoft failed to comply 

with its commitments to offer users a choice screen enabling them to easily choose their 

preferred web browser (EC, 2012). The Advisory Committee agreed with the assessment of 

the Commission that Microsoft failed to comply with their commitments to the Commission 

(EC, 2012). The Advisory Committee also agreed with the fine the Commission intended to 

impose on Microsoft.  

  

The Commission concluded that 15 million users were affected by Microsoft’s failure to 

comply with section 2 of the commitments during the 14 months of the failure of Microsoft 

(EC, 2013). To ensure that the fine has its intended effect, the commission took the size and 

resources of Microsoft into account (EC, 2013). This was done by taking into account that 

Microsoft’s turnover in the fiscal year from July 2011 to June 2012 and that the turnover for 

the last full business year was €55, 088 million (EC, 2013). The Commission set the level of 

the fine at €561 000 000 for failing to comply with the commitments to offer users a browser 

choice screen enabling them to easily choose their preferred web browser (EC, 2013). The 

sum of the fine corresponded to 1,02% of Microsoft’s turnover in the fiscal year between July 

2011 to June 2012 (EC, 2013). 

 

In 2009, the Commission had made these commitments legally binding on Microsoft until 

2014. The Commission found that Microsoft failed to roll out the browser choice screen with 

its Windows 7 Service Pack 1 from May 2011 until July 2012. 15 million Windows users in 

the EU therefore did not see the choice screen during this period. Microsoft acknowledged 

that the choice screen was not displayed during that time (EC, 2013). 

 

In December 2009, the Commission had made legal binding on Microsoft commitments 

offered by Microsoft to address competition concerns related to the tying of their web 

browser, Internet Explorer, to its dominant client PC operating system Windows. 

Specifically, Microsoft committed to make available for five years in the EEA a choice 

screen that enables users of the Windows operating system to choose in an informed and 

unbiased manner which web browser they wanted to install in addition to, or instead of, 

Microsoft's web browser (EC, 2013). The choice screen was provided as of 2010 to European 



 
 

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Windows users who have Internet Explorer set as their default web browser. While it was 

implemented, the choice screen was very successful with users, where 84 million browsers 

were downloaded through it (EC, 2013). Back then, it was the first time that the Commission 

fined a company for non-compliance with a commitment’s decision (EC, 2013). In the 

calculation of the fine the Commission took into account the gravity and duration of the 

infringement, the need to ensure a deterrent effect of the fine and, as a mitigating 

circumstance, the fact that Microsoft has cooperated with the Commission and provided 

information which helped the Commission to investigate the matter efficiently (EC, 2013). 

 

4.3 Google Search Shopping Case (AT. 39740) 

4.3.1 Preliminary Hearings  

In this case the Commission received 17 formal complaints by several search service 

providers about being unfavorably treated of their services in Google's unpaid and sponsored 

search results coupled with a preferential placement of Google's own services (EC, 2010). 

This was allegedly done by lowering the ranking of unpaid search results of competing 

services which are specialized in providing users with specific online content such as price 

comparisons and by preferential placement to the results of its own vertical search services in 

order to shut out competing services (EC, 2010). Google was also accused of lowering the 

Quality Score for sponsored links of competing vertical search services. The Quality Score is 

one of the factors that determine the price paid to Google by advertisers (EC, 2010). Google 

was also alleged to have imposed exclusivity obligations on advertising partners, preventing 

them from placing certain types of competing ads on their web sites, as well as on computer 

and software vendors, with the aim of shutting out competing search tools (EC, 2010). 

Google was also accused of putting restrictions on the portability of online advertising 

campaign data to competing online advertising platforms (EC, 2010). 

The Commission concluded by the allegations that Google may have violated Article 101 

and/or Articles 102 of the TFEU by abusing their dominant position (EC, 2010). Due to the 

favorable treatment, within Google's web search results, of links to Google's own specialized 

web search services as compared to links to competing specialized web search services. The 

use by Google without consent of original content from third party web sites in its own 

specialized web search services. The agreements that oblige third party websites (publishers) 

to obtain all or most of their online search advertisements from Google. And finally, the 

contractual restrictions on the transferability of online search advertising campaigns to rival 

search advertising platforms and the management of such campaigns across Google's 

Adwords and rival search advertising platforms. This made the Commission committed to 

open an antitrust investigation against Google into the allegations made in the complaints.  

Google's internet search engine provides two types of results when people are searching for 

information. These are unpaid search results, which are sometimes also referred to as 

"natural", "organic" or "algorithmic" search results, and third party advertisements shown at 

the top and at the right hand side of Google's search results page, the so called paid search 

results or sponsored links (EC, 2010). The Commission feared that the alleged practices 

could harm consumers by reducing their choice and stifling innovation in the fields of 

specialized search services and online search advertising (EC, 2013).  



 
 

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As a result, the Commission seeked feedback on commitments offered by Google to address 

competition concerns. This is done in order to explore the possibility of a settled outcome 

with Google on its four competition concerns (EC, 2013). The Commission invited 

comments from interested parties on commitments offered by Google in relation to online 

search and search advertising. Following the Commission’s concerns regarding the alleged 

actions of Google in the markets for web search, online search advertising and online search 

advertising intermediation in the EEA. Google made proposals to try to address the concerns 

of the Commission (EC, 2013). In this step the interested parties have the option to submit 

their comments on the offered commitments from a company within one month. Which the 

Commission takes into account later in the analysis of Google's commitment proposals. If the 

Commission concludes that the offered commitments address the four competition concerns, 

the Commission may decide to make them legally binding on Google (EC, 2013). The 

possibility for a company subject to an antitrust investigation to propose commitments which 

the Commission can decide to make legally binding was established in 2004 by Article 9 of 

the EU Antitrust Regulation (Regulation 1/2003). Since this possibility was established, the 

Commission has taken 30 decisions making such commitments legally binding on companies 

(EC, 2013). The Commission argues that using this possibility may be particularly useful to 

swiftly restore competitive conditions on a market. Such markets may for example include 

fast-moving markets in the IT sector (EC, 2013).  

As a response to the concerns of the Commission, Google offered a number of commitments 

to address the four competition concerns. Those proposed commitments are (EC, 2013): 

1. To label promoted links to its own specialized search services so that users can 

distinguish them from natural web search results. 

To clearly separate the promoted links from other web search results by clear 

graphical features. 

To display links to three rival specialized search services, close to its own services, in 

a place that is clearly visible to users.  

2. To offer all websites the option to opt-out from the use of all their content in Google's 

specialized search services, while ensuring that any opt-out does not unduly affect the 

ranking of those web sites in Google's general web search results.  

To offer all specialized search websites that focus on product search or local search 

the option to mark certain categories of information in such a way that such 

information is not indexed or used by Google. 

To provide newspaper publishers with a mechanism allowing them to control on a 

web page per web page basis the display of their content in Google News. 

3. To no longer include in its agreements with publishers any written or unwritten 

obligations that would require them to source online search advertisements 

exclusively from Google. 

4. To no longer impose obligations that would prevent advertisers from managing search 

advertising campaigns across competing advertising platforms. 



 
 

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The offered proposals would be valid for a period of 5 years and covered the EEA. The 

implementation of the proposed commitments would also be monitored by an independent 

Monitoring Trustee from the Commission. 

 

4.3.2 Secondary Hearings & Decision 

After submitting the commitments, they will be subject to a market test of one month. 

Complainants, third parties and members of the public are therefore able to comment on the 

commitments, and the extent to which they address the Commission's four concerns (EC, 

2013). The Commission studies the feedback and takes into account in their analysis whether 

the proposed commitments address the competition concerns. The Commission also assesses 

whether the commitments may need to be improved to adequately address the four 

competition concerns that have been identified. If the Commission concludes that their 

concerns are not addressed by the proposed commitments by the company, the Commission 

would then continue its investigation through the normal antitrust procedure (EC, 2013). If 

the commitments form a satisfactory solution to the competition concerns of the Commission 

following the market test, the Commission may make them legally binding on Google by way 

of a Commitments Decision, the one called Article 9 procedure (EC, 2013). Such a decision 

does not conclude that there is an infringement of EU antitrust rules but would legally bind 

Google to respect the commitments offered (EC, 2013). If the concerned company breaks 

their proposed commitments, the Commission has the power to impose a fine of up to 10% of 

the company’s annual worldwide turnover. 

The Commission has the right to reject the offered proposals three times. If the proposals 

were again unsatisfactory, the company and the Commission are obliged to go in another 

direction. In this case Google's previous proposals were rejected twice (EC, 2014). The 

negotiations thereafter focused on how Google would ensure that rival specialized search 

services can fairly compete with Google's services. The Commission’s concern was the 

favorable treatment of Google's own services on its page. The competitors' results which are 

potentially as relevant to the user as Google's own services could be significantly less visible 

or not directly visible, leading to an undue diversion of internet traffic (EC, 2014). The three 

main issues have been that, firstly the importance of the choice of visual formats in attracting 

user clicks, it is essential that the presentation of rival links is comparable to that of the 

Google services. Secondly the speed with which Google develops its services, that 

comparability of presentation of rival links has to be ensured dynamically over time. Which 

means that if Google improves the presentation of its services, it must do the same with the 

links of the rivals (EC, 2014). Lastly, in a fast moving market, any commitments must retain 

their relevance throughout their lifetime. This means that any new vertical search services 

developed by Google must also be subject to the commitments (EC, 2014). 

 

Google agreed to guarantee that whenever it promotes its own specialized search services on 

its web page, the services of three rivals, selected through an objective method, will also be 

displayed in a way that is clearly visible to users and comparable to the way in which Google 

displays its own services (EC, 2014). That principle would not only apply for existing 

specialized search services, but also to changes in the presentation of those services and 

future services. The Commission would in the coming period inform the complainants in this 

case of the reasons why it believes Google's offer is capable of addressing the Commission's 

concerns. The complainants would then have the opportunity to make their views known to 

the Commission before the Commission takes a final decision on whether to make Google's 

commitments legally binding on Google (EC, 2014). After analyzing the last proposals from 



 
 

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Google, intense negotiations further improved Google’s commitments which enabled the 

Commission to assess that the new proposals are capable of addressing the competition 

concerns. Those revised commitments enabled the Commission to move forward towards a 

decision based on the commitments (EC, 2014).   

 

As a result, the Commission sent Google a Statement of Objections under EU antitrust rules 

alleging systematic favoring its own comparison shopping service. The Commission's 

preliminary view was that Google abused their dominant position in breach of EU antitrust 

rules by systematically favoring its own comparison shopping product in its general search 

results pages in the EEA (EC, 2015). The Commission was concerned that users do not see 

the most relevant results in response to queries to the detriment of consumers and rival 

comparison shopping services, as well as stifling innovation (EC, 2015). Since 2002, Google 

has also been active in providing comparison shopping services, which allow consumers to 

search for products on online shopping websites and compare prices between different 

vendors. The first product it offered, Froogle, was replaced by Google Product Search, which 

in turn was replaced by its current product Google Shopping (EC, 2015). The Statement of 

Objections outlined that the market for general search and comparison shopping are two 

separate markets. In the latter market, Google faced competition from a number of alternative 

providers (EC, 2015). 

 

The Statement of Objections alleged that Google treats and has treated more favorably, in its 

general search results pages, Google's own comparison shopping service Google Shopping 

and its predecessor service Google Product Search compared to rival comparison shopping 

services (EC, 2015). The Commission concluded that (EC, 2015):  

 

● Google systematically positions and prominently displays its comparison shopping 

service in its general search results pages, irrespective of its merits. 

 

● Google did not apply to its own comparison shopping service the system of penalties, 

which it applies to other comparison shopping services on the basis of defined 

parameters, and which can lead to the lowering of the rank in which they appear in 

Google's general search results pages. 

 

● Froogle, Google's first comparison shopping service, did not benefit from any 

favorable treatment, and performed poorly. 

 

● As a result of Google's systematic favoring of its subsequent comparison shopping 

services Google Product Search and Google Shopping, experienced higher rates of 

growth, to the detriment of rival comparison shopping services. 

 

● Google's conduct has a negative impact on consumers and innovation.  

 

The Statement of Objections took the preliminary view that in order to remedy the conduct, 

Google should treat its own comparison shopping service and those of rivals in the same way. 

This would not interfere with either the algorithms Google applies or how it designs its 

search results pages. It would, however, mean that when Google shows comparison shopping 

services in response to a user's query, the most relevant service or services would be selected 

to appear in Google's search results pages (EC, 2015). 

 



 
 

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A second Statement of Objection was sent due to the Commission’s view that Google abused 

its dominant position by artificially restricting the possibility of third party websites to 

display search advertisements from Google's competitors (EC, 2016). The supplementary 

Statement of Objections outlined a broad range of additional evidence and data that 

reinforces the Commission's preliminary conclusion that Google has abused its dominant 

position by systematically favoring its own comparison shopping service in its general search 

results (EC, 2016). The additional evidence was related to the way Google favored its own 

comparison shopping service over those of competitors. In addition, the Commission 

examined Google's argument that comparison shopping services should not be considered in 

isolation, but together with the services provided by merchant platforms, such as Amazon and 

eBay (EC, 2016). The supplementary Statement of Objections found that even if merchant 

platforms are included in the market affected by Google's practices, comparison shopping 

services was a significant part of that market and that Google's conduct has weakened or even 

marginalized competition from its closest rivals (EC, 2016). 

 

Google's flagship product is the Google search engine, which provides search results to 

consumers, who pay for the service with their data. Almost 90% of Google's revenues stem 

from adverts, such as those it shows consumers in response to a search query (EC, 2017). In 

2004 Google entered the separate market of comparison shopping in Europe, with a product 

that was initially called Froogle, and then re-named Google Product Search in 2008 and since 

2013 has been called Google Shopping. It allows consumers to compare products and prices 

online and find deals from online retailers of all types, including online shops of 

manufacturers, platforms, and other resellers (EC, 2017). When Google entered comparison 

shopping markets with Froogle, there were already a number of established players. Google, 

however, was aware that Froogle's market performance was relatively poor (EC, 2017).  

 

Comparison shopping services rely to a large extent on traffic to be competitive. More traffic 

leads to more clicks and generates revenue. Furthermore, more traffic also attracts more 

retailers that want to list their products with a comparison shopping service. Given Google's 

dominance in general internet search, its search engine is an important source of traffic for 

comparison shopping services (EC, 2017).  

 

In 2008, Google began to implement a strategy change in European markets to push its 

comparison shopping service. The strategy relied on Google's dominance in general internet 

search, instead of competition on the merits in comparison shopping markets. Resulting in 

Google's comparison shopping service becoming more visible to consumers in Google's 

search results, whilst rival comparison shopping services are less visible (EC, 2017). 

Evidence shows that consumers click far more often on results that are more visible. Even on 

a desktop, the ten highest-ranking generic search results on page 1 together generally receive 

approximately 95% of all clicks on generic search results. The first result on page 2 of 

Google's generic search results receives only about 1% of all clicks (EC, 2017). This cannot 

just be explained by the fact that the first result is more relevant, because evidence